Showing posts with label cost of Irish banks recapitalization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cost of Irish banks recapitalization. Show all posts

Saturday, July 21, 2012

21/7/2012: Sunday Times July 8 - ESM deal for Ireland


An unedited version of my Sunday Times column for July 8, 2012.



Last week’s Euro zone rush to make some sort of a deal on the common currency debt crisis was originally heralded as a ‘path-breaking’ event. A week on, and the markets have largely discounted the deal, while internal disagreements between the member states are tearing it to shreds.

Within a few days following the summit, heads of Bundesbank, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank came out opposing the core premises of the deal, including the banking union. Finnish, Dutch and Estonian governments strongly disagreed with the ideas of ECB engaging in direct purchases of sovereign bonds, and equal treatment of ESM debt alongside private bondholders. German and Slovak leaders have pledged to respect these countries positions. Austrian parliament’s approval of European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) fund came with some severe conditions attached, also altering the June summit conclusions. Lastly, the ECB’s Mario Draghi was clearly guarded about the deal implications for the ECB independence during his press-conference this Thursday.

Meanwhile, the markets have moved from an euphoric reaction to the deal last Friday back to shorting the euro zone by Thursday, despite the ECB interest rate cut.

Despite these, and other developments, the Irish Government continues to put much hope on the June 28-29 deal. Rhetoric aside, the new deal can, at the very best, allow Ireland to convert some of our government debts into the debt held against Irish consumers and mortgage-holders.

The Government assumes that under the deal, ESM will be allowed to retrospectively cancel government debts relating to banks bailouts and convert these into debts held against the banks themselves.

Assuming this is correct, even though the actual agreement does not mention any retrospective actions, Ireland will be able to move some unknown share of its €62.8 billion total exposure to the banking crisis off the government debt account. The Government has already admitted that it is unlikely to recover any of the NPRF funds ‘invested’ in the banks. Which leaves us with roughly €30-35 billion of promissory notes and other debts that can be in theory restructured via ESM.

On the surface, this looks like a great opportunity, to reduce our official Government debt from 117% of GDP to just over 100% of GDP.

However, the problem with this proposition is that it ignores the actual nature of the deal and the likelihood of such a deal going through.

Let’s start from the latter point.

For Ireland to restructure such a large amount of debt, will require one of the following two options. Either all of the states involved in ESM should be given similar retrospective considerations of past sovereign recapitalisations of the banks , or Ireland must be deemed to be a special case, warranting special intervention.

The former will mean that Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, not to mention Spain, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus will all have to be granted access to the same restructuring process as Ireland. These states have collectively pumped some €400 billion worth of taxpayers’ funds into their own banking systems during the crisis. ESM’s lending capacity is €500 billion. In other words, ESM will effectively have not enough funds to cover the second bailout for Ireland and extensions of bailouts for Portugal and Greece, let alone provide any backstop for Italy and Spain.

Italy has just raised its forecast budget deficit for 2012 by some 50%, while Spain will require €7-10 billion of additional fiscal cuts to meet its 2012 target. Greece has been lax on tax collection during May and June elections. The likelihood of these countries needing additional funds in 2013-2014 is rising, just as ESM lending capacity is shrinking.

The latter possibility would require making a convincing argument that Ireland’s case is unique when it comes to the hardships of recapitalising the banks. In addition, it will require proving that we desperately need special help. This can only be done by admitting that our deficit and debt adjustments, as envisioned in the multiannual programme with Troika, are not sustainable. This would contradict all Troika assessments of the Irish fiscal stabilization programmes to-date.


Now, let’s take a look at the more important point raised above – the point about the actual nature of this deal. In a nutshell, even if successful, the restructuring of our banks-related debts via ESM, as envisioned by the Government, will accomplish little in terms of lifting the burden of unsustainable debts off the shoulders of the economy.

The reasons for this conjecture are numerous.

Firstly, ESM will still require repayment of all the debts transferred from the Government to the fund. Except, instead of the taxpayers, the onus for repaying these debts will fall on Irish consumers.

Even an undergraduate student of economics knows that when the market power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of players, any taxes and charges imposed onto them will be passed directly to consumers. Now, recall that under the Irish Government plans, Irish banking system is moving toward a Bank of Ireland, plus AIB duopoly. In such an environment, the repayment of banks debts to the ESM will simply involve higher banking services costs to mortgagees and bank accounts holders.

Only a regulated duopoly, under certain conditions, can be prevented from gouging consumers to pay charges, and even then imperfectly. Yet, under the deal, the Government will be ceding control over the banking sector to the ESM (who will own the banks and their debts) and the ECB (who will act as the pan-Euro area supervisor of the banks). This means we can expect mortgages and banking costs to rise and with them, foreclosures, personal insolvencies and business liquidations to accelerate.

Secondly, per Irish Government statements, last week’s deal will allow for relieving the burden of the banks debt and promises to restart our economy back to growth. If the former proposition, as argued above, is questionable, the latter is outright bogus.

Ireland’s crisis is not driven by who owns the banks debts. It is driven by too much debt accumulated in all of the corners of our economy: households, companies, Government, and the banks. But the swap of banks-related debts from the Government to the ESM will not reduce the volume of this debt.

And the Irish economy will have an even lower capacity to repay these debts after the swap.

The Government is already committed to taking €8.6 billion out of the economy between 2013 and 2015. Most of it - €5.7 billion – is officially earmarked for ‘cuts’ to the Government expenditure. However, majority of the expenditure cuts are really nothing more than a concealed tax, as these cuts reallocate the costs of services to the households. In the Budget 2012, single largest expenditure reduction measure was a hike on private insurance costs of medical services.

On top of this, further €1.5-1.8 billion will have to be clawed out of the economy due to changes in the EU funding and reductions in state revenues from banks guarantee and support schemes.

In short, put against the reality of Ireland’s struggling economy and battered by the internal disagreements within the euro zone, the so-called ‘seismic’ deal is now turning into a storm in a teacup.



