Showing posts with label NAMA legislation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NAMA legislation. Show all posts

Thursday, September 10, 2009

Economics 10/09/2009: Greens' 'proposal' might lead to lingering capital problems post-Nama

Oliver Gilvarry of Dolmen - a clear supporter of Nama As Is proposal in today's note: "The tax will be 80% of the profits gained from the increase in land value following a re-zoning decision. The impact of risk sharing in NAMA will be to reduce the liquidity generated by the banks on the sale of loans to NAMA. It could also reduce the capital relief banks will experience from the transfer of loans as a certain amount of capital may have to be put aside for the subordinated NAMA bonds they will receive unlike the other NAMA bonds."

This is exactly the point I made yesterday (here). The Greens' helping hand can just as well cost the taxpayers when the banks come begging to Leni again... post-Nama.

And this bring us to Mr Cowen's performance on today's Prime Time. Hmmm - the Gods gotta be laughing somewhere in ancient Rome's temples. Mr Cowen now wants to bring living standards back to 2007 peak levels by taxing us to death, issuing more debt against our future incomes than was ever issued in this country history before, spending like a drunken sailor, not reforming public sector pay and pensions, running vast deficits and... hold your breath... restoring credit and liquidity flows with a Nama-style undertaking?

You can almost see this working in theory, can't you.

You can't? Well, to be honest neither can I. Here is why, quickly:

Nama is about working out bad loans written against bad assets. It is, therefore, an investment undertaking with a life-span of decades. Liquidity provision is a short-term undertaking aiming to increase money supply in the economy that is free to move across the economy.

Nama bonds will not provide such a 'liquidity event' for three reasons:
  1. As an investment undertaking Nama will need credit of its own to work through the loans and underlying assets, so to assume that banks will simply lend-out the €60bn pot of cash they will get from Nama automatically assumes that the cost of working out Nama loans will be financed through some other sources. Is Brian Cowen actually envisioning another issue of debt to finance this undertaking?
  2. As an undertaking to repair balance sheets of the banks, Nama will fund capital base, not lending funds on banks books. In other words, for banks with an average 173% loans to deposits ratio, any cash they can get will have to be locked in a vault. Nama funds cannot be disbursed in new loans.
  3. The Greens have just shaved off a large chunk of the 'liquidity' pool through their 'risk sharing' gizmo.
Now, Taoiseach has clearly told the nation when he claimed that Nama is based on 'international advice' and 'best advice available'. Given that the side critical of Nama includes virtually all leading Irish economics and finance specialists from academia and a handful of foreign academics, including at least 3 Nobel Prize winners, plus Swedish politicians responsible for their 'bad bank' work-out, I fail to see how can the 'best advice available' actually completely exclude the truly best advice made available to the Government.

Finally, Cowen refused to step in to offer even a momentary protection to ordinary households when he was asked if mortgage defaulters will be protected. Mr Cowen has made it now record-clear that his Government is unconcerned about consumers, taxpayers and ordinary entrepreneurs. It is banks who must be rescued.

The more they (Leni, Ahearne, Cowen - oh, and why not call Mary Coughlan out of her retirement to pedal Nama-cakes too) dig, the deeper is the hole... after all they did dig Brian Cowen out of his hole where he resided for some 5 months post April Budget and back into the RTE studios - twice within the span of 5 days last...

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Economics 09/09/2009: Has the Green Party Leadership Sold the Country for a Broom?

Gutless and short of any sort of vision!

The Green Party leadership (per RTE here) has announced a series of "significant changes" to the Nama bill. So what are those significant changes, then?

Before we dive into the details, here is what the papers are not telling you - Green Ministers, the birdie has chirped (hat tip to KOD), received a trade-off from FF: in exchange for introducing a Carbon Tax they signed off on Nama. Why this is the bad news for the Greens and the country? Two reasons:
  • First a minor one - Nama is infinitely more important to this country than the Carbon Tax, so much so, that the Greens' leadership in effect sold family jewels to buy a new broom;
  • Second a major one - Carbon Tax is simply another punitive unavoidable tax for this country. Do not confuse it with some environment improvement incentive measure. Here is why. If Carbon Tax were to be a true behavior modification tax, then at least in theory its introduction should induce people to opt for greener alternatives: use of more public transport (that should be less polluting), more telecommuting, more energy efficiency etc. All of these are good things. But the problem is that a family that works in Dublin and, because of past FF policies was forced to buy their house in Cavan (for example), there is no alternative to driving and there is no alternative to switch to 'cleaner' energy. Indeed, with ESB (legacy of FF) in charge of generation and Eirgrid (legacy of FF) in charge of the grid, we have no real less polluting alternative. So Carbon tax will be unavoidable to many of us and thus it fails as a real 'behavior modification' tax.
  • (Note 1: Carbon Tax is not a punitive tax for middle class Dublin and Cork voters - core Green constituency, so the question I would ask Messr Greens - are you selling the entire country in hope that your small number of voters will swallow the pill?)
  • (Note 2: Has the Green Party leadership signed off on Nama before their general party meeting in an attempt to prevent democratic process within the party forcing their leadership to take a more ethical position on Nama?)
Which brings us to the conclusion on this sad chapter in Irish Green Movement history - Ministers Ryan, Gormley, Sargent and Senator Boyle did indeed agree to Nama in exchange for being allowed to levy another consumer-abusing tax that will feed general budget hole left by the grotesque spending commitments of this Government.

