1/10/15: Russia Manufacturing PMIs: Some Easing in Contraction

Russia’s manufacturing PMI released by Markit showed slower rate of decline in the sector activity in September, rising to 49.1 from 47.9 in August. This is the highest reading in the series since February 2015, but marks 10th consecutive month of sub-50 readings.

Per Markit: both output and new orders posted “negligible growth” in September. More importantly:

• “…excess capacity remained prevalent, leading to further job cuts, while price pressures continued to intensify due to a lower value of the rouble against other major international currencies.”
• “Contributing to the rise in the PMI in September were improved trends in output and new orders, following a period of contraction. In particular, the intermediate goods sector performed well, recording rises in both output and new work. There were reports from the survey panel that domestic demand had firmed over the month and was a key support to production and order books.”
• Key driver to the upside, therefore, was imports substitution. 
• “International demand, in contrast, continued to deteriorate, as highlighted by a fall in new export orders for a twenty-fifth successive month. The rate of contraction was again solid, but nonetheless the slowest since June.”

Overall, Manufacturing PMI signal, in my view, is not yet consistent with expected stabilisation of the economy. Remember, I recently noted that previous hopes for economic recession bottoming out in 2Q 2015 have been squashed by the data, with new consensus outlook for stabilisation in 3Q. Based on the data to-date, this stabilisation did not take place. We are now looking at another quarter of below zero growth and most likely will see sub-zero GDP growth through 4Q 2015 as well.

Chart to illustrate manufacturing sector activity trends:

Note: I covered China Manufacturing, Services & Composite PMIs for September in an earlier note here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/11015-china-pmis-signalling-deeper.html. Overall, Russian Manufacturing PMI (and the exports component of the index especially) are broadly in line with Chinese data so far.

1/10/15: China PMIs: Signalling Deeper Problems Ahead

Latest Manufacturing and Services PMI data for China posted a strong signal of continued deterioration in the economy.

Manufacturing PMI came in at the lowest levels since March 2009, posting 47.2 in September, compared to 47.3 in August, and marking 7th consecutive month of sub-50 readings. Over the last 12 months, Manufacturing PMI reached above 50.0 in just two months, hit exactly 50.0 in one (marking zero growth in the sector) and was below 50 (marking contraction of activity) in the rest. Last time Manufacturing PMI was statistically above 50.0 was in July 2014 and last time it happened before then was in October-November 2013. In other words, there has not been statistically significant growth singled by Manufacturing PMIs for some two years now.

Per Markit release, things were even worse than the headline Manufacturing index suggested:

• “Total new work fell at the quickest rate in over three years, partly driven by a steeper fall in new export business. 
• “As a result, companies cut output at the sharpest rate in six-and-a-half years, while staff numbers fell at the quickest pace since the start of 2009. 
• “The health of the sector has now deteriorated in each of the past seven months. Furthermore, the latest deterioration was the most marked since March 2009.”

On Services side, Markit’s Services PMI for September came in at 50.5, the lowest reading since July 2014. Services PMI for China has never posted a sub-50 reading in the series history, so there is little we can tell about actual levels of activity in the sector based on this data. Still, 50.5 reading is so bad, it ranks as the second lowest reading in the history of the series.

Which brings us to the Composite PMI. China’s Composite PMI posted another sub-50 reading, falling from August 48.8 to September 48.0. This implies the fastest rate of contraction across the economy since January 2009.

Per Markit:

• “Employment trends continued to diverge across the manufacturing and services sectors in September. Manufacturers cut their workforce numbers at a solid pace that was similar to that seen in the prior month, while service providers continued to increase their payroll numbers. However, the rate of job creation was only slight, despite improving upon August’s fractional pace. Consequently, employment at the composite level declined for the fourth successive month.
• “Manufacturing companies signalled a further increase in outstanding workloads in September, which was often linked to reduced productive capacity. Meanwhile, softer growth in new work enabled service sector firms to work through their unfinished business in September and at the fastest rate in ten months. Overall, backlogs of work declined again at the composite level, albeit at a marginal rate.”

In simple terms, whatever growth was squeezed out of both sectors, that growth came from depleting outstanding orders, rather than signing new business.