Box-out:

Ireland’s much-awaited ‘return to the bond markets’ on Thursday was greeted in the media by a number of erroneous reports. The truth is simple as are the questions surrounding the NTMA motives for the auction. Firstly, Ireland returned not to the bond markets, but to a short-term T-bill market. Very short-term, in fact. The two markets are significantly different to pretend the auction was a major breakthrough. Greece, in May this year – amidst the on-going collapse of its economy and political turmoil, also ‘returned’ to the T-bill market. As did Portugal in April when it faced an unexpected need for banks supports. Ireland itself last dipped into this market back in September 2010, while facing an impending bailout. T-bills auctions, therefore, are not exactly the vote of confidence. Secondly, 3 months-dated bills are effectively risk-free and do not constitute a recognition of Irish economic revival. Instead, they are backed by the Troika funds. As per questions raised, one that stands out is why did NTMA need this auction to take place in the first place? There is no need for the Government to borrow any money short-term, as our receipts of the Troika funds are regular, fully funded and without any uncertainty. It appears the whole exercise was about a public and investor relations management by the Government. Thus, the only apparent net positive from the auction is that we did not get rejected by the markets. Then again, neither did Greece in May or Portugal in April.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

06/09/2011: Recapitalization of Irish Banks 2011

On August 31, 2011 Irish Government committed €17.3 billion of our - taxpayers - money to underwrite banks recapitalization following the PCAR 2011 exercise carried out by the CBofI. Three "banks" - BofI, AIB and IL&P received the funds. Here is the official summary of how these funds were distributed. No comment to follow.

Sunday, February 13, 2011

13/02/2011: IMF's statement on Iceland

I twitted about the latest conclusions from the IMF on the state of Icelandic economy post-banks collapse. Here are the exact details of the IMF statement and the statement itself. Emphasis and comments in brackets are mine:

"Financial sector restructuring is moving forward [in contrast, one may add to Ireland's]. Savings banks and non-bank financial institutions are being recapitalized [in Ireland's case, recapitalizations of the banks have been predominantly wiped-out by the continued writedowns, so net increases in actual capital have been negligible], and the supervisory framework is being strengthened by amendments that will be enacted in the coming months [no serious far-reaching amendments have been introduced in Ireland since the beginning of the crisis and the marginal ones that were are yet to be enacted].

"Moreover, recent agreements to restructure the debts of households and small enterprises will help put households, corporations and banks on a more secure financial footing, which is essential for a sustainable recovery [this stands in contrast with what has been happening in Ireland. In addition this directly and indisputably puts the blame for the policy errors in the Irish case onto our Government and EU shoulders, for it is clear that within the EU/IMF deal framework, the IMF was basing its policy proposals on their experience in Iceland].

“Policy discussions focused on the strategy to liberalize capital controls, fiscal and monetary policies, and financial sector reforms [none of these issues are even on our agenda].

Here is the actual press release from the IMF

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Economics 21/12/10: BofI & Irish derivatives warning from the IMF

How wonderful is the world of international banks linkages? And especially, how wonderful it can get when regulators are so soundly asleep at the wheel, a firecracker from the IMF can be shoved in their faces and popped, and the snoring still went on.

A 2007 working paper from the IMF, republished earlier this year in an IMF journal, has warned Irish regulators that (referring to the data through 2005):

“BofI had launched a new venture with a leading Spanish bank, La Caixa to provide extra mortgage options for Irish people buying property in Spain, which included equity release from existing BofI mortgages” (
IMF WP/07/44: External Linkages and Contagion Risk in Irish Banks, by Elena Duggar and Srobona Mitra).

Now, think of those La Caixa/BofI borrowers leveraging levels.
But here’s the bit that relates directly to securitisation threats I hypothesize about in the previous post (here): on page 8 of the report, IMF folks state: “Irish banks could be indirectly exposed to property markets by selling risk protection (buying of covered bonds, credit default swaps, and mortgage backed securities) to other banks which are exposed to foreign property markets. From anecdotal evidence, some small IFSC banks, exposed to international property markets, are selling CDS to other domestic-oriented banks, making the latter indirectly exposed to these property markets even though their loan books are not.”

Of course, the Irish banks were also selling protection to the SPVs they were managing as well. And now, lets jump to IMF’s conclusions:

Some tentative policy lessons could be drawn from the results of this exercise. The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) may want to stress test specific categories of exposures of Irish banks to both the U.S. and the U.K. Even though linkages with the U.S. do not come out strongly from aggregate consolidated balance sheet exposures, there might be derivatives or other off-balance sheet exposures that the bank supervisors may need to be vigilant of. The Irish authorities may need to collect more information about types and counterparties of derivative positions and risk transfers through structured products of Irish banks, as the use of these is likely to grow rapidly in the future. This would especially be necessary if Irish banks are buying CRT products from foreign banks (that is selling risk protection) that are in turn exposed to property markets or other loan products in the U.S. or the U.K., thus exposing the Irish banks to these markets even though there is no direct loan exposure.”

Sounds like a warning against Irish banks exposures to lending against the US-based property? Oh, no – not at all. In fact recall a basic stylized fact of mortgages finance – in the long run (equilibrium) long term yields on Government debt and long term mortgage rates converge. Which means that if an Irish bank was underwriting an interest rate swap for the US SPV that purchased Irish bank’s securitised loans, then Irish bank was taking a position in providing insurance into the US interest rates environment.

The article – based on 2005 data – couldn’t have imagined what followed in 2007 and 2008.
But, needless to say - judging by their staunch silence on the issue of derivatives and securitisation - our regulators didn't bother with the IMF warnings back then... and still are not bothered by them...


Update: It is worth noting that today the EU Commission approved measures for AIB, Anglo and INBS (details here) that include "a guarantee covering certain off-balance sheet transactions" - a code name for things like securitisations and derivatives...

Economics 21/12/10: Derivatives hole?

Updated (end of post)

The following post is attempting to put some numbers behind a highly uncertain, opaque and completely under-reported side of the Irish banks operations - the side relating to securitisations and derivatives exposures. My numbers below are pure estimates and their objective is to at least start raising the questions as to the depth of our (taxpayers) exposure to this murky world of banks' securitised assets.