Now to the news:

Just minutes ago Minister Ryan has told the nation that Nama is ok because Ireland will be getting money from ECB at a very low cost. This is the long-mulled 1.5% assertion. To remind you all - Nama supporters have for some time made the claim that Nama will come cheap - at 1.5% ECB financing rate. Of course, they won't tell us the term. We are in the dark as to how long will the maturity of these bonds be.

Here comes the flashlight: 1.5% charge is consistent with 9-month paper. This will be fine, if we are borrowing to cover short term liability. Or if we were looking at ordinary sort of repos volumes, so that rolling the bonds issued at 1.5% would not be a problem on an annual (or even less) basis. But hold your breath -
  • We will be rolling over some €55-70bn in Nama paper annually! Plus whatever we get to borrow on short term to finance our ordinary deficits, say odd €15bn. Total amount of Irish bonds to be rolled over at the end of 2010 can thus be €60-85bn, in 2013 this amount will reach €104-120bn once interest is rolled up - that means that by 2013, 34-39% of Irish expected GDP will be rolled over in short term bond markets! I thought, honestly, that borrowing short to buy long term assets has gone out of fashion some time ago in the current crisis!
  • A 1.50% is a premium of 1.25% over the ECB rate, and 50bps above the ECB fixed rate tenders. Back in Fall 2008 - amidst raging crisis, ECB rate was 3.25% and tenders were at 4.75% in October 2000. What happens if we go back there? In say 5 years time? By then, cumulated roll over will amount to €120-135bn and our 2016 interest bill on this Green Party legacy will be €5.3-6.4bn. That is interest charge alone!
Finally, let us look at the last set of news on the Green Party leadership shameful surrender. Per RTE site report: "Minister Eamon Ryan said the new measures would increase the protection afforded to the taxpayer." How? Apparently via:
  • The introduction of risk sharing between the banks and NAMA: "in the case of a small proportion of the loans, the banks will not get all the money immediately. Whether or not the banks would get a further payment would depend on whether NAMA is successful.
  • A windfall tax of 80% on profits will apply to developers where they gain from land that is rezoned.
  • The amount of money NAMA can borrow will also be cut from €10bn to €5bn.
  • The new agency will be obliged to report to the Minister for Finance every three months instead of the annually as included in the earlier draft legislation.
What does all of it mean?

First bullet point above: remember that 'levy' on banks that was deemed unfeasible because it creates an implicit option on the banks? Well, the same, in converse, applies to this risk-sharing scheme. If a share of proceeds issued to the banks will be held back, it simply cannot be brought into banks capital reserves without adjusting for the risk of Nama failing. What should such risk adjustment assume about the probability of Nama failure (which will mean banks don't get that extra cash)? Go back to my and other's estimates of the expected losses under Nama. Even Davy Stockbrokers earlier showed that Nama is likely to generate a net loss of ca 5bn. So even by Nama cheerleaders assumption, Nama cannot be expected to work. Thus, the proposed risk sharing scheme will never pay out that share of funds 'held back'. In other words, the expected value of the 'held back' share is Nil!

Further problem arises in the context of the Nama being lauded by various financial analysts (stock brokers etc) as the 'liquidity' event. In other words, it is supposed to solve the problem of our banks' balancesheets and inject liquidity into banks. Now, the amount to be injected will be reduced by exactly the amount of this 'held-back' payment. So if Nama was to be a success because it was injecting liquidity, holding this liquidity back certainly constitutes now a failure of Nama.

Lastly, Nama was supposed to reduce the risk of banks coming to the Exchequer and asking for direct recapitalization. The more 'risk sharing' is involved, the lower will be risk-weighted capital and the greater will be post-Nama demand for recapitalization. So, again, if Nama was in the first place to reduce secondary round of capital demand, new risk-sharing scheme will increase it.

Second bullet point: folks, I thought we were told that developers are not being rescued by Nama. So which profits are they taxing? You can't, Minister Lenihan, have a cake and eat it. Either Nama will rescue the developers (by helping them achieve profit in which case an 80% tax makes sense) or it will not rescue developers (in which case there will be no profits and an 80% tax makes no sense). I wonder if Eamon Ryan actually gave a single thought to this absurd proposal!

Third bullet point: this is irrelevant, because the proposed bill allows Nama to borrow unspecified (unlimited) amount of money in the future with approval of the Minister. So who cares if they can borrow 10bn or 5bn on day one of their operations if they can borrow 30bn more on day two of their existence? Again, have Ministers Gormley and Ryan actually given a single thought to what they were signing?

Fourth bullet point: reporting to the Minister for Finance (behind the closed doors and no public scrutiny) is simply short of proper transparency and accountability procedures. It does not matter how often it is done. Putting a phone connecting two windowless and door-less rooms ain't going to let any light into either one of them, Messr Gormley and Ryan.

So to sum up - we now have it on the record. Ministers Gormley and Ryan, alongside the rest of the Cabinet have signed off on a document that will:
  1. Coercively take ordinary people's incomes;
  2. Clandestinely pass the money over to the banks;
  3. Creating a buffer of opaqueness and evasion of responsibility and accountability between themselves and us, the taxpayers;
  4. The banks will have no incentive to lend to the economy, the households will have no money to pay the bills - a new wave of mortgage defaults and personal loans defaults will be rolling over the banks. The economy will stagnate. Property markets will stagnate. Emigration will be back with the 1980s vengence.
Full stop. Nothing else worth adding.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Economics 02/09/2009: ECB legal eagles picking at the NAMA carcass

The ECB  legal opinion note on Nama provides some interesting reading.

