Showing posts with label Tobin Tax. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tobin Tax. Show all posts

Sunday, January 10, 2016

10/1/6: After the Flood Comes the Tax: European Road to Financial Transactions Tax


New paper, forthcoming as Chapter 10 in Lessons from the Great Recession: At the Crossroads of Sustainability and Recovery, edited by Constantin Gurdgiev, Liam Leonard & Alejandra Maria Gonzalez-Perez, Emerald, ASEJ, vol 18; ISBN: 978-1-78560-743-1, titled After the Flood Comes the Tax: European Road to Financial Transactions Tax is now available on my SSRN page: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2713332.


Abstract

This chapter presents the results of the comprehensive literature survey and supportive empirical assessment of the potential impacts of the Financial Transactions Tax recently adopted by the European Commission in response to the significant financial sector misallocations arising from the Global Financial Crisis. A survey of fifty academic articles relating to both Financial Transaction Taxes and Tobin Taxes shows that although a reduction in liquidity can be expected from such taxes, the impacts this will have on volatility and efficiency in a market is less obvious. A regression model quantifying what the possible effect of an introduction of a 0.1% tax on financial transactions would be on trading volumes and levels of volatility in the European equity market confirms the survey results in broader terms. These results can be used to infer that such a tax would likely increase volatility levels but may not have much effect on trading volumes. As a result the proposed tax can be viewed as an exercise in revenue generation but not as a macro-prudential tool for addressing potential future shocks and imbalances within the European financial system.


Saturday, March 8, 2014

8/3/2014: FTT - More Benign Estimates of Impact?


In recent years, I have written extensively about the problems relating to the introduction of a Tobin-styled FTT, including as proposed by the european authorities.

Last year, I cooperated with an academic survey of the extent literature on FTT across various asset markets and instruments. Using meta analysis that study concluded that on the net, FTT will likely result in:
1) revenues well below those expected by the policymakers, and
2) significant reduction in markets efficiency and price discovery, including potential for adverse changes in liquidity risk environment in the markets for major financial instruments.

This February, a new working paper, titled "A General Financial Transactions Tax: Motives, Effects and Implementation According to the Proposal of the European Commission" by Stephan Schulmeister (WP: 461/2014 Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, February 2014 Source: http://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/pubid/47125) summed up "the main arguments in favour and against a FTT" and provided "empirical evidence about the movements of the most important asset prices."

The author shows that "long swings [in the asset prices] result from the accumulation of extremely short-term price runs over time. Therefore a (very) small FTT – between 0.1 and 0.01 percent – would mitigate price volatility not only over the short run but also over the long run."

In this, the paper conclusions are not novel.

It is generally accepted that efficiency-enhancing FTT will require extremely low rate of taxation in order to 'separate' HFT activities from long-only investment activities. The premise for this is well established in the literature: it is believed that higher order volatility in the markets is induced by HFTs and not by long-only or covered shorts positions.

Alas, I am not entirely convinced that we should be concerned with higher order volatility. Short-lived multiple-sigma events - capturing imagination of the media and the public - are not as disruptive as structural crises. And we all know that structural crises have nothing to do with either naked shorting, leveraged shorting or HFTs. These crises are not caused by the active trading. They are caused by active and sustained fraud or passive and sustained failure to enforce existent regulations, or both. On behavioural side, they are also caused by the 'exuberant expectations' - a situation where individuals mis-price directional risks. None of these causes is subject to FTT constraints if the tax is set at the levels where it is not impeding lucidity and price discovery.

So from the very top, the rationale presented in the paper to support FTT introduction (high frequency volatility) is distinct from the rationale presented by the EU leaders for introducing FTT (structural crises).

It is worth noting that Schulmeister puts heavy emphasis in the causality argument on the feed through from HFT to algos, relying on short shocks propagation mechanism via algos-induced changes in the trend.

The problem with this argument is that

  1. It ignores the existence of arbitrage opportunities (lack of contrarian algos is hardly consistent with Schulmeister's worldview)
  2. It also fails to account for reversion to the mean property of algos.


The paper "discusses the most important implementation issues if only a group of 11 EU member countries introduces this tax (without the UK). If London subsidiaries of banks established in one of the FTT countries are treated as part of their parent company, overall FTT revenues of the 11 FTT countries are estimated at € 65.8 billion, if London subsidiaries are treated as British financial institutions, tax revenues would amount to only € 28.3 billion."

The problem with the above that while the amounts are small, potential disruptions to the markets generated by, say, a 10bps tax can be significant. Take equities portfolio, returning 5% pa gross FTT will reduce the base by 0.1% or 0.2% on trade covered by a derivative contract. Thus, for full execute of a simple long-only strategy, involving simple one-direction hedge, the total tax exposure under the 0.1% FTT is 30 bps. Which is consistent with a 6 percent drop on gross return.

Thus, even if FTT were to deliver reduced short-term volatility, since long-only holders face a new tax, equivalent to roughly 1/5th of the CGT (if CGT is set at 30%). This is hardly immaterial.