Before we begin, I must also relay my thanks to Brian Lucey and 3 anonymous experts for providing advice and comments on the earlier draft and to LorcanRK who was involved in trying to scope the problem earlier.


Years ago, before our sick puppies (banks) became sick, in the golden days when the Anglopup, AIBickey, permo, INBiSquit, EBSsie and BofIpooch were still wagging their happy tails around the streets of Dublin, securitisation was all the rage.

The basic idea behind this transaction runs innocuously enough as follows: a bank holds a bunch of loans, say mortgages. These yield an annual revenue stream, but hold up capital, restricting new lending. To help unlock this capital, a bank can package these loans together and sell them to an SPV which will issue a paper security against these loans that entitles the owner to a share of the total package of loans as they yield returns over time. An SPV, of course, doesn’t manage the mortgages but leaves them in the custody of the bank which acts as a manager/custodian, responsible for collecting the moneys due and paying out to the SPV.

Now, for a bit relevant to us: an agreement between the SPV and the custodian has two key covenants:
  1. loans are held by the custodian in trust, so that the custodian is obliged, upon either the termination of the management contract or should other covenants be breached, to deliver the actual loans/mortgages to the SPV owner;
  2. ability of the custodian/manager to hold on to the loans is subject to a minimum credit rating, usually - investment grade.
The first point means that should an SPV ask an Irish bank for its loans (due to a breach in its covenants), the banks must deliver these loans.

The second point means that if the covenants are breached, by, say for the sake of argument, Irish banks rating sinking to junk, the banks can be found in a breach of covenants and face:
  • a margin call – according to my sources, of up to a whooping 20% face value of the securitized loans in some cases; and/or
  • a call on the actual loans to be transferred to a different manager/custodian nominated by the SPV
Every securitized contract runs alongside it a derivative security designed to protect against the risk exposures relating to the loans.

These derivatives can be
  • symmetric – covering both sides of the potential exposure – e.g. interest rates swaps going both ways or
  • asymmetric or uni-directional, covering only one side of the risk exposure (e.g. an interest rate swap insuring against a future rise in the interest rates).
The derivatives can be written by an independent entity or by the bank, but for the reasons of good risk management (maturity mismatch risk and direct exposure to underwriter risk) these derivatives should really be underwritten by the third parties, not the custodians.

Now, let’s go back to the history. Earlier this year, I wrote about our ‘national derivatives accounts’:
  • AIB held the total derivative exposure to the notional value of €261bn in 2008 which fell to €197bn in 2009 (here)
  • BOI held €360.5bn (here) in 2009
  • Anglo held some €268.3bn worth of notional value derivatives in 2008 (here), falling to €184.5bn in 2010 (here)
The above is very close to the gross notional exposure amounts of €640 billion (for two banks ex-Anglo) reported in 2008 by the employee of the Financial Regulator - Grellan O'Kelly (here).

So now, suppose that the notional value reflects symmetric hedges, and even there, let's assume that directionality is such that benign risk is weighted by twice the weight assigned to maximum loss-linked risk, so that the underlying value of these derivatives is around 1/3rd of the €742.3 billion of notional value, or €245 billion.

Here is the beefy problem. Since these derivatives are written against real loans contracts, what happens if the covenants of the SPVs behind them are breached?

Let’s talk some hypotheticals (since we have no actual clarity on these):
  • Scenario 1: Irish Government debt sinks to junk, which automatically means banks debt sinks to junk (while I was writing this, the latest Moody’s downgrade pushed it even deeper...). There’s a margin call on derivatives of say ½ of 20% mentioned above, or 10%. Oops – Irish banks are in a hole for up to 24.5bn off the starting line (10% of the 245bn above)
  • Scenario 2: Instead of a call on the derivatives, SPV breaks management agreement with an Irish bank and asks for its loans to be moved out of the bank. Wouldn't be a problem, unless: what if the bank, in the mean time, has leveraged the same loans it held in custody for the SPV at the ECB (or CBofI or both) discount window? Well, should the SPVs insist, the Irish banks will be forced to buy their collateral out of ECB and CB of Ireland to the amount that the banks borrowed against such collateral.
Things are starting to smell rotten… But do not be afraid, those in charge who still have some brains left spotted the dodgy stuff. To our chagrin, however, the smart ones are in Frankfurt, not in Dublin. Back in August 2008, the ECB has pulled the plug on taking Irish banks-securitised loans as collateral. Miraculously, in the end of 2008, CBofI lent Anglo €10.5bn against some mysterious collateral that, several of my sources argued, was previously rejected by the ECB.

Why would the ECB decline to take securitised packages as collateral, while taking the loans? Surely this signals something is amiss with the vehicle of securitisation as carried out by the Irish banks?

Two things can be dodgy with the securitized packages in general:
  1. Underlying derivatives, and/or
  2. Security over the loans/assets that are securitized.
I am not going to speculate what it is – time will tell. Instead, let’s run through some scenarios on potential losses due to the above positions.

Assumptions:
  • Assume that the above gross notional amounts of derivatives are 2/3 covering one side of exposure (e.g. expected increases in interest rates, for interest rate swaps) and 1/3 covering less expected opposite direction risk. This means that of the total values of derivatives written by the 3 banks, these derivatives were covering a collateralised pool of loans/assets equal to 1/3 of the gross notional derivatives.
  • Now, some of collateralised assets were held by the banks themselves, but we do not know how much. So let’s assume that 25% and 50% are reasonable amounts for these shares, implying that banks sold on some 50% to 75% of the securitised assets
  • Next suppose that the banks have written down these securitised assets by 20% (a gross overestimate, but let’s allow it to be conservative) and that the ECB has applied the usual 15% haircut in lending against the above writedowns
  • Table below shows the estimates of potential losses

So the downside from the derivatives exposure and securitization can range between €12.25bn and €50.8bn.

