Showing posts with label Irish household debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish household debt. Show all posts

Friday, January 15, 2016

15/1/16: Household Debt Sustainability in One Chart?


Here is a neat chart plotting household debt against long term interest rates in an attempt to visualise property prices in affordability / sustainability context:

Source: @resi_analyst

Irish progression is poor by debt measure, and is sustained (barely) by low interest rates, even post-deleveraging.

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

25/3/15: IMF on Irish household debt crisis


IMF on Irish household debt crisis (from today's Article IV paper):

"Household balance sheets are healing gradually, yet loan distress remains high and over half of arrears cases are prolonged. Households have cut nominal debts by 20 percent from peak through repayments primarily funded by a 4 percentage point rise in their trend savings rate. Debt ratio falls have been large by international standards but debt levels remain relatively high at 177 percent of disposable income. Household net worth has risen 25 percent
from its trough."


One note of caution: IMF statement ignores sales of household debt out of the Central Bank-covered statistics to vulture funds. Furthermore, repossessions, insolvencies, bankruptcies, voluntary surrenders and some mortgages restructurings have also contributed to the reduction in household debt. Thus, not all of the debt reduction is down to organic debt repayment by households.

It is also worth noting that per chart above, Irish household debt is currently at the levels of 2005-2006 - hardly a robust reduction on crisis-peak.

More from the IMF: "A recent survey finds household debts concentrated among families with mortgages, having 2 to 3 children, with the reference person aged 35 to 44, and in the two top income quintiles. Yet, their debt servicing burden is still similar to other groups, reflecting the high share of long-term “tracker” mortgages, with an average interest rate of 1.05 percent at end 2014."

The problem is that the recent survey IMF cites covers data through 2013 only! (http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/socialconditions/2013/hfcs2013.pdf).

Overall issues, therefore, are:

  1. Irish household debts remain extreme relative to disposable income;
  2. Distribution of household debts is adversely impacting the most productive segment of Irish population and the segment of population in critical years for pensions savings; and
  3. Deleveraging of the households is by no means completed and remains exposed to the risk of rising interest rates in the future.


All points I raised before and all points largely ignored by Irish policymakers.

Sunday, July 13, 2014

13/7/2014: Household Debt Mountains


In the earlier post (here) I covered IMF data on Non-Financial Corporations debt, comparing Spain and other 'peripherals' with Ireland. And here is one other comparative: for household debt


I know, I know... it doesn't matter, really, that households are being tasked with funding Government debt first, their own debt later. All is sustainable...

One caveat: per my understanding, the above does not include household debts transferred to investment funds, as data for Ireland comes from ECB, which does not include data not covered by the CBofI, which does not include household mortgages and other debt sold to institutions not covered by the banking licenses in Ireland. So there, keep raising taxes and reporting higher revenues as a 'success' or 'recovery'... because household debt does not matter... until it matters...

Friday, April 19, 2013

19/4/2013: More from the IMF on Irish banks...

Getting back to the IMF GFSR report released earlier this week. Some nice charts worth a quick comment or two:

Two things worth noting in the above:

  1. Increase in covered bonds for Irish banks, absent, pretty much, any serious issuance between 2007 and 2012 and maturing of some bonds. This may be linked to the deteriorating quality of assets against which the bonds were secured, requiring 'top-ups' with new assets. In effect, this means that to maintain existent level of funding a bank will require more assets to be put aside.
  2. Massive, relative to GDP, exposure to MROs + LTROs for the Irish banks. Let's keep in mind that some Irish banks were precluded from participating in the second LTRO due to lack of suitable collateral. Even with that, Irish banking sector exposure to LTROs relative to GDP is the largest of all countries in the sample.
The next two charts plot relationship between banks' lending to households and corporates and the growth forecasts for the economies:


By both charts above, Ireland appears to be basically just on the borderline between the core and the peripheral countries. Of course, this means preciously little, since Irish banks basically are issuing no new loans and thus whatever rates they report are heavily, very heavily biased in favour of higher quality borrowers. Here's how this bias works: the bank in Ireland issues a loan to company A for the amount X and duration W. The rate on this loan is r=f(A,X,W)  such that if A quality is higher then rate r  is lower, if X is larger, the rate is higher, and if W is longer, the rate is also higher. We control all other variables that might influence the rate quoted. If the case of the same company looking for the same loan outside Ireland, the bias above would imply a lower rate quoted, or a smaller loan granted or for shorter duration, or all or any permutations of the above. 