Per ECB (§1.1) Nama is designed to “expeditiously deal with the assets acquired by it and protect or otherwise enhance the long-term economic value of those assets, in the interests of the Irish State”. Several things are going on here.

  1. the ‘expeditious’ nature of Nama is referred to in Part 1 §2 (b) line (viii) of the draft bill and Part 2, Chapter 1, §10 (1)(b). However, §2 page 21 states: “
  2. So far as possible, NAMA shall, expeditiously and consistently with the achievement of  the purposes specified in subsection (1), obtain the best achievable financial return for the State…” Has anyone spotted a slight contradiction? Assets will be disposed expeditiously, Nama will act expeditiously, but asset pricing will be based on long-term valuations. This is known as a maturity mismatch risk – the objectives are ‘expeditiously’ short-medium term, pricing is long-term.
  3. As the ECB states, repeating Nama legislation language correctly, Nama will aim to guard the interest of the Irish state. Now, the State does not have the existent allocated means for such an undertaking, so to pay for Nama, it has to use taxpayers’ money in an emergency draw on resources. Since the Irish State is not spending on Nama the money that belongs to it, why should the State interests be protected by Nama and not those of the payee, i.e the taxpayer? Of course, the only way that Nama legislation makes sense from the point of view of protecting our property rights and liberty is if State interest = Taxpayer interest. This is, alas, not so. Irish State under the current Government has been run as a thiefdom of public sector unions and vested interest groups. This, of course, is not and should not be of concern to the ECB. But it should be of concern to ourselves, the taxpayers, and to the opposition.
Further per ECB §1.1: “As noted by the Minister, replacing property related loans with Irish Government bonds will strengthen the balance sheets of the banks”. So this is it, then, the ECB has clearly agreed that Nama bonds will not be off-balancesheet for the Exchequer, but will be ‘Government bonds’ and thus countable into the overall:

  • Public debt;
  • Future public bonds risk premia;
  • Future demand for public bonds issued by the Irish Exchequer
Now, note that consistent with what minister Lenihan told the Oireachtas committee yesterday – something that the Government evaded saying out loud – the bonds will have to be ‘marketable’ in the open market, so their pricing cannot bear artificially low interest rates. This validates my (and other’s) earlier assumptions on long-term Irish bonds pricing for Nama at a coupon of 5-6%pa in 2021.

ECB §1.3 recognizes that Nama is planning to purchase a wide range of assets, including “any other class of assets” (other than loans and collateralized products). This, of course, opens Nama to political favouritism with the banks (in exchange for no layoffs and for not skinning their customers) and with the specific developers. It also, potentially, allows Nama to expand its mandate to cover mortgages and other loans. In the end, this little clause opens up a possibility to a wholesale redrawing of the already blurred boundaries between Irish businesses and the State.

The same paragraph in the ECB note also acknowledges that Nama will cover rolled up interest and re-financed products – a land mine when it comes to overall portfolio pricing and quality.

§1.10 states that “NAMA (or a NAMA group entity) may, with the  Minister’s  approval, borrow, with or without the Minister’s guarantee, such sums as it determines to be necessary for the performance of its functions (including debt securities borrowed from the Minister or NTMA and debt securities issued by NAMA or a NAMA group entity to provide consideration for the acquisition of bank assets).” What does it mean? Well, the first part (before the brackets) means that Nama can borrow funds on its own. The liability for such borrowing will fall on Nama or on the taxpayers. Care to tell what happens if Nama cannot meet its liabilities on borrowings not guaranteed by the State? Yes, right, the Minister will have to rescue Nama from Nama… using the taxpayers funds! Why would we allow a state-owned entity with defined remit an open access to borrowing?!

The bit in the brackets is also telling. It shows that Nama will be able to issue its own bonds (debt securities) and that it will be able to ‘borrow’ bonds from the Government. The latter, of course, means that the following scheme to finance Brian Cowen’s egregious public sector payoffs (oh, sorry – deficits) can be run:

Step 1: Nama, with a permission of Brian Lenihan, ‘borrows’ from NTMA freshly issued bonds.

Step 2: Nama ‘lends’ these bonds to the banks who then monetize them through the ECB;

Step 3: Banks ‘repay’ Nama with cash;

Step 4: Nama ‘repays’ the Exchequer;

Step 5: end game is: Brian Lenihan gets Mr Cowen more dosh to waste on public sector expenditures; Nama is clear, and the banks got a shave off the transaction. The taxpayers are, without being informed, soaked for the amount of bonds issued by NTMA.

§2.1 of the Note clearly is extremely guarded when it comes to assessing the potential effectiveness of Nama on liquidity markets and on the Irish banking sector. It does not show full credence of the ECB in the scheme’s ability to repair our broken banking sector. This, in itself, is understandable, as ECB is always reluctant to go out of its comfort zone endorsing adventurous member states’ plans. But it is a serious concern, given that the Government has no plan B should Nama fail to repair credit flow or inter-bank funding in the Irish economy. In addition, §2.1 is not really dealing with the issue of credit flow, but rather with the ability of Irish banks to access funding. So ECB is being cautious in endorsing Nama as a tool for clearing banks’ balance sheets, not as a tool for repairing the overall credit flows.

