Showing posts with label structural recession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label structural recession. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

24/6/2014: US Productivity Slowdown: It's Structural & Nasty


"Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession" a new paper by John Fernald (NBER Working Paper No. 20248, June 2014) looks at the U.S. labor and total-factor productivity growth slowdown prior to the Great Recession in the context of the slowdown "located in industries that produce information technology (IT) or that use IT intensively, consistent with a return to normal productivity growth after nearly a decade of exceptional IT-fueled gains". In a sense, the paper reinforces the point of view that I postulated in my TEDx talk last year dealing with the 'end' of the Age of Tech (here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/14112013-human-capital-age-of-change.html).

Fernald opens the paper with a set of two quotes. One brilliantly describes the core question we face:
"When we look back at the 1990s, from the perspective of say 2010,…[w]e may conceivably conclude…that, at the turn of the millennium, the American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation….Alternatively, that 2010 retrospective might well conclude that a good deal of what we are currently experiencing was just one of the many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human history." Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2000)

Fernald argues that "The past two decades have seen the rise and fall of exceptional U.S. productivity growth. This paper argues that labor and total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth slowed prior to the Great Recession. It marked a retreat from the exceptional, but temporary, information-technology (IT)-fueled pace from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This retreat implies slower output growth going forward as well as a narrower output gap than recently estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2014a)."

Figure 1 from the paper illustrates how the mid-1990s surge in productivity growth indeed ended prior to the Great Recession. The rise in labor-productivity growth, shown by the height of the bars, came after several decades of slower growth. But, notes Fernald, "in the decade ending in 2013:Q4, growth has returned close to its 1973-95 pace. The figure shows that the slower pace of growth in both labor productivity and TFP was similar in the four years prior to the onset of the Great Recession as in the six years since."



And things have been bad since. Labour productivity growth (slope of liner trend below) is now on par with what we have been witnessing in 1973-1995, and shallower than in 1995-2003. But the trend is still close to actual performance, which signals little potential for any appreciable acceleration:


Beyond labour productivity, things are even messier. Charts below plot the Great Recession against other recessions in terms of productivity, output and labour utilisation:







Notes: For each plot, quarter 0 is the NBER business-cycle peak which, for the Great Recession,
corresponds to 2007:Q4. The shaded regions show the range of previous recessions since 1953. Local
means are removed from all growth rates prior to cumulating, using a biweight kernel with bandwidth of 48 quarters. Source is Fernald (2014).

All of the above show the cyclical disaster that is the current Great Recession, but crucially, they show poor recent performance in Labour Productivity, exceptionally poor performance in Hours of Labour used, disastrous performance in Total Factor Productivity… in other words - historically problematic trends relating to productivity, labour utilisation and tech-related productivity in the current recession compared to all previous recessions.

But more worrying is that, as Fernald notes: "That the slowdown predated the Great Recession rules out causal stories from the recession itself. …The evidence here complements Kahn and Rich’s (2013) finding in a regime-switching model that, by early 2005—i.e., well before the Great Recession—the probability reached nearly unity that the economy was in a low-growth regime."

So what's behind all of this slowing productivity growth? "A natural hypothesis is that the slowdown was the flip side of the mid-1990s speedup. Considerable evidence… links the TFP speedup to the exceptional contribution of IT—computers, communications equipment, software, and the Internet. IT has had a broad-based and pervasive effect through its role as a general purpose technology (GPT) that fosters complementary innovations, such as business reorganization. Industry TFP data provide evidence in favor of the IT hypothesis versus alternatives. Notably, the euphoric, “bubble” sectors of housing, finance, and natural resources do not explain the slowdown. Rather, the slowdown is in the remaining ¾ of the economy, and is concentrated in industries that produce IT or that use IT intensively. IT users saw a sizeable bulge in TFP growth in the early 2000s, even as IT spending itself slowed. That pattern is consistent with the view that benefiting from IT takes substantial intangible organizational investments that, with a lag, raise measured productivity. By the mid-2000s, the low-hanging fruit of IT had been plucked."

This a hugely far-reaching paper with two related implied conclusions:

  1. Prepare for structurally slower growth period in the US (and global) economy as the last catalyst for growth - tech - appears to have been exhausted; and
  2. The Age of Tech is now in the part of the cycle where returns to innovation and technology are falling, while returns to financial assets overlaying tech sector are still going strong. The classic bubble scenario is being formed once again, as always on foot of disconnection between the real economic returns to the assets and asset valuations. This bubble will have to deflate.

Monday, June 9, 2014

9/6/2014: Some Unorthodox Thinking About Europe's & Irish Recessions...