Two charts to highlight these trends:

28/9/15: Blow Outs in the Markets: Beware of Debt Financing

 This is an unedited version of my article in the Village Magazine from June 2015.

Three recent events, distinct as they may appear, point to a singular shared risk faced by the Irish economy, a risk that is only being addressed in our policy papers and in the mainstream media.

Firstly, over the course of May, European financial markets have posted surprising rises in Government and corporate bond yields amidst falling liquidity, widening spreads and increased volatility.

Secondly, both the IMF and the Irish Government have recognised a simple fact: once interest rates revert back to their 'normal' path, things will get testing for the Irish economy.

And thirdly, the Irish Government has quietly admitted that the fabled arrears solutions to our household debt crisis are not working.

Deep below the lazy gaze of Irish analysts, these risks are connected to the very same source: the massive debt overhang that sits on the back of our struggling economy.

Stability? Not So Fast.

Take the first set of news. The problem of spiking yields and blowing up trading platforms in the European bond markets was so pronounced in May, that the ECB had to rush in with a bold promise to accelerate its quantitative easing purchases of Government paper to avoid an even bigger squeeze during the summer. All in, between January and the end of May, euro area government bond yields rose by some 6 basis points, cost of non-financial corporate borrowings rose by around 9 basis points, and banks' bond yields were up 1 basis point. All in the environment of declining interbank rates (3-month Euribor is down 10 basis points) and massive buying up of bonds by the ECB.

In one recent survey completed by the Euromoney before May bond markets meltdown almost 9 out of 10 institutional investors expressed deep concerns over evaporating market liquidity (higher costs of trading and longer duration of trades execution) in the sovereign bond markets. In another survey, completed in late 1Q 2015 by Bank of America-Merill Lynch, 61% of large fund managers said that European and U.S. stocks and bonds are currently overvalued - the largest proportion since the survey began back in 2003.

In the U.S., current consensus expectation is for the Federal Reserve to start hiking rates in 3Q 2015. In Europe, the same is expected around Q3 2016. And recently, both estimates have been moving closer and close to today, despite mixed macroeconomic data coming from the economies on the ground. If the process of policy rates normalisation coincides with continued liquidity problems in the bonds markets, we can witness both evaporation of demand for new government debt issues and a simultaneous increase in the cost of funding for banks, companies and the Governments alike.

Cost of Credit

Which brings us to the second point - the role of interest rates in this economy.

In recent Stability Programme Update (SPU) filled with the EU Commission, the Department of Finance provided a handy exercise, estimating the impact of 1% rise in the ECB key rate. The estimates - done by the ESRI - show that in 2017, a rise in ECB rate to 1 percentage point from current 0.05% will likely cost this economy 2.1% of our GDP in 2017, rising to 2.4% in 2018 and 2019. By 2020, the effect can amount to the losses of around 2.5% of GDP.

This increase would bring ECB rates to just over 1/3rd of the historical pre-crisis period average - hardly a major 'normalisation' of the rates. Which means that such a hike will be just a start in a rather protracted road that is likely to see rates rising closer to 3-3.5 percentage points.

But here is a kicker, the ESRI exercise does not account fully for the realities on the ground.

In addition to the ECB rate itself, several other factors matter when we consider the impact of the interest rates normalisation on the real economy. Take for example cost of funds in the interbank markets. Average 12 months Euribor - prime rate at which highest-rated euro area banks borrow from each other - averaged 3.29% for the period of 2003-2007. Today the rate sits at 0.18%. Which means rates normalisation will squeeze banks profits line. If euro area, on average, were to hike their loans in line with ECB increases, while maintaining current 12 months average lending margins, the rate charged on corporate year and over loans in excess of EUR1 million will jump from the current 2.17% to 3.37%.

It turns out that due to our dysfunctional banking system, Irish retail rates carry a heftier premium than the euro area average rates, as illustrated in Chart 1 below. Which, of course, simply amplifies the impact of any change in the ECB base rate on Ireland’s economy.