§2.4.3 is worth quoting in full: “Third, regarding the valuation of eligible assets, asset-specific haircuts on the eligible assets’ book values appear to be contemplated, and independent third-party expert opinions play a role in the valuation process for the NAMA scheme. The detailed provisions of the draft law regarding valuation issues reflect the fact that the pricing of eligible assets is a crucial and complex issue that is likely to determine the overall success of the NAMA scheme. Although the measures contemplated by the draft law should restore confidence in the Irish banking system, the ECB considers it important, in line with previous opinions that the pricing of acquired assets is mostly risk-based and determined by market conditions. The preference expressed in the draft law for the long-term economic value of assets, rather than current market values, requires careful consideration in this context. In particular, it should be ensured that the assumptions to determine the long-term economic value of bank assets will not involve undue premium payments to the participating financial institutions to avoid creating inappropriate incentives from their side as regards the use of the scheme.”

Several things worth noting here:

  1. Unlike in the case of Nama effectiveness on economy and inter-bank credit, the ECB is clear that “the measures contemplated by the draft law should [not ‘might’] restore confidence in the Irish banking system”. This, of course, simply means that banks’ shareholders and bond holders will win unambiguously from Nama. And the economy and the taxpayers, well, they just might see some improvements… Any questions, anyone, as to who benefits?
  2. The ECB is clearly unhappy about the ‘long-term economic value’ being used as a basis for pricing. The ECB is also clearly concerned that Nama pricing will provide an ‘undue premium payments’ to the banks – in other words, a pay off at the expense of the taxpayers. Now, per ECB remark, the entire process hinges on whether we can trust Nama (i.e Irish Government) not to skin the taxpayers to give a helping subsidy to its cronies (national banks). You be the judge if you can extend them this trust.
  3. The ECB, alongside myself and other critics of Nama, and in contrast with the Government position, clearly states that ‘assumptions’ are crucial. Assumptions that go into pricing models are, of course, of preeminent importance for they will determine exactly the level of pricing deployed. The Government, to date, has not produced any basic assumptions to be used in pricing, other than those contained in overly optimistic statements by the Taoiseach and other members of the Cabinet. These, of course, have ranged from calling the end of Irish recession back in May this year, to a ridiculously uninformed estimates of the speed of property prices adjustments post bust in other countries (7-8 years estimate by the Government officials and consultants), 15 years plus estimated by academics (my own estimate based on IMF and OECD data for past busts since 1970 through 2003 is that for the serious busts similar to the one experienced by Ireland today, the correction takes on average 18 years and in some instances can take more than 20 years).

 To repeat here a simple mathematical exercise. If our current values are at 50% of the 2006-2007 peak, and we are to get back to the same peak values in 8 years, the required rate of growth in property prices to achieve this feat will be 9.1% per annum on average. To get to 80% of the peak price in 8 years requires over 7.6% annual average growth rate from 2010 on.

Oh, and as I’ve said before, this is before you factor in the cost of financing. At, say 5% pa, we are looking at double digit growth required annually on average for the next 8 years to get us to within 60% of the peak value in 2006-2007, let alone to 80%!

You be the judge if we can get such growth stats out of the property market, especially with Nama sitting on a pile of surplus properties, but to put it into perspective – the craze of 2003-2007 have not seen such rates of price inflation.

§2.4.4. clearly states ECB’s dislike of the levy idea as being potentially destabilizing to the banking sector. It is also hinting at possible illegality of such a levy as being a challenge to the need to provide a ‘level playing field’ for participating institutions.

§2.4.6 refers to the risk of political interference in Nama and the potential impact of Nama under political tutelage on banks in the longer term. This is related to the fact that the ECB is cautious about endorsing Nama’s economic effects. And the same is confirmed in §2.4.7, but this time around from the point of the banks themselves. Here the ECB is noting that Nama might lead to credit markets remaining tight as banks might focus on “preserving and rebuilding their own equity, instead of lending into the economy”. But, of course, the ECB’s note on this is not an accident – Nama legislation, that is allegedly designed explicitly to ensure restoration of functioning banking system in Ireland has absolutely nothing to say about this crucial factor. 

So on the net, I wouldn’t count the ECB note as a sound endorsement of the Nama plan as outlined so far by the Government. And I am not surprised – the entire idea of Nama, inclusive of the proposed legislation leave more questions unanswered and more concerns unaddressed than a first year undergraduate paper on how to manage the economy.

Saturday, August 1, 2009

Economics 1/08/2009: NAMA - alternatives Part IV

June 2009 paper from the IMF, titled The Economics of Bank Restructuring: Understanding the Options by Augustin Landier and Kenichi Ueda is something Minister Lenihan and indeed the entire Irish Cabinet should have read, and probably would have read if their economic advisers actually did their jobs. But, of course, the readers of this free (unlike Alan Ahearne's advice) blog can read it here.

Here is a summary (italics are mine):


"This note ...evaluates various restructuring options for systemically important banks. The note assumes that the government aims to reduce the probability of a bank's default and keep the burden on taxpayers at a minimum [a tall assumption for own Government, but hey...].

...If debt contracts can be renegotiated easily, the probability of default can be reduced without any government involvement by a debt-for-equity swap. Such a swap, if appropriately designed, would not make equity holders or debt holders worse off. However, such restructurings are hard to pull off in practice because of the difficulty of coordinating among many stakeholders, the need for speed, and the concerns of the potential systemic impact of rewriting debt contracts.

When debt contracts cannot be changed, transfers from the taxpayer are necessary. Debt holders benefit from a lower default probability. Absent government transfers, their gains imply a decrease in equity value. Shareholders will therefore oppose the restructuring unless they receive transfers from taxpayers.