A decade-old classic paper, "Structural Traps, Politics and Monetary Policy", by Robert H. Dugger and Angel Ubide (International Finance 7:1, 2004: pp. 85–116 link here) provides a framework for understanding why in structural crises, monetary easing might be not only ineffective, but actually harmful to the recovery.

Now, recall that we are in a structural recession, in Ireland and across the euro area, and before us, Japan was in the same boat and, by me assessment, still is there.

Dugger and Ubide introduced "the concept of structural trap, where the interplay of long-term economic development incentives, politics, and demographics results in economies being unable to efficiently reallocate capital from low- to high-return uses." From Ireland's point of view, there are three sources of potential trap:
  1. The obvious one: construction and property investment sector - where a lot of resources were trapped in the 2000s in a low-return (long-term) activities and these resources, currently idle, cannot be re-allocated to other sectors of economy due to lack of skills, debt anchors, and frankly put, lack of other sectors to which they can be re-allocated; and
  2. Less obvious: MNCs-led activities. Sure, these are high-return activities from the aggregate economy point of view. But from indigenous economy vantage point, this conjecture may not be true. Some MNCs (notably in manufacturing) engage in both, tax optimisation and value-adding here. But these are dwindling in numbers and activities here. Many services MNCs add a lot of value elsewhere and book it through Ireland to far-flung tax havens.  The end point is that here too productive resources (human capital) are trapped in low-return (from indigenous economy) activity without being able to flow to other, higher return sectors (problem is, again, where are these sectors in Ireland's indigenous economy), and
  3. Less talked about: public sector and semi-state companies.


Per Dugger and Ubide, "the resulting macroeconomic picture looks like a liquidity trap – low GDP growth and deflation despite extreme monetary easing." So far - on the money for euro area and Ireland. The kicker is next: "But the optimal policy responses are very different and mistaking them could lead to perverse results. The key difference between a liquidity trap and a structural one is the role of politics."

Dugger and Ubide show "how, in the Japanese case, longstanding economic incentives and protections and demographic trends have resulted in a political leadership that resists capital reallocation from older protected low-return sectors to higher-return newer ones." Wait, is not the same happening in Ireland? Incentives to boost property of late? Incentives to preserve capital (and employment) in public sectors? Incentives and direct power to protect and increase resources in semi-state sectors? Do you remember the days when Irish media was praising ESB for 'investing' in the economy amidst worsening recession and on foot of higher consumer charges? Do you recall when Irish media was singing 'Nama investment needed' songs?

"If the Japanese case is instructive, in a structural trap, extremely loose monetary policy perpetuates deflation and low GDP growth, because unproductive but politically important firms are allowed to survive and capital reallocation is prevented." Irish Water anyone? Or ESB? Or DAA? Or HSE? Or sprinklings of weaker universities & ITs? Keep going… 

"By preventing the needed reduction in excess capacity, a structural trap condemns reflationary policies to failure by making the creation of credible inflation expectations impossible. Faced with a structural trap, an independent central bank with a price stability mandate should adopt a monetary policy stance consistent with restructuring. If political resistance is high, monetary policy decision makers will need to keep nominal rates high enough to ensure that capital reallocation takes place at an acceptable pace."


Thought provoking, no?

Tuesday, June 18, 2013

18/7/2013: QE or Not-QE... spot the difference?

My recent exchange with @LISwires on the issue of risks involved in both continued QE and pursuing an exit strategy.


The tweet the started it: "Both are… RT @LISwires: QE is "Treacherous" RT @livesquawk: Roubini: Fed Exit Strategy Will Be 'Treacherous' fw.to/gWL3DCg @CNBC"

Explaining my view that QE & Exit strategies are both consistent with structural and grave risks are:

[Both QE and exit is] like being between a rock and a hard place... inside an iron pipe… Exit = QE = non-QE = stimulus = austerity = disaster. The whole point of a structural depression is EXACTLY that!

In a normal recession, one half of the economy's 'cart' gets stuck in the 'mud'. In a structural depression, the entire cart is in the middle of a quick sand trap.

The ONLY thing that would've worked was direct injection of funds to write down household & corporate debts, & in some cases - restructure sovereign debt too. We missed the boat on this by engaging in LTROs/OMT/ESM/EFSF/ESF/EBU/EMU… stupidity of tinkering along the edges. Hence [having engaged in wasting resources on marginal solutions], from here on - it is vast pain over long term. The choice was made by our 'leaders' in ECB/EU/IMF/National Governments/NCBs.

The real failure of economists/economics is NOT our inability to forecast disasters. It is in our inability to see the size & nature of disaster AFTER it hits.

Note: my reference to the direct recapitalisation solution can be traced to this: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2010/05/economics-16052010-eu-on-brink.html