The reason for this is the pesky issue of Irish banks profitability - a matter that is distinct from the euro area average banking sector performance due to massive non-performing loans burden and legacy of losses carried by our banking institutions. Per latest IMF assessment published in late April, Irish banking system is the second worst performing in the euro area after the Greek when it comes to existent levels of non-performing loans. In today's terms, this means that the average lending margin charged by the banks in excess of ECB policy rate is 3.4% for house purchase loans, 5.63% for loans to Irish companies under EUR1 million with a fix of one year and over, and 4.0% for loans to same companies in excess of EUR1 million. Which means that a hike in the ECB rate to 1% will imply a rise in interest rates charged by the banks ranging from 0.84% for households loans, to 0.92% for smaller corporate loans and to 1.22% for corporate loans in excess of EUR1 million.

Chart 2 below highlights what we can expect in terms of rates movements in response to the ECB hiking its base rate from the current 0.05% to 1%.

No one - not the ESRI, nor the Central Bank, nor any other state body - knows what effect such increases can have on mortgages arrears, but is pretty safe to say that households and companies currently experiencing difficulties repaying their loans will see these problems magnified. Ditto for households and companies that are servicing their debts, but are on the margin of slipping into arrears.

While the ESRI-led analysis does enlighten us about the effects of higher rates on tax revenues and state deficits, it does little in providing any certainty as to what happens with consumer demand (linked to credit), property investment and development (both critically dependent on the cost of funding), as well as the impact of higher rates on enterprise formation and survivorship rates.

In addition, higher rates across the euro area are likely to imply higher value of the euro relative to our major trading partners' currencies. Which is not going to help our exporters. Multinational companies trading through Ireland are relatively immune to this effect, as most of their trade is priced internally and stronger euro can be offset by accounting and other means. But for SMEs exporting overseas, every percentage point increase in the value of the euro spells lower sales and lower profits.

Debt Overhang: It Matters

Across the euro area states, there are multiple pathways through which higher rates can drain growth momentum in the economy.

But in Ireland's case, these pathways are almost all invariably adversely impacted by the debt overhang carried by the households and the corporate sectors. Current total debt, registered in Irish financial institutions as being extended to Irish households and resident enterprises stands at just over EUR263.7 billion. And that is before we take into the account our Government debt, as illustrated in Chart 3.

A 1 percentage point increase in retail rates can see some EUR2.64 billion worth of corporate and household incomes going to finance existent loans - an amount that is well in excess of EUR2.28 billion increase in personal consumption recorded in 2014 compared to 2013, or 24% of the total increase in Ireland's GNP over the same period. Add to that added Government debt costs which will rise, over the years, to some EUR1.5 billion annually.

What is not considered in the analysis is that at the same time, rising cost of credit is likely to depress the value of the household's collateral, as property prices are linked to credit markets conditions. Which means that during the rising interest rates cycle, banks may be facing an added risk of lower recovery from home sales.

The effect of this would be negligible, if things were relatively normal in Irish mortgages markets. But they hardly are.

At the end of Q4 2014, total number of mortgages in arrears stood at 145,949 accounts, amounting to the total debt of EUR29.8 billion or 18% of total lending for house purchases. 94,929 accounts amounting to EUR14.94 billion of additional debt were restructured and are not in arrears. Roughly three quarters of the restructured mortgages involve 'solutions' that are likely resulting in higher debt over the life time of the restructured mortgage than before the restructuring was applied. We cannot tell with any degree of accuracy as to how sensitive these restructured mortgages are to interest rates changes, but arrears cases will be much harder to resolve in the period of rising rates than the cases so far worked out through the system.

When, Not If…

You'd guess that the ESRI and Department of Finance would do some homework on all of the above factors. But you would be wrong. There is no case-specific risks analysis relating to interest rates changes performed. Perhaps one of the reasons why majority of analysts have been dismissing the specific risks of interest rates increases is down to the lack of data and models for such detailed stress-testing.

Another reason is the false sense of security.

Take the U.S. case. The U.S. economy is now in an advanced stages of mature recovery, based on the most recent survey of economic forecasters by the BlackRock Investment Institute. But the underlying weaknesses in growth remain, prompting repeated revisions of analysts' expectations as to the timing of the Federal Reserve rates hikes. Still, the Fed is now clearly signaling upcoming rate hike.

The Fed is pursuing a much broader mandate than the ECB - a mandate that includes the target of full employment. The twin mandate is harder to meet than the ECB's singular objective of inflation targeting.