Here is an interesting point. In the first chart above, Irish house loans rates went up during the crisis, but corporate loans rates went dramatically down during the crisis. Now, houses-related loans within the Irish banking system are currently in default at close to 20% rate, while SMEs loans are in default close to 50% rate. High quality corporates are probably in the same rate of default today as in 2007. Which means that corporate loans book of Irish banks should be posting default rates (NPLs) of similar or larger proportions as house lending book. Yet the rates for two types of loans have moved in the opposite direction and very significantly.

On foot of the above, question for our Dear Leaders: Are Irish banks, for purely political reasons (recall Government's repeated exhortations about the need for the banks to 'do their bit for the economy', 'lend to our SMEs' etc), using house loans pricing to subsidise corporate loans issuance?

Just in case you start harping on about Irish corporates having better debt loads than households, IMF has the following handy charts:

And more: Irish corporates have exceptionally poor interest coverage ratios:
Keep in mind - the above applies only to listed firms, not to privately held ones...

Thursday, April 4, 2013

4/4/2013: Real Debt: European Crisis in 4 charts

Some interesting charts from Liu, Yan and Rosenberg, Christoph B., World Economic Outlook, April 2013. IMF Working Paper No. 13/44. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229653

Chart 1 below details the extent of the debt overhang in a number of countries:


Charts 2 and 3 outline the problem relative to financial assets available to offset the debt (theoretical offset, obviously):


Non-performing loans problem...


Quite telling, with no commentary needed, imo.

Thursday, November 15, 2012

15/11/2012: Dutch Debt Crisis and a Tripple-dip Recession?


With Eurostat publishing today preliminary estimates for Euro area GDP for Q3 2012, the Netherlands have moved firmly into the view as the country with substantial pressure on its economy.

Take a look at the core numbers:

  • In Q3 2012, the Dutch economy contracted 1.1% q/q - the sharpest quarterly contraction in all fo the EU27
  • This contraction follows 0.1% growth in Q2 and Q1 2012 and a contraction of 0.7% in Q4 2011
  • In other words, in q/q terms, the Netherlands are now heading for a tripple-dip recession.
  • In year on year terms, things are bleaker still: Q4 2011 say annual contraction of 0.4%, which was followed by a 1.0% drop in Q1 2012, 0.4% decline in Q2 2012 and now 1.4% decline in Q3 2012.
The problem the country faces, despite having a AAA-rated government debt and relatively minor issues on the fiscal side, is the debt overhang in the household sector. As charts below show, the Netherlands has the second highest gross debt/GDP ratio in the EU27 and the highest in the euro area. The debt overhang in the household sector is getting worse, not better, during the current crisis.



Gross debt to GDP ratio on households side has the same (directionally, but potentially more severe in magnitude) effect on future growth as the Government debt. Based on the OECD and IMF data:



And here are some comparatives from Goldman Sachs Research, highlighting the Netherlands plight:

 Note: HP change refers to House Prices change


All of which makes the Netherlands a 'sick man' of Europe and helps explain why the Dutch Government is rightly concerned with the costs of underwriting peripheral economies 'rescue' using its own money...

Monday, September 10, 2012

10/9/2012: Irish Households Debt Overhang: IMF note


IMF published today three papers relating to Ireland's economy. Each of interest on its own merit and I intend to blog about them.

However, here's a chart that actually summarizes pretty well both the extent of the Irish crisis and the sorry state of affairs expected as we exit it:
Here's IMF's explanation for the household deleveraging process out of what is - by the standards of the chart above - a historically unprecedented debt overhang.