Pretty wide.

Let’s take a look at the underlying assumptions. Running through the ‘What if covenants are breached?’ scenarios, one has to remember that many of the securitized loans borrowed against are related to more stable, longer-term mortgages. Since default rates across mortgages are lower it is highly unlikely that SPVs wouldn’t want to claim them out of the hands of the insolvent banks. This means that the 10% margin call on all loans scenario is highly unlikely to materialize. More likely – either the margin calls will be larger, or full call backs will be triggered. Which suggests that the range above more realistically should be expected around €17.15bn and €25.7bn.

Also, recall that Irish banks weren’t really at the races in speculating on financial instruments, preferring instead to speculate on property. This means that my assumption of 50% unidirectional net derivatives relating to property securitization is pretty conservative.

And remember that none of this has been factored by either the IMF or anyone else into the expected losses across the Irish banks. It hasn’t been incorporated into my earlier estimates of
  • €67-70 billion total losses on NAMA, recognized losses and post-2010 commercial and investment books’ losses, and
  • €9-11 billion total losses on mortgages post-2010, plus
  • the lower €17bn figure as an estimate for the derivatives and securitization-related losses.
The total expected loss across the entire banking sector, net of recoveries might be as high as €93-98 billion. Or it might go as high as €107bn. And at this point, folks, even an old hawk like myself starts to feel scared.


Note: these are potential estimates. Given that we have been given no clarity as to the depth of securitisations, or the derivative instruments underlying it, nor do we have any idea as to what the banks have been doing with custodial-managed loans that relate to securitised products, one can only guesstimate - or speculate - as to the true extent of losses. I tried my best to be very, very conservative in the above, with my upper limit of factored estimate of €25.7bn in losses being below the average of the most benign scenario (€12.25bn) and the worst case scenario (€50.8bn). I was also very conservative in my assumptions. Note also that in the end, €17-25bn range of losses used in final estimate of the total cost of banks bailouts corresponds to just 2.29-3.37% of the notional value of all derivatives held in 2009 by the three banks.


Update: things are hardly trivial when it comes to potential securitisation-linked derivatives exposure. Back in 2007, the IMF has warned Irish regulators that:

BoI has transferred the bulk of its domestic residential mortgage assets to a designated mortgage credit institution, which has a banking license to issue mortgage covered securities.—these are used both for hedging interest risk and for generating additional funding. Almost 60 percent of these securities were held by other Euro Area members, while 25 percent was held in USD by other countries. (IMF WP/07/44: External Linkages and Contagion Risk in Irish Banks, by Elena Duggar and Srobona Mitra - here)

Did IMF say 'the bulk'? So as of 2006-2007, the bulk of mortgages were out to securitisation in a 'conservatively' run BofI?

Monday, December 6, 2010

Economics 6/12/10: IMF stress tests for Irish banks

Here are three things that are worth asking about the latest details of the EU/IMF 'rescue' package released over the weekend. All relate to the issue of banking sector restructuring:

  1. According to reports, some €2 billion will be available to enable the banks to sell €20 billion worth of assets (which, of course, implies sales of performing loans, as all other assets, such as foreign divisions, auxiliary services providers, asset management branches etc have already been flogged or put on the market). As reports issued today specify: the funds may come in the form of a loss protection or as a guarantee for asset purchasers. These €2 billion come on top of the €10 billion set aside for the immediate re-capitalization of the banks, and on top of further €25 billion in contingency funding allocated. So it appears that it either comes from the Exchequer side of the EU/IMF deal, reducing deficit financing available to the Government or, alternatively, on top of the €67 billion in lending extended under the whole deal. In effect, the EU/IMF will now engage Irish taxpayers funds (remember - these €2 billion are loans) to sweeten the bitter pill for buyers of Irish banks assets. A small, but lovely morsel of taxpayers income that will be spent on artificially propping Irish assets for sale.
  2. According to the Irish Times, stress testing scenarios deployed by the IMF in pricing the overall demand for taxpayers funding for the banks involved the following assumptions: losses of 10% on buy to let mortgage books and 6.5% for residential mortgages. These assumptions underwritten the demand for €25 billion in contingency funding, spread as €15 billion in required capital, plus €10 billion additional cushion. This is rather interesting and worrying. Buy-to-let mortgages are most certainly completely under water right now, given collapsed rents and capital values, as well as more recent vintage of these mortgages. If investment and commercial books are facing up to 35-40% losses currently (as consistent with the Government own estimate of €50 billion final cost of banking sector recapitalization), is it safe to assume that buy-to-rent mortgages will tank at 10%? Similar questions arise with respect to 6.5% assumption on mortgages defaults. In fact, we already know that over 100,000 mortgages are either in official distress or under renegotiated repayment holidays or interest rates adjustments. This pushes the effective default and at-risk of default numbers will in excess of 6.5% as of today.
  3. If contingency fund of €10 billion were to be taken as covering any losses in excess of 6.5% defaults on mortgages and 10% default on buy-to-rents, then this amount is expected to cover: (1) Haircuts by Nama on additional €14 billion in loans transfers (cost ca €6-7 billion at past haircuts), plus (2) Losses in excess of assumed rates on mortgages and buy-to-rents, plus (3) any further losses on investment and development books, plus (4) any further losses on derivatives exposures. This is hardly realistic of a cushion. So it appears that the IMF was either not given the full realistic picture of the Irish banks balance sheets, or it is seriously underestimating the demand for future losses cover in the banks.
Either way, the numbers continue to suggest that the €67 billion package of loans will not be enough to provide simultaneously a cover for Exchequer deficits and the funds required to underwrite losses and capital requirements of the banks. Somehow, the Irish Exchequer will have to make up for this shortfall.

Saturday, October 2, 2010

Economics 2/10/10: Brian Lucey's comment on Minister Lenihan's statement

In rare occasions, I re-print here some comments made available to me by other economists and analysts. This is the full text of Professor Brian Lucey's comment in yesterday's Irish Examiner (not available on the newspaper website):

"THE Government yesterday engaged in a series of interventions, announcements, and actions which in my opinion have brought the prospect of an intervention from the IMF or the European Union significantly closer.