While the European inflation is low, it is not as low as one imagines. Stripping energy - helped by the low oil prices - inflation in the Euro area was estimated to be at 0.7% in April 2015. Combined, prices of gas, heating oil and fuels for transport shaved 0.66 percentage points off headline inflation figure. Although 0.7% is still a far cry from 'close to but below 2%' target, for every 10% increase in energy prices, HICP metric watched by the ECB will rise approximately 1.06 percentage points. So far, in April 2015, energy prices are down 5.8% y/y - the shallowest rate of decline in 5 months. Month on month prices rose 0.1 percentage points.

Sooner or later, interest rates will have to rise.  In the U.S., explicit Fed policy is that such increases will take place after the real economy recovers sufficiently to withstand such a shock. In the euro area, there is no such policy in place, in the aggregate, across the entire common currency area, and in the case of specific weak economies, such as Ireland, in particular.

24/9/15: Ireland's Remittances and Foreign Workforce

In a recent post, titled  "Ireland: a land of un-remarkable savers",  I covered EU Commission research on savings rates across different countries.

One interesting finding in the report relates to the issue net remittances or transfers from the country to foreign destinations net of inflows of funds from abroad into the country. These figures cover household remittances, so no direct effect of FDI and other investment flows in them.

Take a look at the following chart:

In absolute terms, Ireland leads the EU in terms of net remittances outflows abroad as percentage of the Gross National Income. Keep in mind - Cyprus was in an emergency funding situation from January 2012 on (when the country first received Russian emergency loans) and requested assistance from the EU in mid-2012, with actual bailout package agreed a year later. In other words, much of 2012 net outflows of household funds from Cyprus was probably down to relatively panicked situation in the country financial sector.

Ireland's net remittances outflows were running, in contrast, against more stabilised situation and inflows of funds from a number of emigrants who left during the crisis. Demographically, these can be divided into three categories:

• Returning migrants (who have little connection to Ireland and, thus, were more likely to take funds out of Ireland on their exit);
• Younger Irish workers (who would have left older family behind and whose earnings abroad would not have allowed for them to become net sender of funds into Ireland) and
• Middle-aged families, who often left properties behind with outstanding mortgages that required regular remittances into Ireland to fund.

The key for Ireland's position at the bottom of the European remittances table is, most likely, foreign workers in Ireland sending their surplus earnings/savings abroad for the lack of interest in investing in Irish assets (property and financial assets). If so, we have a problem: Ireland attracts large numbers of highly skilled younger workers who come here to work in MNCs-led sectors, such as ICT and ICT services, as well as Financial services. These workers, judging by remittances outflows, have little anchoring in the Irish economy.

As the result of remittances (counting only unrecorded remittances, and omitting the deeply negative official remittances), Irish savings rate falls from 14th in the EU to 17th in the EU:

24/9/15: The Ugly Faces of Trade Protectionism

Neat chart from Credit Suisse summarising the extent (and distribution) of new protectionist policies across several key economies:

Several points worth making:

• The obvious one: the U.S. leads in terms of protectionism. Which is ironic, given the U.S. championship of open trade agreements (TTIP and TPP being the most current ones) and the U.S. tendency to de-alienate the world into 'Free Trade' and 'Protectionist' groups of countries.
• BRIC come second and Europe comes third. Which is again highly ironic as BRIC rely heavily on trade-driven model for growth and Europe can't get over how (allegedly) free trade it is.
• Everywhere, save Russia and the U.S., state aid & bailouts is minor segment of trade protectionism policies.
• Export subsidies are meaningful in China and India.
• Trade defence and finance measures dominate in the U.S., India, Brazil and Europe, and are weaker in Japan and China, while virtually non-existent in Russia.

All-in - a pretty ugly picture of reality post-crisis.

23/9/15: China Flash PMI for Manufacturing: September

China flash Manufacturing PMI is at 47.0 for September - lowest level since March 2009 and 7th consecutive reading below 50. Over the last 12 months, the index has been below 50 in 9 months, at 50 for one month and has not been statistically above 50 since July 2014.

Index is now on a solid downward trend since January 2010 and looks set to be the second worst performing PMI in BRIC group (after Brazil) for the third month in a row.