Another issue arises in the context of the numerical estimates presented in the paper. The upper envelope estimate of EUR65.8 billion is based on the assumption of zero migration by institutions. EUR28.3 billion lower envelope estimate is based on the assumption that some migration is possible to the UK, with such migration triggering FTT application only to one side of trade (the side domiciled in FTT-imposing country). Alas, obviously, the exercise fully ignores the possibility to both sides of the trade migrating to non-FTT jurisdiction.

Friday, June 14, 2013

14/6/2013: EU's FTT: One Tax, Multiple Problems

FTT - Financial Transactions Tax - has been the pet project of pure love for Eurocrats and Socialistas in the Member States, hungry for revenue. It has been labelled a 'Robin Hood Tax' because the politicians attempted to sell it as a tax on filthy-rich financial services to redistribute to starving unemployed, presumably, despite the simple fact that in the un-competitive and fragmented market for financial services that is Europe, such a tax - any tax - will be fully passed onto ordinary savers, investors, depositors and in general onto the users of financial services.

The EU Commission published volumes of commissioned - made-to-order - research that shows just how brilliant an idea the FTT really is: it will raise loads of revenues, harm no one and will not reduce financial markets efficiency. Stopping just short of declaring the FTT to be a panacea to common cold, the EU enthusiastically propagandized the idea despite the simple fact that vast majority of academic research on the topic of transactions taxes finds that they are either ineffective as means for revenue raising or costly in terms of economic efficiency.

I wrote about this (see link at the bottom of this post below) and will continue to write, not because I long for an easy life for the bankers or financial investors, but because I recognise the fact that investment markets are necessary to the functioning of the society and the economy, and because I also recognise that more open, less restricted, but well-regulated and strictly enforced financial services are better than anything that Brussels et al can conceive in their technocratic dreams.

So in line with the past record, here's another study (http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/an-evaluation-of-the-financial-transaction-tax) that explores "...whether the FTT is likely to correct the market failures that have contributed to the financial crisis, how well the FTT is likely to succeed in raising revenues, and how the FTT compares to alternative taxes in terms of efficiency."

The study finds (emphasis is mine) "... little evidence that the FTT will be effective in correcting
market failures. Taxing of transactions is not well targeted at behaviour that leads to excessive risk and
systemic risk creation. The empirical evidence does not suggest that the introduction of an FTT reduces
volatility or asset price bubbles. Transaction taxes will likely reduce investment in trading activity and
information acquisition, but also raise the costs of insurance against currency and interest risks by
companies, insurers and pension funds. The welfare effect of that is unclear."

"The FTT will likely raise significant revenues, in spite of the fact that the tax base is highly elastic. In the short term, the incidence of the tax will be chiefly on the current holders of securities. Ultimately, the tax will be borne in part by end users, and we estimate the likely effects on economic growth."

"When compared to alternative forms of taxation of the financial sector, the FTT is likely less efficient given the amount of revenues. In particular, taxes that more directly address existing distortions (such as the current VAT exemption for banks, and the bias towards debt financing) provide more efficient alternatives."


And here's a report from the Open Europe think-tank on the FTT, assessing the EU Commission response to the concerns of the eleven - that right, eleven - member states: (http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/if-you-had-kept-quiet-you-would-have.html)

Quote: "The Commission's response ranges from weak to capricious to outright ridiculous. For example, when it says that "we're not aware of any credit crunch" in Europe."

What else is new?

Note: I wrote about the concerns around the issues of repos and hedging here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/3052013-ftt-up-down-down-again-climbing.html


Links to past articles on FTT: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/search?q=FTT&max-results=20&by-date=true
You can search this blog for key words and sort the posts by relevance or date.

Thursday, May 30, 2013

30/5/2013: FTT: Up, Down, Down again: Climbing Political Hillocks in Europe

Looks like the EU is now climbing down another over-hyped policy hillock. After scrapping plans to ban / regulate olive oil in restaurants, the EU is now moving in the direction of drastically undercutting original plans for the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT).

I outlined on a number of occasions numerous reasons why FTT was a bad idea for the EU (see set of posts here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/search?q=FTT&max-results=20&by-date=true). The latest changes in the EU seem to be related primarily to the rate of tax (see http://www.ifre.com/brussels-plans-major-scaling-back-of-financial-trading-tax/21088491.article).

However, also per article: "Rather than levying trade in stocks, bonds and some derivatives from 2014, it may now apply to shares only next year and to bonds up to two years later." Again, sadly, the new changes are way off, as argued here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/2652013-ftt-v-sovereigns-addiction-to.html .

The real problem is that there is no way to structure a reasonably efficient FTT. None at all. Any FTT proposal will strike either one or some of the outcomes below:

  1. Raise too much revenue, chocking off market efficiency and damaging liquidity
  2. Raise too little revenue, making no real differences in any direction
  3. Push high volume (liquidity-enhancing) and low margin (information-disclosing) transactions out of open markets platforms into dark pools and off-shore
  4. Incentivise even more debt over equity
At some point in time, we must realise that any defence of FTT is at this stage is nothing but political face-saving.

Sunday, May 26, 2013

26/5/2013: FTT v Sovereigns' Addiction to Debt



FT.com reports (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3121802-c480-11e2-9ac0-00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fhome_us%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2UQE68h14) that 

"The European Central Bank has offered to help the EU redesign its financial transactions tax to avoid any ‘negative impact’ on market stability, highlighting official fears about the implementation of the levy."

So far so good, as FTT indeed is likely to cut liquidity in the markets, reducing markets efficiency, and potentially increasing volatility, rather thane educing it.

Of course, the original idea the EU came up involved levying tax on trading in bonds, equities and derivatives. So one would expect the following prioritisation from the ECB concerned with markets impacts:
1) Not to distinguish between bonds and equities in tax application and rates, as the two instruments are de facto long-only instruments in either corporate (real) economy, banks (financial economy) and sovereigns (for bonds - which somewhat qualifies as a real economy as well).
2) Levy tax primarily on derivative instruments (although here, tax can be avoided much easier)
3) Recognise that in the restricted competition environment and with legacy subsidies from the crisis period still in place for incumbent financial institutions, any FTT will be at least in part passed onto retail investors and savers, and in more extreme cases - e.g. duopoly model of banking in Ireland - onto all retail users of banking services)
4) Real economy - incomes, investment, entrepreneurship, unemployment, etc - will be most impacted by the FTT levied on real assets - equities and some (not all) bonds and this effect will be stronger the stronger is the banking and investment banking sector concentration in the economy.

Alas, as is clear from the FT.com article, the ECB is not concerned with (3) and (4) whatsoever, and it is unconcerned with (1) either. It also seems to be aware of (2) pitfalls. Aside from that, ECB is concerned with the perennial task faced by all European Government - the obsession of raising as much tax revenue as possible while incentivising more debt pumped into sovereign bond markets.


Per FT.com: "The ECB believes markets should efficiently “transmit” changes in interest rates to the real economy." You might think that this means transmitting higher (lower) ECB rates into higher (lower) (a) Government bond yields and (b) higher/lower cost of private credit. Err… you would be wrong.

Per FT.com there are rumours that "…the ECB would prefer to have a limited UK-style stamp duty on equities". What can possibly go wrong, then?

ECB concern is clearly to grease the wheels of sovereign bond markets. The fact that FTT will reduce markets liquidity in real instruments & will cost retail investors in the end - well, that is hardly ECB's concern at all. ECB like the EU Governments is only worried about own coffers & give no attention to the economy.  

Equity markets volatility (FTT original raison d'être is to reduce volatility) had NOTHING to do with the current crises. The ECB focus on 'UK-styled stamp duty on equities', if confirmed, thus exposes FTT as a pure scam to raise more tax revenues, not a measure to deal with 'markets instability'. 

As FT.com quotes one of the market participants: "bond markets were a “phenomenally attractive” way of channelling savings into investment." Alas, it is not - corporate bonds are debt. Shoving more debt while disincentivising equity investment is not a great idea for long term sustainable funding.

In Europe, lending money to Governments, including to fund dodgy unfunded pensions and white elephant projects, is tax-wise deemed to be more laudable than to invest in equity of real enterprises. By corollary, lending to companies is also deemed to be more preferential than funding them via equity. One of the outcomes of this decades-long preferential treatment of debt is the current crisis: over-bloated and under-funded public spending coupled with too much private debt (including banking debt) against too little equity (the latter imbalance drove the bailouts of banks in euro area periphery).

With this in mind, talking about 'Robin Hood' taxes on Financial Services in EU is equivalent to believing in Santa's Magic raindeer as a viable alternative for public transport.

Friday, November 16, 2012

16/11/2012: FTT - two bits of new evidence


Financial Transactions Tax news:

First we have new research from the Bank of Canada (link here) stating:
"Little evidence is found to suggest that an FTT would reduce speculative trading or volatility. In fact, several studies conclude that an FTT increases volatility and bid-ask spreads and decreases trading volume. Furthermore, a number of challenges associated with the design and effectiveness of an FTT could limit the revenues that FTTs are intended to raise. For these reasons, countries considering the
imposition of FTTs should be aware of their negative consequences and the challenges involved in implementation."

And next we have early stage evidence from just a few months of FTT operations in France: here.

I wrote on the topic of FTT for a number of years now. Here's an article from 2010. Here's more from 2010. And more on the blog. I am also working with two co-authors on a comprehensive literature review of the FTT, which so far is not going well for supporting the idea of FTT.

Stay tuned.

Updated: and here's a SoberLook take on the French experience with FTT. Paragraph below the quote explains the little French problem... oh, well, it's a War on Speculators, then.