The major announcements were threefold: the announcement of the losses of Anglo, the bombshell in relation to Allied Irish Banks, and the startling admission that the Government was voluntarily withdrawing from international markets. Let us examine all three of these.

In relation to Anglo Irish Bank, we finally begin to see clarity and reality from the Government; for the first time in two and a half years estimates begin to overlap. The worst-case scenario that the Government has put forward is that Anglo will lose €35 billion. This is the average estimate. We must take this government figure with a very large pinch of salt. The Government over the last two years has given us at least four “final” figures for the total cost of Anglo. God be with the days when it was only 4.8bn. It remains highly likely in my view and in the view of independent analysis external and internal to the country, that the Anglo losses could stretch towards €40bn.

That
is an eye-watering amount of money, equivalent to nine months’ total government expenditure. While this on its own is bearable, what is unbearable, and should not be borne, is that once again bondholders take precedence over citizens.

The only rationale for having such an extensive guarantee in 2008 was that over the period of time the banks would be cleaned of their bad loans, the banks would be cleaned of their bad management, and the bondholders would be dealt with. Subordinated bondholders should get nothing, senior debt holders should have been faced with a stark choice; either take an offer of perhaps 30 cent on the euro or take their chances on the market place. A debt-for-equity swap should also have been considered.

On all three of these issues the Government has failed. We are told that instead of NAMA taking loans in excess of €5 million, it will only take loans in excess of €20m; this leaves a large amount of impaired and toxic loans on the balance sheet of the banks. It is these very toxic loans that imperilled the banks in the first place and which will make it next to impossible for the banks to engage in any meaningful credit creation.

As if Anglo were not enough, we are also told that AIB will require an additional 3bn. The state will end up with 70%+ ownership of AIB; this will rise as AIB will find it difficult to raise the required funds from the markets or from asset disposals and will consequently have to ask the taxpayer to invest further. The ludicrous situation is that the taxpayer will be taking ownership of a much weaker bank than had this been done two years ago. AIB has sold the jewel in its crown, the Polish operation, and is actively selling its US and British operations. We will own a bank which has sold off its profit-making arms and will be left with a carcass.

Finally, it appears, in so far as one can glean from the gnomic and somewhat confused utterances of Eamon Ryan, that the Government were told that the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) did not feel they could raise funds in the markets. The Government has therefore locked itself out of the markets until early 2011. Presumably, the hope is that by 2011 a miraculous change in Irish and world economic conditions will have occurred.

What remains absolutely unclear is what plans, if any, the Government has for a situation where in 2011 the NTMA finds it either impossible to raise funds or finds that those funds are prohibitively expensive. There are in excess of 5bn of Irish government bonds maturing in 2011, these will have to be rolled over or repaid. What if we cannot raise these funds?

In that case the Irish Government will have to raise funds from the International Monetary Fund or from European funds, and this of course ignores the tens of billions of debt which the banks have to roll over on a regular basis. In my view we have moved closer to the end game of losing national economic sovereignty.

Brian Lucey is associate professor in finance at Trinity College Dublin. "

Irish Examiner 1/10/2010

Friday, August 27, 2010

Economics 27/8/10: The path & cost of banks bailouts

On the foot of today's comment in the Financial Times, here are few quick estimates as to the extent to which current policy on banks recapitalization is bleeding the economy dry.

As estimated by myself (comfortably within the S&P projections), Ireland will stand to lose net:
  • Nama - net loss of (mid-range) €12-19bn;
  • Banks - net losses are €50-55.6bn.
These are mid-range estimates.

My estimates translate into:
  • Anglo Irish Bank expected supports are likely to exceed the overall decline in our GDP by a factor of more than 1.5 times (constant prices GDP fell €20.26bn between 2007-2009). Thus Anglo alone will cost Irish economy more than the entire Great Recession;
  • The bailout will cost us €23,422-34,880 per each person in our labour force as of Q1 2010. Mid range estimate loss is €27,121. Note, labour force includes both employed and unemployed.
  • The entire bailout of the banking system can end up costing Ireland in excess of x3 times the total economic loss incurred during this Great Recession.
  • Anglo alone will cost us the equivalent of providing unemployment benefits for 2 years to over 1.25 million Irish workers.
  • Anglo bailout would cover current Live Register costs for more than 6 years
  • The banking bailout would have covered over one half of all outstanding mortgages in the nation once we adjust for interest accruals (a note to our FR: that's one hell of a real moral hazard, Mr Elderfield, much more real than any aid to mortgage holders you can ever fathom)
  • The cost of bailout risks running at over €69,000 per family of 2 able-bodied adults either employed or unemployed
  • 'Repairing' the banks Government-way can cost 35% of constant prices 2010 GDP or 43.2% of 2010 Gross Disposable National Income, using mid-range estimates for the expected bailout

Lastly, let me note that the alternatives to this 'blank cheque' recapitalization approach always existed and were known to the Government: see links here & here. Members of the cabinet were briefed as to the above-linked proposal and were provided with full cost estimates of these proposal. In at least one case, one cabinet member sought analysis/appraisal of the above proposal from official advisers, with evaluation returning 'no objections to the numbers cited' according to my source. In other words - they couldn't find anything wrong with it at least on the basis of quick evaluation.

Thursday, August 19, 2010

Economics 19/8/10: Irish bonds & our fndamentals

This is an unedited version of my article in the Irish Examiner from August 18, 2010.

The latest Irish bonds auction was perhaps the most eagerly anticipated event in the NTMA’s history. Its outcome was a small victory for NTMA, but a Pyrrhic victory for Ireland.

A quick guide to the results first. Facing svere headwinds from the markets, NTMA managed to sell 4 and 10 year bonds at average yields of 3.627% and 5.386% respectively.

This means that NTMA improved on July auction of 10 year bonds, but is still locked into what amounts to the third highest cost of borrowing over the last three years. A year ago the same bonds were placed at an average yield of 4.55% - which means that borrowing €1 billion today is now €8.4 million costlier than a year ago.