22/9/15: Ireland: a land of un-remarkable savers

Remember the persistent whinging about 'high savings rates' in Ireland. And recall all the talk about how these savings are allegedly killing of domestic demand (because, of course, the 'recovery' has been supporting that demand, so if only the bad households stopped squirrelling away stashes of cash... then).

Ok, it always smelled like a rat, primarily because the alleged savings were not translating into household deposits. But, hey, the story rolled on for years...

So here is a neat EU Commission report on savings across the EU. And here is the top-line chart:

The chart above tells us two things about Irish savings:

1. Our savings rate was pretty darn low - fourteenth from the top in the EU - back in 2012.
2. Our savings rate was pretty darn low over 1995-2012 horizon - fourteenth from the top in the EU.

In fact, as the chart above illustrates, instead of jumping up in 2012 compared to 1995-2012 average, our rate stayed on average. Bang on it (we are on a red line).

Worse, adjusting for pensions, our savings rate is also remarkably poor - ranked 12th highest in the EU per following chart:

And our social services (pretty wide-ranging for some key demographics of dis-savers and very narrow for the demographic of savers) have little effect on our savings rate - net of social services, our saving rate ranks 15th (as opposed to 14th) from the top:

Of course, savings rates can be calculated differently across economies, so EU report distinguishes two sources of financial savings (savings used to purchase financial assets) and non-financial savings (savings used to purchase homes, gold etc). So may be, just may be the 'high rate of savings' was down to the latter (remember, Irish households were trying to repay their home mortgages as fast as possible)?

Nope, not that either. Per chart above, we rank 11th in the EU in terms of our financial savings rate and 19th in terms of non-financial savings.

So what on earth was that 'high savings' story about? A business lobby-invented scheme to get the state to 'nudge' savings out of the banks and into spending? A state-concocted dream to justify potential (and in some cases actual, e.g. pensions levy and property tax) introduction of taxes on assets? A glitch in data caused by mortgages close-offs due to sales to unregulated foreign entities and to writedowns on banks balancesheets? Precuationary savings that went to fund relocation of younger adults abroad? Or a compensation in the accounts by increased financial (cash) savings offsetting somewhat decline in the values of non-financial savings (house prices tanking)? Or all of the above?

One way or the other, Ireland is clearly not a nation of savers nor are we a nation of spenders. We are, remarkably unremarkably mid-of-the-road type...

22/9/15: Germany's IFO: "Refugees to Cost Ten Billion Euros"

Here is the full release from the Ifo Institute (emphasis in bold and comments in italics are mine):

"Ifo Institute Expects Refugees to Cost Ten Billion Euros

Munich, 22 September – If a total of 800,000 asylum-seekers do indeed come to Germany this year, as forecast by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, it would cost the state around ten billion euros. This figure does not take into consideration family members joining the refugees or any educational measures; and is therefore a conservative estimate.  [here is a useful, albeit dated, link on family reunification framework in Germany showing significant potential impact. More current data is covered here. In addition, while educational expenditures can be significant, part of the costs will be carried through apprenticeships and training schemes that are covered by employers and that involve productive work, contributing to value added in the German economy.]

The qualification structure of immigrants from the crisis-afflicted states of Syria, Iraq, Nigeria and Afghanistan is probably poor. According to data from the World Bank, the illiteracy rate even among the 14-24 year old age group is 4 percent, 18 percent, 34 percent and 53 percent in these countries respectively. Even in the most developed of these countries (Syria) only 6 percent of the population has a university degree, which is not equivalent to a German diploma in many cases. Although refugees tend to be male and younger than the demographic average age, one thing is still clear: they are poorly prepared for the German labour market. In addition to language courses, Germany will also need to invest in training, which will generate extra costs. [We do not know exact quality of education and skills attained by the refugees, but applying average population parameters in this case can be fraught with some problems. For example, refugees coming through trafficking channels are required to pay up-front fees that are substantial in size, relative to average incomes. This means that there can be a strong selection bias in terms of refugees who reach Europe, compared to the average population in the country of origin - biases that tend to select more educated / better skilled and more financially enabled migrants. If so, their literacy rates and educational attainment status can be well above averages. In addition, undergoing a refugee journey implies very significant hardship, that is most likely known (at least partially) prior to the journey start. This can imply that refugees arriving into Europe may have stronger aptitude to succeed in integrating into new host society than those who remain behind. These biases are relatively well known in the literature on migrants flows in large scale migrations in the past.]
 
