Showing posts with label Ukraine crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine crisis. Show all posts

Sunday, May 31, 2015

31/5/15: IMF slashes Ukraine Economy Outlook


IMF statement on Ukraine with some pretty ugly forecast revisions.

[Note, emphasis in italics is mine]

"Press Release No. 15/243, May 31, 2015

IMF Statement on Discussions with Ukraine on First Review under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission visited Kyiv during May 12-29 to hold discussions on the first review under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement (EFF) in support of the authorities’ economic reform program (see Press Release No. 15/107).

At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Nikolay Gueorguiev, mission chief for Ukraine, made the following statement today in Kyiv:
 ...
“The authorities’ commitment to the reform program remains strong. All performance criteria for end-March were met and all structural benchmarks due in the Spring are on course to be met, albeit some with a delay. This good program implementation has been achieved notwithstanding an exceptionally difficult environment, in part related to the unresolved conflict in the East, which took a heavier than expected toll on the economy in the first quarter of 2015.

Accordingly, the mission has revised down growth projections for 2015 to -9 percent and projects end-year inflation at 46 percent. Inflation was mostly driven by one-off pass-through effects of the large exchange rate depreciation in February as well as the needed energy price increases.

“In recent months, signs that economic stability is gradually taking hold are steadily emerging. The foreign exchange market has remained broadly stable. Gross international reserves, although still very low, have increased to US$9.6 billion at end-April. Banks’ deposits in domestic currency have been recovering. The budget outturn in the first months of 2015 was stronger than expected, partly due to temporary factors.

“The authorities recognize that decisive implementation of economic reforms is indispensable for entrenching financial stability and restoring robust and sustainable growth. They are committed to advancing fiscal consolidation and energy sector reforms, including further energy tariff adjustments to eliminate the large losses of Naftogaz, reduce energy consumption, and foster energy independence. They are also moving ahead with the rehabilitation of the banking system, and the improvement of the business environment to enhance the productive potential of the economy.

“The authorities are also determined to complete the ongoing debt operation in line with program objectives. This will ensure that public debt is sustainable with high probability and the program remains fully financed, which are requirements for the completion of the review. More broadly, continued financial support for Ukraine’s reform efforts from official and private creditors is vital for the success of the program.”

Let's hope IMF optimism wins over the reality, but just two and a half months ago, the IMF projected gross international reserves for 2015 at USD18.3 billion, and now they are celebrating reserves at USD9.6bn. IMF programme sustainability analysis was forecasting real GDP decline of 5.5% in 2015 - not 9% decline the Fund now projects. See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1569.pdf for more details.

One has to wonder, just how 'flexible' the Fund became in recent years when it comes to 'hard' numbers underpinning it's 'programme sustainability' arithmetic.

Saturday, May 30, 2015

30/5/15: Private Sector Counter-Proposal for Ukrainian Debt Restructuring


An interesting and far-reaching article on Ukraine's attempts to restructure some of its debts via Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-29/ukraine-creditors-said-to-offer-coupon-cuts-10-year-extension-ia9ao4ey

In the nutshell, Ukraine needs to restructure its debt per IMF three targets for debt 'sustainability':

  • generate $15 billion in public-sector financing during the program period; 
  • bring the public and publicly guaranteed debt-to-GDP ratio under 71% of GDP by 2020; and 
  • keep the budget’s gross financing needs at an average of 10% of GDP (maximum of 12% of GDP annually) in 2019–2025

Note, these are different than what Bloomberg reports.

Key difference, however, is the matter of Russian debt. S&P note from February 2015 addressed this in detail: see more here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/15415-s-ukraine-ratings-and-reality.html. In simple terms, Ukraine's debt to Russia is not, repeat: not, a private debt. Instead it is official bilateral debt. As such it is not covered by the IMF programme condition for restructuring privately held debt regardless of whatever Ukrainian Rada or Government think. Full details of the IMF programme are linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/7415-imf-ninth-time-is-gonna-be-lucky.html

As I noted in March note, "IMF has already pre-committed Ukraine to cutting USD15.3 billion off its Government debt levels via private sector 'participation' in the programme" (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/16315-ukraines-government-debt.html) Once again, Bloomberg 'conveniently' ignores this pesky fact about only private debt being covered.