However, the NTMA results are hardly a reason to cheer, from the economy wide perspective.

Three events have triggered the extraordinary global attention to Irish bonds over the last few weeks. Firstly, there was a public relations flop when the ECB had to step in provide support for Irish bonds by directly buying the surplus paper out of the market. Second by Monday this week, Irish bond spreads over the benchmark German bunds rose to a stratospheric 300 basis points. At the same time, our CDS spreads hovering above 310 basis points benchmarks, were
signaling that markets anticipated a significant probability of Irish Government default on its sovereign debt.

All of these developments, especially set against much calmer changes in yields and CDS spreads in other Eurozone economies have indicated that the markets are changing not just in terms of the overall willingness of bond investors to underwrite risk in general, but in their attitudes to Irish debt in particular.

You see, during the first quarter of this year, sovereign debt crisis has engulfed the peripheral economies of Europe, collectively know as PIIGS (Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain). The crisis, of course, was triggered by the markets belated realisation that these countries economies cannot sustain massive debt and deficit financing liabilities they have taken on before and during the current Great Recession. That was the moment when Ireland was lumped together with the rest of the Eurozone’s sickest economies.

This time around, we are on our own. Over recent months, all of the PIIGS countries have unveiled a series of aggressive deficit reduction and austerity programmes aimed at significantly reducing their future borrowing requirements. All, that is, except for Ireland. Instead, Irish Government has spent the last 9 months waiting for the Trade Unions to vote on the Croke Park deal that actually limited our future ability to address deficits. On top of that, we staunchly resisted markets, the IMF and the EU Commission repeated calls for clarity on specific budgetary measures planned for the period of 2011-2014. Currently, the IMF forecasts Irish deficit to remain at over 5% of GDP in 2015.

In May 2010, before factoring in the latest funding allocations to banks, IMF Fiscal Monitor provided an estimate for Ireland’s borrowing requirements for 2010. These figures are strikingly different from the deficit numbers presented by our official framework. IMF forecast that Ireland will need to borrow at least 19.9% of its GDP in order to finance debt roll overs from previous years maturing in 2010, plus the deficit of -12.2% of GDP. In approximate terms, Ireland’s Government borrowing this year would amount to roughly €33bn before Anglo Irish Bank and INBS latest projections for new funding.

Thus, in the last two weeks, the bond markets have finally began to re-price Irish sovereign debt as if the country is no longer the leader in the PIIGS pack in terms of expected future deficit
corrections.

In the end, the markets are right. Ireland is facing a massive debt and deficit overhang that is well in excess of any other advanced economy in the world. And contrary to official statements uttered on the matter this week, this twin problem is not a matter of one-off recapitalization of the Anglo Irish Bank. Instead, it is a long-term structural one.

Take first the banks. The recapitalization and balance sheets repair approach undertaken by the Government so far means that Nama alone can be expected to lose around €12 billion over the next 10 years. These losses will have to be underwritten by the Irish economy.

In addition, total losses by the Irish banks are likely to add up to between €49 and €53 billion over the next three-four years. These can be broken down to €33-36 billion that will be needed in the end for the zombie Anglo, €6bn for equally gravely sick INBS, at least €8 billion for AIB and up to €2 billion for the healthiest of all – Bank of Ireland.

These numbers are based on my own analysis and are confirmed by slightly more pessimistic estimates by the independent banking sector analyst Peter Mathews. Once again, Irish economy – or in other words all of us – can be expected to underwrite these. Thus, total bill for ‘repairing’ Irish banks via Government preferred approach of Nama, plus recapitalizations is likely to be €61-65 billion over the next decade.

Now, consider our current spending. Having slashed capital expenditure down to the bone, the Government has committed itself to preserving public sector pay and employment through 2014. Transfers – including welfare and subsidies – are pretty much a no-go area for serious
savings, given continued rises in unemployment, long term nature of new joblessness and political dynamics in the country. Between them, these two spending headlines account for over 1/3 of the entire deterioration in our public spending from 2008 to-date.

Budget 2010 forecasted that our debt to GDP ratio will peak at around 84% in 2012 and will slowly decline thereafter. This, of course, is clearly an underestimate, but even by that metric, we are looking at a debt mountain of over €152 billion.

All of this means that at the very least, Irish state debt will be well in excess of €210 billion by 2014-2015. Given yesterday’s auction results, the interest bill on this debt alone will total €11.3 billion annually – more than 1/3 of all tax revenue collected in 2009.

Let’s put this into more easily understood perspective. If Ireland were a household and its debt constituted its mortgage taken over 30 years, the ‘family’ will be spending more than half of its total gross income on interest and principal repayments.

Or put differently, the legacy of this crisis and systemically mistaken approach taken to repairing the banking sector will amount to over €111,000 in new debt dumped on the shoulders of every currently employed person in the country. To say, as our policymakers and official analysts do, that this figure doesn’t really matter because it is a ‘one-off measure’ is adding insult to the injury.

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Economics 13/07/10: AIB needs your cash

The dogs are barking across Dublin’s RDS. Touring the USofA, our Taoiseach has told the nation that AIB may (oh, just ‘may’?) need further state support to meet new capital targets. That admission, of course, comes after the solemn statement by Minister Lenihan back in March that the announced measures to provide capital to AIB and BofI were final. And on the heels of numerous assertions by our banks’ cheerleaders squad in Dublin’s stockbrokerage houses that AIB will be able to raise capital on its own accord, once the taxpayers pay through the nose for ordinary shares in the bank in round 3 of recapitalisations.

Well, taxpayers did pay through the nose. And AIB still needs more than €7 billion – based on status quo scenario concerning loans quality. Should it see continued deterioration in loans going forward from Q1 2010, the bank will need more than that. How much more? Anybody’s guess. But that open ended nature of AIB’s liabilities won’t hold back our nation’s leader. Last night, Brian Cowen pledged an open ended support to AIB saying that AIB “may need some help, but we will provide that”. How much will Brian be ready to ‘provide’? Not a single word. There is no stop-loss rule operating for this Government. Then again, we know as much from the Government treatment of the Anglo.