The required transfer amounts vary across restructuring plans. Asset sales are more costly for taxpayers than asset guarantees or recapitalizations. [We know thi - NAMA will ask us to pony up €60bn in bonds, plus another €10bn+ in recapitalization funds on top of already awarded €7bn+ - all for bailing out a system that in its entirety is worth no more than €10bn]. This is because sales are not specifically targeted to reduce the probability of default. Guarantees or recapitalizations affect default risk more directly. Transfers can also be reduced if the proceeds of new issues are used to buy back debt.

Depending on the options chosen, restructuring may generate economic gains. These gains should be maximized. Separating out bad assets can help managers focus on typical bank management issues and thereby increases productivity. Because government often lacks the necessary expertise to run a bank or manage assets, it should utilize private sector expertise [Now, if you read NAMA legislation, the system will rely on NAMA-own employees to run risk and credit committees - what 'private sector expertise'?]. Low up-front transfers can help prevent misuse of taxpayer money [Well, NAMA will have up-front transfers of some €60bn!In contrast, my proposal for the banks to take market-driven writedowns before NAMA transfers would minimise this.]. Moreover, the design of bank managers' compensation should provide incentives to maximize future profits.

If participation is voluntary, a restructuring plan needs to appeal to banks. Bank managers often know the quality of their assets better than the market does. This means banks looking for new financing will be perceived by the market to have more toxic assets and, as a result, face higher financing costs. Banks will therefore be reluctant to participate in a restructuring plan and demand more taxpayer transfers. A restructuring that uses hybrid instruments - such as convertible bonds or preferred shares - mitigates this problem because it does not signal that the bank is in a dire situation. [Of course, NAMA is all about one instrument - taxpayers' cash] In addition, asset guarantees that are well designed can be more advantageous to taxpayers than equity recapitalizations. [Well, of course we had no 'well-designed' guarantees - we have a blanket guarantee. And thus we also have subsequent recapitalizations. And now NAMA. And after NAMA - more recapitalizations... I mean this Government and its advisers wouldn't last long in a junior policy research job at the IMF...] A compulsory program, if feasible, would obviously eliminate any signaling concerns. Information problems can also be mitigated if the government gathers and publicizes accurate information on banks' assets. [NAMA is a compulsory programme. And yet, despite the IMF advice, it is reliant on a sweet-heart deal for the banks with total disregard for the taxpayers' interests. Reckless? Venal? You decide.]

In summary, systemic bank restructuring should combine several elements to address multiple concerns and trade-offs on a case-by-case basis. In any plan, the costs to taxpayers and the final beneficiaries of the subsidies should be transparent. [NAMA legislation makes its operations fully concealed from any public scrutiny and fully indemnified against any charges of reckless waste of taxpayers' resources. It even makes it impenetrable to the courts.] To forestall future financial crises, managers and shareholders should be held accountable and face punitive consequences. [This is explicitly prevented in the NAMA legislation] In the long run, various frictions should be reduced to make systemic bank restructuring quicker, less complex, and less costly.

I rest my case. In a nutshell, even by IMF standards, NAMA is a monster that will willingly or recklessly defraud the Irish taxpayers.

Friday, July 31, 2009

Economics 31/07/09: NAMA Part III

The NAMA Legislation provides some stunningly simplistic and outright primitive economic analysis. This is contained in Part 5 of the Bill (once again, italics are mine):

PART5: VALUATION METHODOLOGY

Determination of acquisition values—valuation methodology.

58.—(1) In this section—
(a) a reference to the current market value of the property comprised in the security for a credit facility that is a bank asset is a reference to the estimated amount that would be paid between a willing buyer and a willing seller...
(b) a reference to the current market value of a bank asset is a reference to the estimated amount that would be paid between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s-length transaction...

[In other words, the difference between the two values is that the property value is a valuation of the collateral, while the asset value is the valuation of the loan drawn against this collateral as an asset. This difference should capture: counterparty risk, liquidity risk, expected return risk, lien risk and term structure risks. None are specified or explicitly required for pricing in the NAMA legislation.]

(c) a reference to the long-term economic value of the property [bank asset, per point (d) below] comprised in the security for a credit facility that is a bank asset is a reference to the value that the property can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable financial system when current crisis conditions are ameliorated and in which a future price or
yield of the asset is consistent with reasonable expectations having regard to the
long-term historical average...

[So, implicitly, this statement assumes an imposition of some assumptions on:
  • What constitutes a stable financial system and how does this system impact the pricing in operative markets - something that is virtually impossible to ascertain as the only functional markets we have a history of relate to the property bubble period? Was our financial system stable when we were lending x10 times income to home buyers? Or was it stable when the likes of AIB were embroiled in a series of massive scandals?
  • What constitutes an amelioration of the current crisis - with further issues arising as to what crisis is being meant in this context: the crisis in property markets? in banking? in credit supply? in money supply? in financial assets? in the economy at large? in the Exchequer revenue? in the labour markets? in the markets for land sites? or in demographics? or in all the above?
  • What is the relationship that determines the future (expected?) price of an asset or a yield on the asset and what is the assumed relationship between the yield and the price? What determines the relevant expectations mechanism?
  • What is the long-term historical average? A 10-year historical average taken from today back 10 years is one thing. A 5 year one is another. Yet a third number can be obtained if the historic average is taken back from some date in the past (say 2007 to 1998) and so on. In reality, there is an infinite number of long-term historic averages that can be taken. Which one will be selected and on what basis is never attempted to be answered in the document.]