Now, it appears we have the first private sector offer for restructuring. It is pretty dramatic, as Bloomberg note linked above outlines. But it is clearly not enough, as it involves no cuts to the principal. This is the sticking point because the proposal front-loads notional savings to the amount of USD15.8 billion, but it subsequently requires Ukraine to repay full principal - a point that is not exactly in contradiction to the IMF plan in letter, but certainly risks violating it in spirit. The chart below shows that beyond Q2 2017, Ukraine is facing pretty steep repayments of debt and there is absolutely no guarantee that by then Ukraine will be able to withstand this repayments cliff.


To further complicate issues, Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) passed a law last week that would hold off repayments of debt until there is an agreement with private holders on haircuts. This presents three key problems for Ukraine:

  1. The law can be used to hold off on repaying Russian debt, which is not private by definition and as such will constitute a sovereign default on bilateral loans. This will be pretty much as ugly as it gets short of defaulting on IMF.
  2. The law, if implemented, will also halt repayments on genuine private debt. Which will also constitute a default.
  3. If Russia refuses to restructure its debt (for example, citing the fact that it is non-private debt), Rada law will have to be applied selectively (e.g. if Rada suspends repayments on Russian debt alone), which will strengthen Russian position in international courts.

In case of default, be it on Russian debt or on private debt, or both, Ukraine will see its foreign assets arrested. Which involves state enterprises-owned property, accounts etc. The reason for this is that Rada has no jurisdiction over laws governing these bonds, which are issued under English law. In addition, Ukrainian banks - big holders of Ukrainian Government debt - will be made insolvent overnight as the value of their assets (bonds) will collapse.

Final point is that ex-post application of the law, there will be no possibility for achieving any voluntary restructuring of debt as all negotiations will be terminated because Ukraine will be declared in a default.

While Greece continues to attract much of the media attention, the real crunch time is currently happening in Kiev and the outcome of this crisis is likely to have a significant impact across the international financial system, despite the fact that Ukraine is a relatively small minnow in the world of international finance.

Here is Euromoney Country Risk assessment of Ukrainian credit risks:

Ukraine score is 26.30 which ranks the country 147th in the world in creditworthiness.

Saturday, May 2, 2015

2/5/15: IMF to Ukraine: Pain, and More Pain, and Maybe Some Gain


A very interesting IMF working paper on sustainability and effectiveness of fiscal policy in Ukraine that cuts rather dramatically across the official IMF policy blather.

Fiscal Multipliers in Ukraine, by Pritha Mitra and Tigran Poghosyan, IMF Working Paper, March 2015, WP/15/71 looks at the role of fiscal policy (spending and investment) in the Ukrainian economy.

As authors assert, "since the 2008-09 global crisis, which hit Ukraine particularly hard, the government relied on fiscal stimulus to support recovery. In reality, it was the main lever for macroeconomic management… Today, even after the recent float of the Ukrainian hryvnia, fiscal policy remains key to economic stabilization." In particular, "Over the past five years, the government relied on real public wage and pension hikes to stimulate economic activity, sometimes at the expense of public infrastructure spending. Many argue that this choice of fiscal instruments undermined private sector growth and contributed to the economy falling back into recession in mid-2012."


Since the IMF bailout, however, fiscal adjustment is now aiming for a reversal of long term imbalances on spending and revenue sides. In simple terms, fiscal adjustment now became a critical basis for addressing the economic and financial crisis. As the result, the IMF study looked at the effectiveness of various fiscal policy instruments.

The reason for the need for rebalancing fiscal policy in Ukraine is that current environment is characterised by "…the severe crisis, its toll on tax revenues, and financing constraints, necessitate fiscal consolidation. But the challenge is to minimize its negative impact on growth."

In other words, the key questions are: "Will tax hikes or spending cuts harm growth more? Does capital or current spending have a stronger impact on economic activity?"

Quantitatively, the paper attempts to estimate "…the fiscal multiplier – the change in output, relative to baseline, following an exogenous change in the fiscal deficit that stems from a change in revenue or spending policies."

The findings are: "Applying a structural vector auto regression, the empirical results show that Ukraine’s near term fiscal multipliers are well below one. Specifically, the impact revenue and spending multipliers are -0.3 and 0.4, respectively. This suggests that if a combination of revenue and spending consolidation measures were pursued, the near-term marginal impact on growth would be modest", albeit negative for raising revenue and cutting spending.

"Over the medium-term, the revenue multiplier becomes insignificant, rendering it impossible to draw any conclusions on its strength. The spending multiplier strengthens to 1.4, with about the same impact from capital and current spending. However, the impact of the capital multiplier lasts longer. Against this backdrop, the adverse impact of fiscal consolidation on medium-term growth could be minimized by cutting current spending while raising that on capital."

The risks are unbalanced to the downside, however, so the IMF study concludes that "Given the severe challenges facing the Ukrainian economy, it is important that policymakers apply these results in conjunction with broader considerations – including public debt sustainability, investor confidence, credibility of government policies, public spending efficiency. These considerations combined with the large size of current spending in the budget, may necessitate larger near- and long-term current spending cuts than what multiplier estimates suggest."

In simple terms, this means that, per IMF research (note, this is not a policy directive), Ukrainian economy will need to sustain a heavy duty adjustment on the side of cutting public spending on current expenditure programmes (wages, pensions, purchasing of services, provision of services, social welfare, health, etc) and, possibly, provide small, only partially offsetting, increase in capital spending. This would have to run alongside other measures that will raise costs of basic services and utilities for all involved.

The problem, therefore, is a striking one: to deliver debt sustainability, current expenditure and price supports will have to be cut, causing massive amounts of pain for ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, infrastructure spending will have to rise (but much less than the cuts in current expenditure), which will, given Ukrainian corruption, line the pockets of the oligarchs, while providing income and jobs to a smaller subset of working population. Otherwise, the economy will tank sharply. Take your pick, the IMF research suggests: public unrest because of cut-backs to basic expenditures, or an even deeper contraction in the economy. A hard choice to make.

In the end, "More broadly, fiscal multipliers are one of many tools policymakers should use to guide their decisions. Given the severe challenges facing the Ukrainian economy – including public debt sustainability, low investor confidence, and subsequent limited availability of financing – it may be necessary for policymakers to undertake stark consolidation efforts across both revenues and expenditures, despite the adverse consequences for growth."

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

7/4/15: IMF: Ninth Time is Gonna be Lucky in Ukraine


It is perhaps revealing that the IMF is being forced to defend its Ukraine package 2.0 only a month after it was unveiled. And even do so without providing any explicit risk assessments. Here is the latest on the Fund efforts on this front. Lipton's full speech is here: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/040715.htm

Of note two things:

  1. This is an 9th lending programme by the Fund to Ukraine, with 8 previous ones being... err... not exactly successful.
  2. The current programme is based on (see details here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1569.pdf) assumed 2015 real GDP contraction of 5.5%, growth of 2% in 2016, 3.5% in 2017 and 4% every year thereafter through 2020.  And below is the table of forecasts from the Central Bank of Ukraine (NBU) showing 2015 forecast for -7.5% growth and 2016 forecast for 3% growth. It also shows that NBU estimates y/y growth in Q4 2014 to have been -14.8% and Q1 2015 growth to be -15%. And that -7.5% growth in 2015 will require positive growth in Q4 2015 and a relatively modest contraction in Q3 2015.

All of which suggests that the Fund leading 'assumption' on growth might be a touch optimistic. And that makes its leading 'target' for debt/GDP ratio of 94% at year end 2015 to be a touch unrealistic. Just as the Funds' all previous leading assumptions and targets that the IMF set in all previous lending arrangements with Ukraine.

But, as the Good Director might say, this time it is different...

Sunday, March 22, 2015

22/3/15: Ukraine: disastrous growth figures


Ten quarters of shrinking GDP, out of 11 last. Ukraine:


Source: FT

When's the next 'rethink' by the IMF of the debt projections?..

Friday, February 20, 2015

20/2/15: Russian Public Perceptions of 2014 Events


A small snippet of an insight into Russian public opinion about big themed 2014 events via Levada Center: http://www.levada.ru/eng/most-memorable-events-1


The obvious conclusion: the overall dominance of Ukraine and economic crisis in public perceptions of the most important events of 2014.

Another obvious conclusion, absolute lack of interest in the fate of Russian opposition: the Navalny case being remembered by only 2%, despite the case entering headlines once again in December 2014 - January 2015. These, of course should be seen in line with "Protests after the verdict of the Navalny brothers’ trial" (3%), pushing joint significance of the case to more respectful 5%.

Third point: whilst the Western sanctions against Russia are clearly at the forefront of public attention, the counter-sanctions (often reported in the Western press as inducing hardship on ordinary Russians) are less important than the death of opera singer Yelena Obraztsova.

Fourth point: proximately linked events are showing some interesting results: for example, "Terrorist attack in Paris" (18%) and "Solidarity marches after the terrorist attack in Paris" (10%) jointly signify singular event and by importance rival "American and Western European sanctions against Russia".

Fifth point: "The creation of the European Economic Union" (5%) is about as important to Russians as "The World Economic Forum in Davos" and probably less significant than "Power outages in Crimea due to the Ukrainian blockade" (6%).

Friday, November 7, 2014

7/11/2014: Russian Ruble: Rough Days Ahead


Things are getting ugly in the Ruble corner today:

First this:
Via @Schuldensuehner

Then a bit of a recovery to this:
Via @Schuldensuehner

And in the longer run, this:

Three points:

  1. Ruble is supposed to move to a free float by the end of 2014;
  2. Central Bank of Russia abstained from intervening in forex markets between May and the end of September, but it has burned through ca USD68 billion so far this year in total defending the currency with USD22.21 billion of this in October alone (see chart below).
  3. Central Bank announced two days ago that it will limit its interventions in the markets going forward to just USD350 million per day maximum cap. The Bank is taking a more 'random walk' approach to interventions, announcing that it will intervene in the markets only sporadically. This increased the uncertainty about Ruble supports. So far, Ruble is down more than 27% y/y to USD.
Remember, weaker Ruble offsets, in part, adverse effects of weaker oil prices on Russian fiscal balances. The bad news - from the exporting countries point of view - is that Russia's imports are becoming less and less affordable, pushing more activity away from European exports and in favour of domestic substitution. 


Per official accounts, CBR has sold USD25.232 billion and EUR 2.159 billion (gross of purchases) in the entire 2013, with major purchases starting in Q2 2013. In contrast in the 10 months of 2014 so far, CBR sold USD66.247 billion and EUR 5.426 billion, gross. Net of purchases, 2013 net sales of USD24.261 billion against 2014 (through October) net sales of USD63.426 billion; and 2013 net sales of EUR2.048 billion against 2014 net sales of EUR5.189 billion.

Overall, we can expect more rough days ahead for the Ruble, but a possible recovery in Q1 2015 once the risk re-pricing takes hold post free float and the effects of USD repricing in the wake of the US Fed policy decisions is complete.

Friday, October 24, 2014

24/10/2014: Weekly Russian Economy Update


Bofit released some latest data on Russian economy, so here is the summary, with some of additional points by myself.

September economic activity acceleration came as a bit of a surprise.

  • Manufacturing output was up 4% y/y, driven in part by devaluation of the ruble and in part by increased oil refining activity.
  • Defense spending is up 33% y/y in January-September, which also is helping manufacturing orders.
  • Agricultural output is sharply up as harvest hits near-record levels.
  • Consumption is up as retail sales rose 1.7% y/y with non-food sales up 3.5%. Some observers suggest that households are taking out savings to prepare for higher inflation (inflation hit 8.3% in September, sharply up on 8% in August). Since incomes declined in real terms (down to devaluation and inflation), we can assume that this is to some extent true, although banks are not reporting declines in deposits.
  • New car sales shrank 20% y/y in September from 0% y/y in Q1 2014. 
  • But consumption is most likely showing lags relative to the rest of the economy, so we can expect continued deterioration in retail sales into Q1 2015.
  • Decline in fixed capital investment shallowed out by about 2 percentage points, as Bofit notes "thanks to distinctly better development in investment of large energy and transport enterprises than other investment".
  • Meanwhile, construction activity is slowing down from the H1 2014 boom.


Net outcome: the Economy Ministry estimates GDP growth at +0.7 % y-o-y in January–September 2014, with only slight deceleration in the July-September.

This is strong reading, considering some forecasts (e.g. World Bank at 0.5% for 2014). That said, as I noted earlier today, with Central Bank heading into October 31 decision on rates with expected 50-100 bps hike, we might see a sharp decline in the economy in Q4 2014. It would take 0.2% drop in Q4 to get us to WB outlook.

On the other front, everyone who grew tired of focusing on ruble collapse have switched into prognosticating federal budget meltdown on foot of falling oil prices. Yes, Brent fell by a quarter compared to 2014 highs. And Urals followed the trend with prices around USD85/barrel. The chart below (via Bofit) illustrates.



But no, this is not a letdown yet on fiscal side. Here's Bofit analysis: "If the price of crude oil holds at the $85–95 level for a longer time, Russian growth will be much slower than current consensus forecasts predict… Russia’s 2015 federal budget also assumes an average oil price of $100 next year, producing a budget deficit of 0.5 % of GDP. The impact of a lower oil price on Russia’s fiscal balance will still be manageable; the nominal increase in budget revenues from ruble depreciation will in part off-set losses. Prof. Sergei Guriyev estimates public sector finances could withstand an oil price of $80–90 for a couple of years thanks to reserve funds and the weak ruble. Sberbank’s research department has calculated that the current account will remain in surplus next year even if the oil price holds at $85. Export revenues will fall, but also imports will decline substantially on e.g. the weak ruble and impacts from economic sanctions."

How fast Russian imports fall relative to exports? Tough guess, but here's IMF data showing 2009 crisis period:



One thing is clear: the above forecasts by the IMF for 2015 show pretty small reaction in imports. If Russian demand for imports goes negative, it will be down to a number of factors:

  1. Lower ruble leading to imports substitution - which is GDP-enhancing;
  2. Russian sanctions leading to imports substitution - which is GDP-enhancing;
  3. Government contracts shifting to imports substitution (including those with Ukraine, relating to military equipment) - which is GDP-enhancing.

And as 2009 shows, the room for contracting imports is massive: 28.7% y/y in one shot. And IMF is forecasting 2015 decline to be just 0.3% y/y.

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

2/9/2014: Levada Poll: Decline in Russian Public Support for Intervention in Ukraine


Levada Centre published the latest analysis of public opinion in Russia in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. The details are here [in Russian]: http://www.levada.ru/29-08-2014/chislo-storonnikov-vtorzheniya-na-ukrainu-za-polgoda-sokratilos-vdvoe

Top results summarised:

  • Numbers of Russians who are prepared to support Russian direct engagement in an open military conflict is now below the number of those who oppose an open intervention for the first time since accession of Crimea.
  • 43% of respondents "definitely" or "likely" will not support an open military confrontation with Ukraine now stands against 41% who are ready to support such an intervention. In March 2014, 74% supported direct intervention and in May the number was 69%.
  • In March 2014, 36% of respondents said they would "definitely" support direct military intervention in Ukraine. In the latest poll the number is down to 13%.
  • Only 17% think that Russia is responsible for the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, while 75% believe that Moscow bears no responsibility.
  • 32% of respondents believe that Russia is interfering in the Ukrainian affairs, while 25% believe that Russia does interfere but should do so. 31% believe that non-interference is a correct approach.
  • Overall, 48% of respondents are against any interference, while 40% are in favour.
  • In April 2014, 35% of those surveyed viewed Eastern Ukraine as a potential member of the Russian Federation. In August poll that number fell to 21%. However, the numbers supporting independence for Eastern Ukraine rose from 25% to 40%.
  • In May, 49% of Russians approved of Russian support for pro-Russian separatists, in July this proportion peaked at 56% and has now fallen back to 50% in August. Most common appropriate support means voiced are diplomatic, economic and humanitarian aid.


The survey was conducted on 22-25 of August, based on representative sampling of 1,600 respondents from 46 regions. Statistical error does not exceed 3.4%.

Thursday, August 28, 2014

28/8/2014: The State of Russian Economy


I published a lengthy note summarising my view of the state of Russian economy on the LongRun Economics Blog: http://trueeconomicslr.blogspot.ie/2014/08/2782014-russian-economy-outlook.html

The post looks at:

  • Russian GDP growth
  • State of Russian foreign reserves
  • Central Bank policy interventions
  • Capital outflows
  • Funding situation for Russian banks and corporates
  • Russia's external balance
  • Federal Government finances
  • Problems with imports substitution 
The summary is:


Russian economy is showing signs of stress, both in structural terms and in terms of the fallout from the Ukraine crisis.

In structural terms, reforms of 2004-2007 period now appear to be firmly shelved and are unlikely to be revived until the sanctions are lifted and some sort of trade and investment normalization takes place. Structural weaknesses will, therefore, remain in place.

In dealing with the crisis fallout, even if Russia were to switch to self-sufficiency in food production and tech supplies for defense sector and oil & gas sector, as well as re-gear its corporate borrowings toward Asia-Pacific markets, the reduced efficiencies due to curtailed trade and specialisation are likely to weigh on the economy. There is absolutely no gain to be had from switching the economy toward an autarky.

Politics aside, it is imperative from economic point of view that Russia starts to make active steps to disentangle itself from Ukrainian crisis. Rebuilding trade and investment relations with the West and Ukraine – both very important objectives for the medium term for Russia – will take a long, long time. It’s best to hit the road sooner than later.


Please note: this is not a note designed to deal with geopolitical crisis unfolding in Ukraine or Russia's role in the crisis. Here, I deal with economics.