"Under the current forecast, households would reduce debt gradually from about  210 percent of disposable income to 185 percent by 2017. Building on the forecast of the
savings rate, the debt path is calculated based on the IMF desk forecast for a muted recovery
of disposable incomes at below GDP growth. Further, the debt path assumes that households use about half of their savings to retire debt, and new lending growth remains moderate, increasing from 1.6  percent of GDP in 2012 to 5.3 percent by 2017."

Now, give it a thought, folks.

  1. Irish crisis in mortgages is well in excess of anything represented in the above chart;
  2. Irish deleveraging over 9 years (2009-2017) will yield mortgages debt reduction of just 25 percentage points even if we use half of our entire savings to pay down the debts;
  3. This painful deleveraging will still Ireland's mortgages markets in wore shape in 2017 than the second worst peak  of the crisis (the UK) back in 2007.
And here's the chart showing that all the debt paydown to-date has had zero effect on arresting the degree of Irish households leveraging (debt/asset value ratio) as underlying asset values of Irish properties continue to fall:

It is clear from the above that the Irish Government is out to lunch when it comes to dealing with the most pressing crisis we face - the crisis of severe debt overhang on households' balancesheets.



Friday, June 15, 2012

15/6/2012: IMF Review : Mortgages Arrears & Household Wealth

In the previous post I promised a closer look at the IMF analysis of the household wealth and mortgages in Ireland. Per Article IV consultation paper:

Mortgage arrears continued to rise as some households struggle with high indebtedness. 

  • Household’s net wealth peaked in mid-2007, but has since declined by 37 percent largely due to the collapse in housing prices. 
  • By 2011, households’ deleveraging efforts have reduced debt by 13 percent from its end 2008 peak. 
  • Declining incomes have, however, meant the overall household debt burden has eased by only 3 percentage points to 208 percent of disposable income in 2011, although there has been some relief from lower interest rates. 
  • Income declines, especially on account of the rise in unemployment, have also driven the increase in the rate of mortgage arrears on principal private residences to 10.2 percent of mortgage accounts and 13.7 percent of mortgage balances at end March 2012. 
  • The share of mortgages that have been restructured—predominantly through payments of only the interest due or somewhat more—rose to 12.6 percent at end March 2012, but more than half of restructured loans are in arrears, indicating that deeper loan modifications are needed in some cases.



 More charts from the IMF:
In IMF news, rental yields are now closer to stabilization levels, but house prices are averaging 10 times average disposable per capita income, implying ca 4 times average disposable per-family income. In my view, prices will need to reach 3-3.5 times before the property market becomes affordable in the current conditions. This, however, is a longer-term target, with intermediate target being most likely even lower at 2.5 times (given credit conditions and general economic conditions). Also note, the above do not account for upcoming property taxes and for future reductions in disposable income due to tax increases.

Meanwhile credit condition remain horrible:


Chart above clearly shows that although interest costs and interest rates have declined, deleveraging did not take place. This stands in sharp contrast to the US and UK, where deleveraging of the households was more aggressively underpinned by bankruptcies and repossessions. Another issue is that declines in interest rate burden apply primarily to tracker mortgages.

Charts below highlight rapidly accelerating problems with mortgages defaults:


Chart above shows the decomposition of restructured mortgages, highlighting the extent of significant changes in the overall mortgages burden under restructuring (interest only 35%, below interest-only payments at 14%, payment moratorium at 4% and hybrid at 5%, implying that at the very least well over 50% of all restructured mortgages are not delivering on capital repayments).


Friday, January 13, 2012

13/1/2012: Irish Household Income and Consumption: Q3 2011

The latest data on disposable income (Institutional Accounts) from CSO presents the picture of real recession ravaging Irish economy. Here are the core details from Q3 2011 - the quarter when Irish economy tanked once again in terms of aggregate GDP and GNP.
  • Gross disposable income of Irish households in Q3 2011 amounted to €21,761 million - a decline of 4% yoy and a drop of 4.3% qoq.
  • By use of disposable income (separate database proving longer historical series), gross disposable income of households dropped 3.8% yoy and 4.2% qoq.
  • Final consumption has declined 3.8% yoy and 2.5% qoq.
  • Gross savings of the households fell 3.9% yoy and 11.6% qoq