(2) Subject to subsection (4), the acquisition value of a bank asset is its long-term economic value as determined by NAMA.

[Well, see above on long-term economic valuation, but in effect this is the statement that says it all - there is no price, there is no pricing model, there is not even a hint at the pricing model fundamentals. This is a botched economic analysis that would not warrant a permission to buy a typewriter for the DofF, let alone to 'invest' Euro 90bn into any undertaking. And this problem is compunded by the fact that this Bill seals the hatches on risk and credit committees operating NAMA by requiring that their members be NAMA employees or directors and not establishing any independent presence on these committees. This is like having a reactor heading into a meltdown and shutting down your monitoring systems because they are flashing red.]

(3) NAMA shall determine the long-term economic value of a bank asset by reference to the following:
(a) the current market value of the property comprised in the security for the credit facility that is the bank asset at a date specified by NAMA;
(b) the current market value of the bank asset, at a date specified by NAMA, by reference to market rates and accepted market methodology;
(c) the long-term economic value of the property referred to in paragraph (a) at the date referred to in that paragraph...

[This is incomprehensible gibberish, folks. It has neither any meaning nor economic or financial justification whatsoever. There are no accepted market rates, for there is no market for these securities and/or assets other than at extremely deep discounts that Minister Lenihan has already ruled out. The legislation provides nothing for testing the market - as I suggested in one of the required bullet points below.]

(4) NAMA may, if it considers it appropriate after consultation with the Minister, and subject to any regulations made by the Minister under subsection (5)... determine that the acquisition value to be assigned to particular bank assets or class of bank assets shall be—
(i) their current market value, or
(ii) a greater value (not exceeding their long-term economic value) that NAMA
considers appropriate in the circumstances.
[But not a lesser value, note. And once again, since there is no market value or a mechanism to attempt establishing some market value testing, this means NAMA will pay above market value for all assets. Furthermore, this section explicitly commits NAMA to use taxpayer funds to pay the real price or more for the given loan! Sickened yet? Ok, let me explain in a bit more detail. There is an auction with only one bidder. The bidder has stated up front that he will pay any price at or above the market price. But there is no market price. Where do you think the seller will set the opening bid at? If the implicit market value, known to the seller, but not the bidder is X, the seller will set an opening bid at X+y, where y is a positive premium on the 'stupidity' of the buyer or on the fact that the buyer has committed to buying the asset and is willing to pay above the market value for it. What will be the reservation price set by the seller? X+y+z, where z is a positive premium on 'desperation' of the buyer to acquire the asset. What will be the price paid by the buyer? X+y+z+v, where v is the premium on seller's skills in convincing the buyer to purchase the asset. v is also non-negative. Done. Basic auction theory, folks. Incidentally, adopting the approach advocated by me in the bullet points below removes: y through forcing the banks to take realistic writedowns first prior to NAMA; and removes z by requiring a simulative establishment of the market which can test the actual price of at least of the assets. One can't really remove v, for the smarter bankers will always be able to sell to the careless or incompetent, or both, authorities that can author this document in the first place.]

(6) In determining the acquisition value of a bank asset under subsection (2) or (4), NAMA shall have regard to the following:
(a) any value that the participating institution concerned submits as being, in its opinion, the current market value of the property comprised in the security for the credit facility that is the bank asset [that's X above];
(b) the acquisition value already determined in accordance with the valuation methodology of another similar bank asset [thats y derived from previous sales];
(c) the credit worthiness of the debtor or obligor concerned [that's v above];
(d) the performance history of the debtor or obligor in respect of that asset [that's v above];
(e) any reports furnished to NAMA in relation to the matters specified in subsection (7) whether prepared before or after the commencement of this Act [that's z above].

[So to recap: NAMA paid price for an Asset = X+y+z+v, where X is 'true' value of the asset; and (y+z+v) is a strictly positive premium accruing to the bank from the economic illiteracy written into this legislation!]

I have covered section 59 of the Act already in the previous post.