Many refugees will remain in Germany in the long-term and bring their relatives into the country. Migratory pressure from North Africa and the Middle East will remain high purely due to the demographical situation in these countries.  [This is correct, and the pressures are rising, not abating. The problem here is signalling: by openly accepting 800,000 refugees, German leaders have sent a very loud signal to the potential future refugees. Reality, however, is that such a signal will probably have only a marginal effect on refugees flows over time, since the main drivers (first order factors) pushing larger quantities of refugees into Europe - demographics, political and geopolitical instability, institutional deterioration, regional wars and conflicts, as well as issues such as climate change - remain acute.]

To avoid the refugee crisis becoming a long-term financial burden for German taxpayers, refugees have to get paid employment as fast as possible, so that they can meet their own living costs. There are fears, however, that many of them will not be able to find a job with a minimum wage of 8.50 euros in place because their productivity is just too low. It would be therefore be a good idea to lower the minimum wage across the board to prevent unemployment from rising.  [This is a matter for a separate analysis. While refugees initial productivity is likely to be lower, training and apprenticeship schemes should provide fast uplift in productivity for those who are well-enabled for such training. The key to limiting the cost of integrating refugees hinges crucially on several dimensions of German policy, namely: access to training, incentives to undertake training, quality of matching individuals to training opportunities, etc. Other considerations (for example pre-acceptance assessment of attitudes and aptitudes to integration) can help, but at this stage are not feasible except on a margin (for example prioritising processing of refugees who pass pre-acceptance assessments). Minimum wage coverage should not apply to apprenticeships and training schemes in general, in my view, and instead these activities should be covered by a separate minimum wage set below the normal employment-related minimum wage.]

Raising Hartz IV standard rates in the present situation is a very bad idea, as this would reduce incentives for refugees to look for work and generate an additional fiscal burden.
 
Model simulations by the Ifo Institute show that even in the case of a suspension of minimum wage legislation and Hartz IV rates remaining stable, the supposed immediate integration of immigrants into the German labour market does not stand to benefit the German economy. Although there are some labour market advantages, they are outweighed by higher unemployment rates and net transfers to immigrants.
 
Article: “Immigration: What Does the Domestic Population Stand to Gain?”  in: ifo Schnelldienst 18/ 2015; p. 3-12; a preview of the article is available at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/sd-2015-18-battisti-etal-einwanderung.pdf "

Overall, a bold and interesting statement from Ifo (who are known for being bold), and a topic worth discussing.

22/9/15: Why Reform Irish Cider Excise System?

My paper for the Cider Ireland submission to Budget 2016 is available as text here.

20/9/15: Euromoney: "Cyprus almost as safe as Portugal"

"The Cyprus risk score has steadily improved this year in Euromoney’s crowdsourcing survey, rebounding in Q2, and is seemingly on course for further improvement in Q3 as economists and other risk experts make their latest quarterly assessments. Chalking up almost 53.1 points from a maximum 100 allotted, Cyprus has managed to climb one place in the rankings to 56th out of 186 countries surveyed, leapfrogging India and closing in on Portugal into a more comfortable tier-three position:"

Read more here.

Here are my notes on the topic (to accompany the quote in the article):

In my view, Cypriot economy recovery after 3 years of deep recession and banking sector devastation is still vulnerable to growth reversals and deeply unbalanced in terms of sources for growth. Firstly, the rate of growth is hardly consistent with the momentum required to deliver a meaningful recovery. Cypriot GDP rose 0.2% y/y in 1Q 2015 and 1.2% y/y in 2Q 2015. This comes on foot of 14 consecutive quarters of GDP decline. Quarterly growth rate in 2Q came below flash estimate and expectations.

Positive growth was broadly based, but key investment-focused sector of construction posted negative growth. Deflationary pressures remained in the Cypriot economy with HICP posting -1.9% in August y/y on top of -2.4% in July. Over January-August 2015, HICP stood at -1.6% y/y.