Using Q1-Q3 2011 data we can compute expected annualized series for 2011, which are shown in chart below. In annualized terms:
  • 2011 is forecast to see gross disposable income of Irish households drop 2.9% yoy on 2010 and reach -14.2% cumulative fall on the peak at 2008
  • Final household consumption expenditure is set to fall 2.7% yoy and 16.2% on peak at 2008
  • Gross household savings is expected to fall 4% yoy and 17% on the peak in 2009

 Of course, in the above, Gross household savings includes repayments of debts, which is reflected in the fact that since the beginning of the crisis, our savings were rising, just as out incomes tanked.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

16/11/2011: Irish Mortgages Crisis

Unedited version of my latest Sunday Times article (November 13, 2011).


Per latest data available to us – at the end of June 2011, there were 777,321 outstanding mortgages in Ireland. Of these, 55,763 mortgages were in arrears more than 90 days, up 53% on same period a year ago. In addition, 39,395 mortgages were ‘restructured’ but are currently ‘performing’ – in other words, paying at least some interest. Adding together all mortgages in arrears, repossessions, plus those that were restructured but are not in arrears yet, 95,967 mortgages (12.3% of the total) amounting to €17.5 billion (or 15.2% of the total outstanding mortgages amount) are currently at risk of default, defaulting or have defaulted.

Given the trend in these developments to-date, we can expect that by the end of 2011 there will be some 114,000 mortgages in distress in Ireland. By the end of 2012 this number can rise to over 161,000 or some 21% of the total mortgages pool in the country.

This is a staggeringly high number. When considered in the light of demographic distribution and vintages, 21% of all mortgages that are likely to be in arrears around the end of 2012-the beginning of 2013 will account for up to 30% of the total value of mortgages outstanding.

Mortgages at risk of default

Source: Central Bank of Ireland and author own calculations

This is a simple corollary from the fact that mortgages crisis is now impacting most severely families in their 30s and 40s, with more recent and, thus, larger mortgages signed around the peak of the property bubble. These households are facing three pressures in today’s environment.

Firstly, they are experiencing above-average unemployment and income pressures. Per Quarterly National Household Survey, in Q2 2011, unemployment rate for persons aged 25-34 was 16.5% and unemployment rate for those in age group of 35-44 was 12.4, both well ahead of the 8.95% average unemployment rate for older households. By virtue of being more concentrated in the middle class earning categories, they are also facing higher tax burdens than their lower-earning younger and more asset-rich older counterparts.

Secondly, they are facing higher costs of living, further depressing their capacity to repay these mortgages. More likely to live on the outer margins of commuter belts, our middle-income earners are facing more expensive cost of commute, courtesy of higher energy prices, high taxes associated with car ownership and the lack of viable public transport alternatives. In September this year, prices of petrol were 15.4% above their levels a year ago. Inflation in diesel prices is running at 14.8%. Cost of road transport increased 5% in a year through September, and bus fares are up 10.8% These households are also facing higher costs associated with raising children. Since the time these families bought their houses (e.g. 2005-2007), primary and secondary education costs went up 21-22%, and third level education costs rose 32%. On average, larger families require greater health spending, the cost of which rose 3.4% year on year in September and now stands at 16% above 2005-2007 levels. The three categories of costs described above comprise ca 19% of the total household budget for an average Irish household and above that for a mid-aged household with children.

Thirdly, as their disposable incomes shrink and mortgage costs rise (mortgages-related interest costs are up 17.2 year on year and 11% on 2006), the very same households that are hardest hit by the crisis are also missing vital years for generating savings for their old age pensions provisions and most active years for entrepreneurship and investment.

In short, courtesy of the crisis and the Government policy responses to it to-date, Ireland already has a ‘lost generation’ – the most economically, socially and culturally productive one. And this generation is now at the forefront of the largest homemade crisis we are facing – the crisis of mortgages defaults and personal bankruptcies.

Against this backdrop, the forthcoming Personal Bankruptcies Bill should form a cornerstone of the Government’s policy.