And while on the matters of Taoiseach tour of the US, unable to sell the idea that Ireland has turned economic ’corner’ on the recession, our leader is meeting some pretty important people. NYSE CEO Duncan Niederauer and NYC mayor Michael Bloomberg are on the list of those who need to be wooed into ‘Green Jersey’ club. Presumably, they’d love to send some of their companies (listings and HQs) down to the Emerald Isle, but need Taoiseach to convince them.

Messrs Bloomberg and Niederauer will have to be satisfied with playing the second fiddle in Mr Cowen’s sonorous opus ‘Turning Over, Again’. Per Taoiseach: "The first objective will be to give a clear message to key media outlets, business figures and opinion formers that Ireland has turned the corner…"

In other words, accustomed to his own PR hype, economic management is all in the media reporting for Mr Cowen. That, plus what’s being said at business lunches and social dinners in Manhattan. In other words, if the foreigners – especially the important ones – can be made believe things are good back in Auld Dublin, then surely they must be good.

No? Who says so? Oh, those pesky 450,000 unemployed and underemployed back in Ireland? Well, we’ll have jobs for them in no time, once Micheal O'Blumberg and Duncan MacNiedehan send their NYC 'investitors' over to Upper Merrion Street to buy some of those banks shares. After all, Bertie Ahearn thinks they should be a bargain at €5 each, while with Brian Cowen's latest unconditional pledge to plug AIB's capital hole no matter what, Bertie might just be right...

But just in case you think it’s all about Brian Cowen telling the Americans how to properly read our economic stats and banks balance sheets to discern the ‘turnaround’, think twice. Per Reuters report: “Mr Cowen said he will also ask for advice from business and political leaders on how Ireland can continue its fight against the recession and create jobs.”

Oh, wait – what recession? Didn’t we turn that corner?

Does anyone find this a little bit strange? We have an elected leader of the nation whose job description is to govern the state going over to the US to 'ask business leaders for an advice' on how to do his job?

Then again, our Taoiseach can boast of his policies getting us out of the recession. So why would he ask foreigners to provide him with their own ‘get out of recession’ ideas? May be, its because he really hasn’t a policy himself or he might need external validation for his policy of having no policy, or may be it is both. You tell me. But it does seem a bit uncomfortable, in aesthetic terms, to see our head of state travelling to the US to ‘consult’ foreign business leaders on how to solve our problems. I can’t imagine Angela Merkel or Nicolas Sarkozy doing the same. At least, not in front of the media…

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Economics 1/6/2010: Numbers game at Anglo

Last night, I sat down to run through possible scenarios for the Anglo's 'The Bad and the Ugly' Banks division. You see, something was telling me right off the start that the idea of a 'Good' Bank just doesn't really square off with our knowledge of the bank's operations to date.

So I posited to myself the following question: given Nama transfers and rumored split off of €12-15bn worth of loans into a 'good' bank, can the resulting entity be viable? Like a scientist in a lab, I donned on a white coat (well, really my favorite UofChicago sweatshirt), pulled out a Petri dish (my Excel) and started observing the split of that outright not-so-beautiful and very toxic (to the taxpayers) bacteria, called Anglo...

Here are the results, first in numbers and then in plain English:

Step 1: recall we have pumped €10.3 billion worth of promisory notes into the bank alone. Relying on my yesterday's analysis (see details here), I reproduced the demand that a 'Good' Anglo will generate for funding these promisory notes. Now, a reminder - these numbers (penultimate column) correspond to interest only charge on Anglo from the promisory notes. They exclude principal repayment and other recapitalization funding already in the bank.
Bah, I said, the thing in the Petri dish of mine looks pretty ugly. Ugly as in unable to cover the taxpayers-due interest on capital it receives at the first glance.

Ok, I said to myself, but may be were the new 'Good' bank to grow over time, it will become relatively viable with time? Suppose the 'Good' bank generates no impairments going forward (unrealistic assumption, but suppose it does), suppose that 'Good' Anglo grows its book at 5% (generating no new impairments). Further suppose that there's some value in the 'Bad' bank - so assume 20% of the loans transferred to it perform in the future (an extremely optimistic assumption, but what the h***ll, not much out of line with the general assumptions the Government has been making all through its management of the crisis).

The question I asked then was: with all these rosy assumptions in place, what amount of interest payments annually can Anglo afford?

To compute this, I took several scenarios:
  1. I allowed 'Good' Anglo to take €12 or €15 billion in loans on board;
  2. I assumed that it generates 2% of the loan book annually (another optimistic assumption - as it corresponds to an efficiently operating bank in terms of costs, book of business and funding costs - all of which are not exactly characteristic of the Anglo)
  3. I then assumed three different potential burden levels on interest (recall, no principal) repayment at 30% of the total annual return by the bank, 25% and 20%. Let me explain here that a 30% number is utterly unrealistic, implying that almost a third of the entire operating revenue of the bank will be used to pay interest on a small share of its capital funding. This will, in effect, leave no surplus to pay bonuses (of any kind) and dividends (of any kind) as well as to finance bank's insurance etc. 25% mark is also unrealistic, while 20% is back-breaking for a bank, but can be probably sustained over a couple of years.
Table below shows the results by stating the amount of interest repayment that the bank can generate across both its 'Good' and 'Bad' divisions. Blue-bold numbers mark the first time that the annual interest funding requirement gets met.
All of this is fine, I said to myself next, but before the interest requirement is first met on the annual basis, there are years of the bank not covering the interest bills. These will cumulate.

My next question, therefore was: How soon can the bank break into the 'black' vis-a-vis interest repayment alone?
Table above shows the cumulated interest arrears from the €10.3 billion in promisory notes. It clearly shows that under all scenarios, save one (the most optimistic scenario) the entire Anglo operation cannot be expected to generate enough cash to cover even the portion of its interest bill. In fact, under the more realistic scenario (last two columns), Anglo - 'Bad' and 'Good' combined - will continue to accumulate interest arrears on the taxpayers funds (ex €4 billion in direct capital it received) through 2020.

There is no principal repayment charge in the above, nor is there a chance of receiving anything close to the interest bill, even assuming that we do not roll up interest on the cash we put in. In simple words - the entire Anglo operation is so fundamentally bust, that the taxpayer is likely to never receive even a few cents on the euro of the money we've put into it.

The only thing that grew in my Petri dish was a voracious bacteria capable of hoovering taxpayers money at a speed unimaginable to any other bank.

One wonders if that is what Mr Alan Dukes and our Government mean when they are saying that proceeding with keeping Anglo on a respirator amounts to minimizing the cost to the taxpayers.

Monday, May 31, 2010

Economics 31/05/2010: Anglo's latest cash call

This just in - the Government has decided to give Anglo, yes, that very Anglo which is Ireland's real zombie bank with no prospect - even theoretical one - a fresh capital injection of €2 billion (here). This brings taxpayers' capital injected into the bank to €14.3 billion to-date.

The official information by DofF claims that because the injection comes in a form of a promisory note, payable over 10-15 years, there will be lesser impact on the taxpayers today. However, although the official announcement does not say so, this term structure of payments means that our future deficits will be front loaded (pre-committed to the amount announced today), implying that for Ireland to reach required 3% deficit/GDP limit by 2015, we will have to face an increased funding requirement for Anglo over time.

This requirement must be provisioned today, since the notes work in the following way:
  • At any point in time between today and 10-15 years from now, Anglo can waltz into DofF's offices and ask for any share - between 0.00001% and 100% of the amount issued on the promisory note.
  • At that moment, the Government will have to come up with cash pronto, which means - no time to issue separate bonds.
  • Which implies that the very second Mr Dukes asks for cash, our deficit goes up by that exact amount.
Now, prudentially, we should have set an escrow account and provided for this funding. In practice, as is clear from the DofF release, no provisions will be made. The entire, and I repeat, the entire risk of the drawdown therefore is leveled on the shoulders of taxpayers. The DofF in effect is praying to the forces of fortune that Anglo won't come in with a request for funds tomorrow, and/or that any request will not be for the entire sum of the promisiory note.

Now, let us revert back to the 'bank' called Anglo. The State has now committed €10.3 billion in promisory notes. These carry interest rate of... well, I am not sure... but suppose it is 5% to cover the cost of borrowing for these funds in the market, once the funds are disbursed. Assume that 10% of that (actually below a normal charge for a letter of credit for an insolvent company) is outstanding annually until a drawdown. Make a further assumption: assume that Anglo will draw the entire amount in equal annual installments over 5 years - an assumption that is also extremely conservative.

At 5% per annum, Anglo's liabilities to the taxpayers are:
Let me quickly and briefly explain the last 2 columns above. The penultimate column shows the sum of interest charges (at 5% on drawn funds), plus underwriting charge (at 0.5% for undrawn promisory note funds remaining) that Anglo should be paying over the next 10 years, assuming draw down is evenly spread over 5 years on both tranches. The last column then states the amount of loans that are performing that Anglo needs to have on its books in each year to cover the loans interest, not the principal, but interest, assuming that Anglo uses 0.5% of the loans to cover its interest rate, which would roughly amount to 25-30% of its entire interest income on the loans (note - that is really a severe case of the credit squeeze on a bank, but hey, suppose they manage without breaking the back).

How do I come up with this 25-30% estimate? In a normal year, one can expect a fully efficient bank to make ca 2% of their loans volume in revenue. If it pays 0.5% of that amount to cover costs of promisory note, it will be swallowing 25% of the revenue base.

Now, Anglo is transferring to Nama some €35 bn worth of loans, leaving it with ca €30 billion in remaining loans on its books. Of these, roughly 60% is expected to go into the 'bad' bank - in other words, roughly €18 billion worth of loans won't b performing. This leaves it with roughly 40% of loans or €12 billion on the side available for revenue generation. It needs ca €28 billion to cover the cost of the prmisory notes alone...

Get the picture? Even if you dispute my assumptions and half all the costs of the promisory note carry, you still can't get Anglo balance sheet to cover the cost (not the principal) of what it is borrowing from the taxpayers. This puts into perspective the DofF claim that: "As the Minister stated last March the overriding objective of the Government is to minimise the cost to the taxpayer of the restructuring of Anglo Irish Bank".

Monday, May 24, 2010

Economics 24/05/2010: Another day of bloodletting at BofI

So, you've paid €0.19-0.32 per rights per share of BofI - following, undoubtedly your brokers advice (for the €0.24-0.32 part of the range, or Friday close per €0.19 bit). You shelved out €0.55 per share on the promise of a discount of 42% on the post-rights price from the brilliant boys at BofI. You are now €0.02-0.15 per share in a hole, or down 2.7-20.8% in a span of 2 trading days (using latest quoted price of €0.725 per share).

Consolation / silver lining?

You could have been an Irish taxpayer (most likely you are), in which case you would be nursing a loss of €0.63-0.83 on your earlier purchases of the same shares, assuming Brian Lenihan cuts the losses and sell the rights (a tall order assumption).

Then again, although all of us lost - either as bank's new shareholders or as taxpayers, there is yet a much more adversely impacted group of people out there - the poor souls who, while paying taxes in this land also bought a-new into BofI rights issue...

Really, a rare example of all lose, no one wins... except for the existent shareholders and BofI management, who so far enjoyed artificial support from the State.

Now, do recall this: on Thursday September 18 2008, our former Leader Supremo Bertie Ahern told George Hook (Newstalk)that: Bank of Ireland shares are €3.80 today. Now, if I meet you here next year, or the year later, do you seriously think Bank of Ireland shares will be €3.80? I'd go out and buy Bank of Ireland shares... that's what I'd do" (quoted from the next day Irish Times - here). Errr...