Showing posts with label Tech. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tech. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

16/5/17: Technology: Jobs Displacement v Enhancement


Technological innovation is driving revolutionary changes across the labour markets and more broadly, markets for human capital. These changes are structural, deep and accelerating, and, owing to their nature, are not yet sufficiently understood or researched.

One theoretically plausible aspect of the technological innovation in terms of human capital effects is the expected impact of technology on demand for (and therefore supply of) different occupations. For example, we know that technology can act as a complement to or a substitute for labour.

In the former case, we can expect advancement of technology to create more jobs that are closely linked to enhancing technological innovation, deployment and productivity. In other words, we can expect more geeks. And we can expect - given lags in education and training - that as demand for geeks rises, their wages will rise in the short run before falling rather rapidly in the longer term.

In the latter case, there is a bit less certain, however. Yes, technology’s primary objective is to lower costs of production and increase value added. As a result, it is going to displace vast numbers of workers who can be substituted for via technological innovation. However, not all substitutable workers are made of the same cloth and not all technological innovation is capable of achieving unambiguous returns on investment necessary to sustain it. Take, for example, an expensive robot that costs, say, USD 600.000 a pop, but can only replace 3 lower skilled workers in a laundromat, earning USD16,000 per annum. So with benefits etc factored in, the cost of these 3 workers will be around USD70,000 per annum. It makes absolutely zero sense to replace these workers with new tech at least any time before the tech systems become fully self-replicating and extremely cheap. So, for really lower skills distributions, we can expect that jobs displacement by technology is unlikely to materialise soon. But for mid-range wages, consistent with mid-range skills, there is a stronger case for jobs displacement.

All of which suggests that we are likely to see a U-shaped polarisation process arising when it comes to jobs distribution across the skills segments: higher wage segment rising in total share of employment, as complementarity effects drive jobs creation here; and the lower wage segment also rising in total employment, as robots-induced increase in value added across the economy translates into greater demand for low-skills jobs that cannot be efficiently displaced by technology, yet. In the middle, however, we are likely to witness a cratering of employment. Here, the workers are neither complementary to robots, nor are they earning low enough wages to make expensive robots non-viable as a replacement alternative for labour.

Interestingly, we are already witnessing this trend. In fact, we have been witnessing it since the early 1990s. For example, Harrigan, James and Reshef, Ariell and Toubal, Farid paper titled “The March of the Techies: Technology, Trade, and Job Polarization in France, 1994-2007”, published March 2016, by NBER (NBER Working Paper No. w22110: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755382) looked into “employee-firm-level data on the entire private sector from 1994 to 2007” in France.

The authors “show that the labor market in France has polarised: employment shares of high and low wage occupations have grown, while middle wage occupations have shrunk.” So the story is consistent with an emerging U-shaped labour market response to technological innovation on the extensive margin (in headcount terms). And more, the authors also find that inside margin also polarised, as “…the share of hours worked in technology-related occupations ("techies") grew substantially, as did imports and exports.”

However, the authors also look at a deeper relationship between technology and jobs polarisation. In fact, they find that, causally, “polarisation occurred within firms”, but that effect was “…mostly due to changes in the composition of firms (between firms). [And] …firms with more techies in 2002 saw greater polarization, and grew faster, from 2002 to 2007. Offshoring reduced employment growth. Among blue-collar workers in manufacturing, importing caused skill upgrading while exporting caused skill downgrading.”


Sunday, April 24, 2016

24/4/16: Silicon Valley Blues Go Into a Sax Solo...


In recent weeks, I have been covering growing evidence of pressures in the ICT sector bubble (the Silicon valley blues of shrinking VC valuations and funding). You can track this coverage from here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/04/21416-taking-sugar-from-kids-pantry.html.

Now, with its usual tardiness, the Fortune arrives to the topic too, in a rather good exposition here: http://fortune.com/silicon-valley-tech-ipo-market/.

Good summary graphic from Renaissance Capital:


But, of course, what is more interesting in the sector development is the horror show of earnings reporting that is unfolding across mature segment of the tech sector. These are well-covered here: http://wolfstreet.com/2016/04/24/apple-iphone-revenue-decline-sinks-tech-sector-earnings/, offering the following summary:


So let's see: earnings in mature segment are falling or the 5th quarter in a row (even when you control for Apple performance); earnings of Apple (tech leader) are into their second consecutive quarter of severe pressures. And unicorns (which don't even offer any serious basis for fundamentals-based valuations, including those on the basis of earnings) are rapidly taking on water. You don't really need a CFA to get this one right...

Thursday, April 21, 2016

21/4/16: Taking Sugar From the Kids Pantry: Tech Sector Valuations


In a recent post I covered some data showing the trend toward more sceptical funding environment for the U.S. (and European) tech start ups: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/04/15416-tech-sector-finance-gravity-of.html.

Recently, Quartz added some interesting figures to the topic: http://qz.com/664468/investors-are-slashing-startup-valuations-and-not-even-uber-and-airbnb-are-safe/.


Things are not quite getting back to fundamentals, yet... but when they do, tech sector hype will blow up like a soap bubble in a tub. When the entire sector is valued on the basis of some nefarious stats instead of hard corporate finance parameters, you are into a game that is what Russian Roulette is to a Poker table.

Saturday, June 20, 2015

20/6/15: WLASze: Weekend Links of Arts, Sciences & zero economics


Couple of non-economics related, but hugely important links worth looking into... or an infrequent entry into my old series of WLASze: Weekend Links of Arts, Sciences and zero economics...

Firstly, via Stanford, we have a warning about the dire state of naturehttp://news.stanford.edu/news/2015/june/mass-extinction-ehrlich-061915.html. A quote: "There is no longer any doubt: We are entering a mass extinction that threatens humanity's existence." if we think we can't even handle a man-made crisis of debt overhang in the likes of Greece, what hope do we have in handling the existential threat?

Am I overhyping things? May be. Or may be not. As population ages, our ability to sustain ourselves is increasingly dependent on better food, nutrition, quality of environment etc. Not solely because we want to eat/breath/live better, but also because of brutal arithmetic: economic activity that sustains our lives depends on productivity. And productivity declines precipitously with ageing population.

So even if you think the extinction event is a rhetorical exaggeration by a bunch of scientists, brutal (and even linear - forget complex) systems of our socio-economic models imply serious and growing inter-connection between our man-made shocks and natural systems capacity to withstand them.


Secondly, via the Slate, we have a nagging suspicion that not everything technologically smart is... err... smart: "Meet the Bots: Artificial stupidity can be just as dangerous as artificial intelligence
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/04/artificial_stupidity_can_be_just_as_dangerous_as_artificial_intelligence.html.

"Bots, like rats, have colonized an astounding range of environments. …perhaps the most fascinating element here is that [AI sceptics] warnings focus on hypothetical malicious automatons while ignoring real ones."

The article goes on to list examples of harmful bots currently populating the web. But it evades the key question asked in the heading: what if AI is not intelligent at all, but is superficially capable of faking intelligence to a degree? Imagine the world where we co-share space with bots that can replicate emotional, social, behavioural and mental intelligence up to a high degree, but fail beyond certain bound. What then? Will the average / median denominator of human interactions converge to that bound as well? Will we gradually witness disappearance of human capacity of by-pass complex, but measurable or mappable systems of logic, thus reducing the richness and complexity of our own world? If so, how soon will humanity become a slightly improved model of today's Twitter?


Thirdly, "What happens when we can’t test scientific theories?" via the Prospect Mag: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/what-happens-when-we-cant-test-scientific-theories
"Scientific knowledge is supposed to be empirical: to be accepted as scientific, a theory must be falsifiable… This argument …is generally accepted by most scientists today as determining what is and is not a scientific theory. In recent years, however, many physicists have developed theories of great mathematical elegance, but which are beyond the reach of empirical falsification, even in principle. The uncomfortable question that arises is whether they can still be regarded as science."

The reason why this is important to us is that the question of falsifiability of modern theories is non-trivial to the way we structure our inquiry into the reality: the distinction between art, science and philosophy becomes blurred when one set of knowledge relies exclusively on the tools used in the other. So much so, that even the notion of knowledge, popularly associated with inquiry delivered via science, is usually not extendable to art and philosophy. Example in a quote: “Mathematical tools enable us to
investigate reality, but the mathematical concepts themselves do not necessarily imply physical reality”.

Now, personally, I don't give a damn if something implies physical reality or not, as long as that something is not designed to support such an implication. Mathematics, therefore, is a form of knowledge and we don't care if there are physical reality implications of it or not. But physical sciences purport to hold a specific, more qualitatively important corner of knowledge: that of being physically grounded in 'reality'. In other words, the very alleged supremacy of physical sciences arises not from their superiority as fields of inquiry (quality of insight is much higher in art, mathematics and philosophy than in, say, biosciences and experimental physics), but in their superiority in application (gravity has more tangible applications to our physical world than, say, topology).

So we have a crisis of sorts for physical sciences: their superiority is now run out of the road and has to yield to the superiority of abstract fields of knowledge. Bad news for humanity: deterministic nature of experimental knowledge is getting exhausted. With it, determinism surrounding our concept of knowledge diminishes too. Good news for humanity: this does not change much. Whether or not the string theory is provable is irrelevant to us. As soon as it becomes relevant, it will be, by Popperian definition, falsifiable. Until then, marvel of the infinite world of abstract.

Thursday, December 25, 2014

25/12/2014: Skilled Immigration and Employment in the U.S.


There is a persistent debate in economics about the effects of migration of the highly-skilled workers on employment prospects and careers of the natives. Here is one interesting study looking at such effects within the context of the targeted immigration programme based on skills within the particular set of sectors - the STEM, or more commonly, Science and Technology.

Kerr, Sari Pekkala and Kerr, William R. and Lincoln, William Fabius, Skilled Immigration and the Employment Structures of U.S. Firms (see arvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 14-040: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354963) "study the impact of skilled immigrants on the employment structures of U.S. firms … [accounting for] the fact that many skilled immigrant admissions are driven by firms themselves (e.g., the H-1B visa)." The authors "find rising overall employment of skilled workers with increased skilled immigrant employment by firm. Employment expansion is greater for younger natives than their older counterparts, and departure rates for older workers appear higher for those in STEM occupations compared to younger worker."

From the point of view of countries, like Ireland, relatively open to immigration of skilled workers, but without a specific skills-based 'filter' (Irish system is open to migrants on the basis of nationality, rather than skills, but has strong selection biases into skills-based immigration due to lack of jobs creation outside the STEM categories of jobs), the above suggests that skills depreciation in the STEM sector can be a problem for the natives. As supply of younger STEM employees from abroad rises, there can be a tendency for displacement of older workers, premature termination or flattening out of careers and, subsequently, lower supply of pensions and income provisions in later years of life.

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

24/6/2014: US Productivity Slowdown: It's Structural & Nasty


"Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession" a new paper by John Fernald (NBER Working Paper No. 20248, June 2014) looks at the U.S. labor and total-factor productivity growth slowdown prior to the Great Recession in the context of the slowdown "located in industries that produce information technology (IT) or that use IT intensively, consistent with a return to normal productivity growth after nearly a decade of exceptional IT-fueled gains". In a sense, the paper reinforces the point of view that I postulated in my TEDx talk last year dealing with the 'end' of the Age of Tech (here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/14112013-human-capital-age-of-change.html).

Fernald opens the paper with a set of two quotes. One brilliantly describes the core question we face:
"When we look back at the 1990s, from the perspective of say 2010,…[w]e may conceivably conclude…that, at the turn of the millennium, the American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation….Alternatively, that 2010 retrospective might well conclude that a good deal of what we are currently experiencing was just one of the many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human history." Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2000)

Fernald argues that "The past two decades have seen the rise and fall of exceptional U.S. productivity growth. This paper argues that labor and total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth slowed prior to the Great Recession. It marked a retreat from the exceptional, but temporary, information-technology (IT)-fueled pace from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This retreat implies slower output growth going forward as well as a narrower output gap than recently estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2014a)."

Figure 1 from the paper illustrates how the mid-1990s surge in productivity growth indeed ended prior to the Great Recession. The rise in labor-productivity growth, shown by the height of the bars, came after several decades of slower growth. But, notes Fernald, "in the decade ending in 2013:Q4, growth has returned close to its 1973-95 pace. The figure shows that the slower pace of growth in both labor productivity and TFP was similar in the four years prior to the onset of the Great Recession as in the six years since."



And things have been bad since. Labour productivity growth (slope of liner trend below) is now on par with what we have been witnessing in 1973-1995, and shallower than in 1995-2003. But the trend is still close to actual performance, which signals little potential for any appreciable acceleration:


Beyond labour productivity, things are even messier. Charts below plot the Great Recession against other recessions in terms of productivity, output and labour utilisation:







Notes: For each plot, quarter 0 is the NBER business-cycle peak which, for the Great Recession,
corresponds to 2007:Q4. The shaded regions show the range of previous recessions since 1953. Local
means are removed from all growth rates prior to cumulating, using a biweight kernel with bandwidth of 48 quarters. Source is Fernald (2014).

All of the above show the cyclical disaster that is the current Great Recession, but crucially, they show poor recent performance in Labour Productivity, exceptionally poor performance in Hours of Labour used, disastrous performance in Total Factor Productivity… in other words - historically problematic trends relating to productivity, labour utilisation and tech-related productivity in the current recession compared to all previous recessions.

But more worrying is that, as Fernald notes: "That the slowdown predated the Great Recession rules out causal stories from the recession itself. …The evidence here complements Kahn and Rich’s (2013) finding in a regime-switching model that, by early 2005—i.e., well before the Great Recession—the probability reached nearly unity that the economy was in a low-growth regime."

So what's behind all of this slowing productivity growth? "A natural hypothesis is that the slowdown was the flip side of the mid-1990s speedup. Considerable evidence… links the TFP speedup to the exceptional contribution of IT—computers, communications equipment, software, and the Internet. IT has had a broad-based and pervasive effect through its role as a general purpose technology (GPT) that fosters complementary innovations, such as business reorganization. Industry TFP data provide evidence in favor of the IT hypothesis versus alternatives. Notably, the euphoric, “bubble” sectors of housing, finance, and natural resources do not explain the slowdown. Rather, the slowdown is in the remaining ¾ of the economy, and is concentrated in industries that produce IT or that use IT intensively. IT users saw a sizeable bulge in TFP growth in the early 2000s, even as IT spending itself slowed. That pattern is consistent with the view that benefiting from IT takes substantial intangible organizational investments that, with a lag, raise measured productivity. By the mid-2000s, the low-hanging fruit of IT had been plucked."

This a hugely far-reaching paper with two related implied conclusions:

  1. Prepare for structurally slower growth period in the US (and global) economy as the last catalyst for growth - tech - appears to have been exhausted; and
  2. The Age of Tech is now in the part of the cycle where returns to innovation and technology are falling, while returns to financial assets overlaying tech sector are still going strong. The classic bubble scenario is being formed once again, as always on foot of disconnection between the real economic returns to the assets and asset valuations. This bubble will have to deflate.