I will repeat the list of provisions that must be required before NAMA can be allowed to proceed in every post on NAMA from ehre on:
  • Provisions for taxpayer protection and provision for a taxpayers' oversight board filled with only independent observers, who are not in the employment of NAMA, NTMA, the State or any other party to NAMA undertaking;
  • Complete and comprehensive balance sheet and cost/benefit analysis of the undertaking;
  • Exact upper and lower limits for banks equity the taxpayers will receive in return for NAMA funds and post-NAMA recapitalization funding;
  • The exact procedures for divesting out of the banks shares in 3-5-7 years time with exact legal commitment by the state to disburse any and all surplus funds (over and above the costs) directly to the taxpayers in a form of either banks shares or cash;
  • The formula for imposing a serious haircut (60%+) on banks bond holders, possibly with some sort of a debt for equity swap and a restriction that NAMA cannot purchase any rolled up interest acrued since the latest 'restructuring' of a loan;
  • A recourse to all developers' own assets - applied retroactively to July 2008 when the first noises of a rescue plan started;
  • The list of qualifications for any bank to participate in NAMA, including, but not limited to, the caps on executive compensation at the banks and the requirement to set up a truly independent, veto-wielding risk assessment committee at each bank with a mandatory requirement for a position of a taxpayers' representative on the board that cannot be occupied by a civil servant or anyone who has worked in the industry in the last 10 years;
  • A requirement that risk and credit committees of NAMA include at least 51% majority of independent experts who cannot be employees of the state, NAMA or any toher parties to this undertaking;
  • A condition that the banks must undergo loan book evaluation prior to transfer of any loans to NAMA, the results of which will be made public - on the web - instantaneously - and will impose a requirement on the banks to write down their assets, again before NAMA purchases any of them, by the requisite amounts to balance their own books in line with valuations;
  • A condition that any loan purchased by NAMA be placed on the open market for the period of 2 weeks and that NAMA will not pay any amount in excess of the bids received (if any), with a prohibition for the participating banks to bid on these loans;
  • A condition that every NAMA loan should be publicly disclosed, including its valuations and bids it receives in the auction stage of the process;
  • A stipulation that all and any regulatory authorities (and their senior level employees) that were involved in regulating the banking and housing sector in this country take a mandatory pension cut of 50% and return any and all lump sum funds they collected upon their retirement;
  • A provision for dealing with the speculatively zoned land to be acquired by NAMA, i.e orderly de-zoning of this land and transfer of this land to either public (if no bidders arise) or private use consistent with sustainable agricultural development, environmental improvements, public use or forestry;
  • The measures to prevent banks from beefing up their profit margins through squeezing their preforming customers;
  • The measures to force the banks to reduce their cost bases by laying off surplus workers;
  • The measures for accounting (in a transparent and fully publicly accessible fashion) on a quarterly basis for NAMA operations and the performance of the state-supported banks.
If I forget something, please, let me know...

Economics 31/07/2009: NAMA Part II

And now slightly more on theat NAMAster:

Remember the levy that the Government dangled in front of the taxpayers as a sign of loss protection or minimization to be built into NAMA. Well, word 'lvey' does not appear in the entire legislation. Not even in a tocken fashion. Not even as a lip service.

And yet, bad and all as this idea might have been, the levy on the banks was announced by Minister Lenihan, repeatedly, as the only means for recouping losses on NAMA. As a friend and colleague remarked, "even that figleaf of taxpayer saving is gone'.


The document reads:
"In making regulations under subsection (1), the Minister may [my emphasis] have regard—
(a) to the rules in relation to State aid and any relevant guidance issued by the Commission of the European Communities [as if he can avoid this under the EU rules], and

(b) in relation to the determination of the long-term economic value of the property comprised in the credit facility that is a bank asset, to—

(i) the extent to which the price or yield of the asset has deviated from the long-term historical average [the half-wits who wrote this don't even understand that our historical averages are so severely skewed by a lengthy bubble in the property markets, that a return to these averages will take well over a decade],

(ii) supply and demand projections by reference to the type of asset and its location,
(iii) macroeconomic projections for growth in the gross domestic product and for inflation,
(iv) demographic projections,
[Who is going to supply these projections? Our forecasters - the DofF, the CB, let alone completely inadequate Forfas and Fas - are so grossly inaccurate in their usual predictions that you might as well use a crystal ball. One good example is the CB - this institution has been frantically issuing new forecasts on a monthly basis in order to catch up with the published forecasts by the private sector.]

(v) land and planning considerations (including national, regional or local authority development or spatial plans) that may exert an influence on the future value of the asset concerned,
(vi) analyses presented by the Minister of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government on the extent to which existing land zoning and planning permissions granted and in force meet or exceed projected growth requirements, and
(vii) analyses presented by the Dublin Transport Office and the National Transport Authority of existing and future transport planning and the associated supply and demand projections for land use.
[As I told the meeting of the Green Party recently, all of this means only one thing - the fig leaf of decorum awarded to the Green Ministers for their singing on the dotted line will see NAMA as a continuation of the development patterns that were based on utterly mad and unsustainable vision of spatial development in Ireland. In effect, the Green Party has lost all and any moral ground to stand on when it signed up to the development model (under NAMA) that cuts across the entire philosophy of the Greens.]

(c) in relation to the determination of the long term economic value of bank assets, to—
(i) the long-term economic value of the property comprised in the security for a credit facility that is a bank asset,
(ii) the net present value of the anticipated income stream associated with the loan asset,
(iii) in the case of rental property, current and projected vacancy rates,
(iv) loan margins,
(v) an appropriate discount rate to reflect NAMA’s cost of funds plus a margin that represents an adequate remuneration to the State that takes account of the risk in relation to the bank assets acquired by NAMA,
(vi) the mark-to-market value of any derivative contracts associated with the bank asset,
(vii) any ancillary security such as personal guarantees and corporate assets,and
(viii) fees reflecting the costs of loan operation, maintenance and enforcement, and

[This lengthy passage tells me right away that NAMA will operate as a banking sector's out of town office. The primacy of taxpayer protection absent in the legislation and the length afforded to the protection of the banks' bottom line is the destruction of the private sector economy on the vast scale. Incidentally, it is also a sealing of banks into servitude to the Exchequer, implying that from the day of NAMA instituion, Bank of Ireland, AIB, IL&P and other participating banks will be Japanese-styled zombies. A short-term pain relief turns a long term cancer!]