Despite some fragile optimism, the Cypriot Government has been slow to introduce meaningful structural reforms outside the financial sector. The economy remains one of the least competitive (institutionally-speaking) in the euro area, ranked 64th in the World Bank Doing Business 2015 report - a worsening of its position of 62nd in 2014 survey. This compares poorly to the already severely under-performing Greece ranked in 61st place.

Thus, in my view, any significant improvements in the country scores relate to the policy-level post-crisis normalisation, rather than to a measurable improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals.

19/9/15: IBM's Global Location Trends Report

Recently released "Global Location Trends: 2015 Annual Report" by IBM should be a pleasant read for Irish policymakers. The report "outlines the latest trends in corporate location selection — where companies are locating and expanding their businesses and creating jobs around the world."

And Ireland features positively and prominently, albeit with a caveat (below).

Take, for example, jobs creation by FDI-backed firms: per report, "Ireland and Singapore remain the strongest per-capita performers among the more mature (and, therefore, higher-cost) economies"

Notice that Ireland's rank has slipped slightly in 2014 compared to 2013.

Another category where we perform really strongly is average job value:

Per report: "For the fourth year in a row, Ireland is the top ranking country in the world on this measure. It continues to attract investment projects in industries characterized by high knowledge intensity and economic value added, such as life sciences and information and communication technology (ICT). The global top 10 ranking consists primarily of mature economies with a mix of investments similar to Ireland’s".

These are pretty impressive numbers, except for one major caveat: none of the report data was adjusted for corporate inversions. So when a U.S. company moves offshore to, say, Ireland (as many did and continue to do), via a tax-optimising inversion, the results appear to be an addition to Ireland's stock of FDI and Ireland's jobs creation, whilst in reality, both are superficial at best, and beggar-thy-neighbour at worst.

Perhaps surprisingly, despite being the main focal point of FDI inflows in the Republic, Dublin did not fare too well in the urban rankings, coming in at joint 12th position in 2014 ranking, down 5 places from the 7th rank in 2013.

Overall, the positive tone of the report is more than warranted in Ireland's case.

Nonetheless, the problem of aggressive tax optimisation and sharp practices by a number of MNCs invested in Ireland should be reflected and discussed in the global rankings.

This is especially important, given the report claims to reflect quality of FDI and jobs created. Ireland attracts massive inflows of tax optimising FDI in the areas of ICT services, pharma, biotech and medical devices, with aggressive on-shoring of Intellectual Property, and dire lack of actual research jobs being created. Instead of actual research, jobs in sales and back office activities, as well as residual (lower value) research are being registered as being registered as 'Professional' or 'Scientific' and the value added by these jobs creation is often, de facto, fully reflective of tax optimisation schemes.

The report authors might want to consult some facts listed here.

19/9/15: Irish Construction PMIs: August 2015

Irish Construction Sector PMIs for August showed moderate de-acceleration in sector growth.

Per Markit:

On a 3mo average basis:

• Overall Construction Sector PMI stood at 60.4 in 3mo through August 2015, up on 57.8 for the 3mo average through May 2015, but down on same period a year ago (61.3).
• Housing Activity sub-index posted deterioration m/m. However, on a 3mo basis the index through August 2015 (58.7) was up on the 3mo average through May 2015 (56.5), but down on 3mo average through August 2014 (63.5).
• Commercial Activity sub-index posted deterioration m/m. On a 3mo basis the index through August 2015 (61.3) was up on the 3mo average through May 2015 (59.4), but down on 3mo average through August 2014 (62.4).
• Civil Engineering activity sub-index posted deterioration m/m and a reading sub-50.0 for the second consecutive month. On a 3mo average basis, 3mo average through August 2015 was at 50.1, identical to the 3mo average through May 2015 and up on 47.6 average through August 2014.

Thus, all sub-indices have deteriorated on a m/m basis, and all, with exception of Civil Engineering, posted deterioration y/y on 3mo average basis.

As shown in the chart below, two key sub-indices of construction sector activity remain above 50 mark, but a sharp deterioration in overall growth momentum for the second month in a row. Both sub-series are signalling potential reversal in the positive momentum trend from September-November 2014 on.

In Civil Engineering, a brief recovery momentum signalled in Q4 2014 has now been erased: