Showing posts with label US policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US policy. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 7, 2018

7/3/18: U.S. Economy: May Keynesian Economics and Fiscal Prudence R.I.P.


We've got an old problem, Roger. Deficits and their forward projections:

And the more detailed vision of the problem:

Now, keep in mind: we are accumulating these at the time of an expanding economy and continued accommodative monetary policies. In other words, the spring is being loaded on the double.

May both, Keynesian economics and Fiscal Prudence, R.I.P.

Sunday, April 10, 2016

10/4/16: Russian Bonds Issuance: Some Recent Points of Pressure


Catching up with some data from past few weeks over a number of post and starting with some Russian data.

First, March issue of Russian bonds. The interesting bit relating RUB22.8 billion issuance was less the numbers, but the trend on issuance and issuance underwriting.

First, bid cover was more than four times the amount of August 2021 bonds on offer, raising RUB22.8 billion ($337 million) across
  • fixed-rate notes (bids amounted to RUB47 billion on RUB11.5 billion of August 2021 bonds on offer)
  • floating-rate notes (bids amounted to RUB25 billion on issuance of RUB9.33 billion of December 2017 floating coupon paper) and 
  • inflation-linked securities (amounting to RUB2.01 billion)
This meant that Russia covered in one go 90 percent of its planned issuance for 1Q 2016, as noted by Bloomberg at the time - the highest coverage since 2011. With this, the Finance Ministry will aim to sell RUB270 billion in the 2Q 2016.

Bloomberg provided a handy chart showing as much:


Now, in 2011, Russian economy was still at the very beginning of a structural slowdown period and well ahead of any visibility of sanctions.

Sanctions are not directly impacting sales of Russian Government bonds, but the U.S. has consistently applied pressure on American and European banks attempting to prevent them from underwriting Moscow's Government issues (http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-warns-banks-off-russian-bonds-1456362124). Prior to the auction, Moscow invited 25 Western banks and 3 domestic banks to bid for USD3 billion worth of Eurobonds (the first issuance of Eurobonds by Russia since 2013). Despite the EU official statement that current sanctions regime does not prohibit purchases or sales of Government bonds, Western banks took to the hills (at least officially).

The point of the U.S. pressure on the European banks is a simple threat: in recent years, the U.S. regulators have aggressively pursued European banks for infringements on sanctions against Iran and other activities. In effect, U.S. regulatory enforcement has been used to establish Washington's power point over European banking institutions. And the end game was that, despite being legal, sale of Eurobonds was off limits for BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and UBS, not to mention U.S.-based Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo.

Another dimension of pressure is the denomination of the Eurobond. Moscow wanted Eurobond issued in dollars. However, dollar-issuance requires settlement via the U.S., enhancing U.S. authorities power to exercise arbitrary restriction on a deal that is legal under the U.S. laws (as not being officially covered by sanctions).

Beyond underwriters, even buy-side for Russian Government bonds is being pressured, primarily by the U.S., with a range of European and American investment funds getting hammered: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-24/russia-loses-buyside-support-for-eurobond-after-banks-balk.

Russian Government bonds (10 year benchmark) are trading at around 9.26-9.3 percent yield range, well down on December 2014 peak of over 14.09 percent, but still massively above bonds for countries with comparable macroeconomic performance statistics.



Interestingly, there is a huge demand in the market for Russian Eurobonds, as witnessed by mid-March issuance by Gazprom of bonds denominated in CHF (see: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/gazprom-taps-switzerland-with-russia-s-first-eurobond-this-year).

It is worth noting again that Russian Government bonds are not covered by any sanctions and are completely legal to underwrite and transact in.

Beyond this, the Western sanctions were explicitly designed to avoid placing financial pressures on ordinary Russians. Government bonds are used to fund general Government deficits arising from all lines of Government expenditure, including healthcare, social welfare, education etc, but also including military spending, while excluding supports for sanctioned enterprises and banks (the latter line of expenditure is linked to funds being sourced from the SWF reserves). Given this, the U.S. position on bonds issuance represents a potential departure from the U.S.-stated objective of sanctions and can be interpreted as an attempt to directly induce pain on ordinary Russians (the more vulnerable segments of the population, such as the elderly, children and those in need of healthcare, or as they are termed in Russian - budgetniki - those whose incomes depend on the Budgetary allocations).

This is a sad turn of events from markets and U.S. policy perspectives - placing arbitrary and extra-legal restrictions on transactions that are perfectly legal is not a good policy basis, unless the U.S. objective is to fully politicise financial markets in general. Neither is the U.S. position consistent with the ethical stance de jure adopted under the sanctions regime.

Sunday, October 5, 2014

5/10/2014: US Removes Russia from GSP Access as Biden Admits US 'Leadership' over Europe


This week, amidst generally holding ceasefire in Ukraine and with Russia continuing to constructively engage in the multilateral process of normalisation of Eastern Ukrainian crisis, the US leadership once again shown its hand on the issue of Russian relations with the West. Instead of pausing pressure or starting to return trade and diplomatic relations toward some sort of normalisation, the US actually continued to raise pressure on Russia.

First, earlier in the week, the US issued a decision to terminate Russia's designation as a beneficiary developing country in its Globalised System of Preferences (GSP) - a system that allows developing economies' exporters somewhat 'preferential' access to the US markets at reduced tariffs. This decision was notified on May 7th and officially published by the White House on Friday when it came into force.

The US GSP is a program designed to aid economic growth in developing economies (more than 100 countries and territories) by allowing duty-free entry for up to 5,000 products.

According to the White House statement, President Obama "…determined that Russia is sufficiently advanced in economic development and improved in trade competitiveness that it is appropriate to terminate the designation of Russia as a beneficiary developing country effective October 3, 2014."

The likely outcome of this is, however, uncertain. Russian exports to the US in the categories covered by the GSP programme are primarily in the areas of strategically important materials, including rare-earth metals and other key inputs into production for US MNCs. The same MNCs can purchase these inputs indirectly from outside the US. So, if anything, the White House decision is harming its own companies more than the Russia producers by de facto raising the cost of goods with low degree of substitution.

While, personally, I do not think Russia is a developing country - it is a middle income economy - in my opinion, the best course of diplomacy (in relation to trade) is opening up trade markets and reducing (not raising) trade barriers. This is best targeted by lowering tariffs first and foremost in the areas where private (not state) companies supply exports. GSP is a scheme that should be expanded to include all economies, not just developing ones and the US and Europe should pursue more open trade with Russia and the rest of the CIS. Sadly, the Obama Administration is using trade as a weapon to achieve geopolitical objectives (notably of questionable value, but that is secondary to the fact that trade should not be used as a weapon in the first place, but as a tool for helping achieve longer term objectives closer economic and social cooperation).


In a related matter, the US VP, Joe Biden, openly confirmed this week that the US has directly pressured its European allies to impose sanctions against Russia. On October 3rd, speaking at Harvard University, Joe Biden said that: “It is true - they [European countries] did not want to do that [impose sanctions against Russia] but again it was America’s leadership and the President of the United States insisting, oftentimes almost having to embarrass Europe to stand up and take economic hits to impose cost,” the vice president said.

So, apparently, there was quite a bit of discord in the Western 'unity' camp over the actions against Russia. Which makes you wonder: was that resistance based solely on the European countries concern for the economic impact of sanctions on their own economies, or was it a function of their scepticism over the actual events in Ukraine (the nature of the latest Ukrainian 'revolution'? the role of the Western powers in stirring the conflict? the role of Russian in the conflict? etc)? Or may be all of the above?..


One way or the other, the US is driving a dangerous game. It is pursuing extremely aggressive course of actions against Russia with no concrete road map for de-escalation, no specific targets for policy and no back up strategy for addressing the adverse effects of isolating Russia in other geopolitical issues, such as ISIS, Middle East, Iran, North Korea and so on.