I will repeat the list of provisions that must be required before NAMA can be allowed to proceed in every post on NAMA from ehre on:
  • Provisions for taxpayer protection and provision for a taxpayers' oversight board filled with only independent observers, who are not in the employment of NAMA, NTMA, the State or any other party to NAMA undertaking;
  • Complete and comprehensive balance sheet and cost/benefit analysis of the undertaking;
  • Exact upper and lower limits for banks equity the taxpayers will receive in return for NAMA funds and post-NAMA recapitalization funding;
  • The exact procedures for divesting out of the banks shares in 3-5-7 years time with exact legal commitment by the state to disburse any and all surplus funds (over and above the costs) directly to the taxpayers in a form of either banks shares or cash;
  • The formula for imposing a serious haircut (60%+) on banks bond holders, possibly with some sort of a debt for equity swap and a restriction that NAMA cannot purchase any rolled up interest acrued since the latest 'restructuring' of a loan;
  • A recourse to all developers' own assets - applied retroactively to July 2008 when the first noises of a rescue plan started;
  • The list of qualifications for any bank to participate in NAMA, including, but not limited to, the caps on executive compensation at the banks and the requirement to set up a truly independent, veto-wielding risk assessment committee at each bank with a mandatory requirement for a position of a taxpayers' representative on the board that cannot be occupied by a civil servant or anyone who has worked in the industry in the last 10 years;
  • A requirement that risk and credit committees of NAMA include at least 51% majority of independent experts who cannot be employees of the state, NAMA or any toher parties to this undertaking;
  • A condition that the banks must undergo loan book evaluation prior to transfer of any loans to NAMA, the results of which will be made public - on the web - instantaneously - and will impose a requirement on the banks to write down their assets, again before NAMA purchases any of them, by the requisite amounts to balance their own books in line with valuations;
  • A condition that any loan purchased by NAMA be placed on the open market for the period of 2 weeks and that NAMA will not pay any amount in excess of the bids received (if any), with a prohibition for the participating banks to bid on these loans;
  • A condition that every NAMA loan should be publicly disclosed, including its valuations and bids it receives in the auction stage of the process;
  • A stipulation that all and any regulatory authorities (and their senior level employees) that were involved in regulating the banking and housing sector in this country take a mandatory pension cut of 50% and return any and all lump sum funds they collected upon their retirement;
  • A provision for dealing with the speculatively zoned land to be acquired by NAMA, i.e orderly de-zoning of this land and transfer of this land to either public (if no bidders arise) or private use consistent with sustainable agricultural development, environmental improvements, public use or forestry;
  • The measures to prevent banks from beefing up their profit margins through squeezing their preforming customers;
  • The measures to force the banks to reduce their cost bases by laying off surplus workers;
  • The measures for accounting (in a transparent and fully publicly accessible fashion) on a quarterly basis for NAMA operations and the performance of the state-supported banks.
If I forget something, please, let me know...

Thursday, July 30, 2009

Economics 31/07/2009: NAMA legislation Part 1

Over the next few days I will be posting my thoughts on NAMA legislation. But here is a quick first installment:

A search of PDF document reveals that:
  1. The word 'taxpayer' appears in the entire legislation only once. Despite the taxpayers being the sole payee for the scheme;
  2. Words 'Taxpayers representation' do not appear in the document at all;
  3. Words 'Taxpayers interest' do not appear in the document at all;
  4. Words 'stop-loss' do not appear in the document at all;
  5. Words 'transparency', 'public interest' (outside the scope of court decisions) and 'public information' do not appear at all;
  6. 'Public disclosure' only applies to restricting such in the cases of expert opinions;
  7. Word 'loss' appears in the legislation only in the areas of:
  • Giving NAMA power to issue complex derivative instruments to hedge against "the risk of loss arising from changes in interest rates, currency exchange rates or other factors of a similar nature, to eliminate or reduce the costs of raising funds or borrowing or the cost
    of other transactions carried out in the ordinary course of business, or increasing return on investment. No stop-loss rules on these derivatives are envisioned, as if they are risk free;
  • In making sure that "participating institutions to indemnify NAMA. 111.—(1) If NAMA or a NAMA group entity so directs, a participating institution shall indemnify NAMA or the NAMA group entity and its officers against any liability or loss..." In other words, the Government employees and NAMA will be protected from any loss claims, but not the taxpayers. Minister Leniham did his job of shielding his cronies well.
6. "30.—(1) As soon as practicable after the establishment day, the Board shall establish 3 committees, and appoint members to them, as follows: (a) an audit committee; (b) a credit committee; (c) a risk committee." There is no independent committee membership requirements, with all, save two members of each committee appointable by the Board of NAMA, and the remaining two - by the Minister.

Actually, worse that that: "(5) The members of the credit committee and the risk committee shall be members of the Board or officers of NAMA. At least 2 members of each of those committees shall be members of the Board." Thus, there will be no independent oversight over risk and credit decisions by NAMA. Not even in theory.

"31.—(1) The Board may establish such advisory committees as it considers necessary or desirable to advise it in the performance of its functions. ...(4) The Board shall determine the terms of reference and procedures of an advisory committee." There will be no statutory requirement for independent oversight of NAMA - cronies run cronies' loans.

7. "Indemnification of members of Board and officers of NAMA, etc. 32.—(1) This section applies to the following: (a) each member of the Board; (b) each officer of NAMA; (c) a director of a NAMA wholly owned subsidiary; (d) a director of a NAMA group entity; (e) a member of the staff of the NTMA. (2) A person to whom this section applies is indemnified in relation to anything done or omitted in the performance or purported performance or exercise of any of NAMA’s functions or powers under this Act, unless it is proved that the act or omission was in bad faith." So the incompetence can never be penalised - a standard practice for Mr Leniham's pets in the public sector.

And a succinct summary of the legislation (hat tip to Richard W):


More to come, so stay tuned, but this already bad enough...