This week, the media reported some of the specifics of the forthcoming legislation, which include two crucial details: the 3-years release period for personal bankruptcy and the non-recourse nature of the arrangement. Under the former, the current period of bankruptcy will be cut from 12 years to 3 years, while under the latter, the new bankruptcy law will limit the extent of the household liability to the current value of the property underlying the mortgage. It is uncertain, at this stage, what claims, if any, can be levied against personal and family savings and other assets.

The provisions, as reported in the media, appear to be well-balanced for a normal bankruptcy reform, but remain excessively harsh for the legislation designed to tackle an acute crisis. Here’s what is needed.

A conditional bankruptcy release period for mortgages taken in the period of 2003-2008 should be set at 12 months subject to satisfactory completion of court-set conditions. Full release should apply after 3 years. There should be no restriction on companies directorships for those in the process, so as not to reduce entrepreneurship and small business ownership.

The lien against the personal income and assets should be designed as follows. No more than 25-35% of the after-tax disposable income can be diverted to the repayment of the mortgage, to allow for private sector rent payments. No more than 30% of the household assets below €25,000 can be used to repay the residual mortgage post-foreclosure. The amount can rise to 50% for assets valued between €25,001 to €50,000 and to the maximum of 70% for assets valued over €50,000. This will minimize losses to the banks, disincentivise strategic defaults and reduce moral hazard, while still allowing families to retain safety cushion of savings to offset the risks of sudden income losses or illness.

Banks objections to relaxing bankruptcy laws, raised this week, is that the new law will trigger a significant demand for capital as losses due to non-recourse clauses will be borne by the lenders. This is simply not true.

Firstly, with some claim on family assets in place, bankruptcy process will still be used only in the cases of extreme financial distress. A combination of a limited liability applying to some family assets and a 3-year repayment period will create both a disincentive to abuse the system and a cushion of burden sharing, reducing the end losses to the banks.  Savings on interest payments supports and legal costs will further reduce taxpayers potential exposure.

Secondly, the stress tests carried out earlier this year were supposed to provide ample supports for the banks against mortgages defaults. Blackrock estimates of the worst-case scenario losses on Irish mortgages over the life-time of the loans amount to €16.3 billion split between €10.2 billion owner-occupier and €6.1 billion for buy-to-let borrowers. Central Bank of Ireland assumed 3-year losses amount to the total of €9 billion. Reformed bankruptcy law is unlikely to raise the Blackrock estimates for life-time losses, but is likely to push forward the defaults that would have occurred outside the Central Bank-assumed time frame of 2011-2013. In other words, unless the stress tests performed were not rigorous enough, or the Central Bank assumptions on 2011-2013 defaults were not realistic, capital supplied to the banks post PCARs already incorporates expected losses.

Either way, there is neither an economic nor moral justification for using bankruptcy laws as a tool for locking borrowers in servitude to the lender. During the boom, the Irish state and banks have acted recklessly toward the very same borrowers. The duty of care to protect consumers and investors was abandoned by the previous Financial Regulator, the banks, public authorities in charge of regulating property markets and, ultimately, the Governments that presided over the system, which put full burden of risks associated with property purchases on the buyers. Remedying this requires giving distressed borrowers some powers to compel burden sharing vis-à-vis the banks.


Box-out:

This week, the entire world was consumed with the saga of Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation. Played out across the media – from print to facebook – the story of the ‘departing villain’ was almost comical, were it not tragic in the end. Tragic not so much in the inevitable rise in Italian bond yields, but in the sense of denial of reality that the media and political circus that surrounded Mr Berlusconi’s departure from power. Italy is a Leviathanian version of the zombie economies of Greece and Portugal. Between 1990 and 2010, Italian real GDP grew at an average rate of less than 1% per annum, less than half the rate of Spain, Greece and Portugal. Italian growth in exports of goods and services, over the same period was roughly one half of the rate of growth in Spain and 1.5 times lower than that for Greece and Portugal. Italy’s unemployment rate averaged just below that for other 3 countries. Italian fiscal deficits, at an average of 5.2% per annum, were greater than those of Portugal (3.3%) and Spain (3.1%), but lower than those in Greece (7.8%). Ditto for structural deficits. These are hardly attributable to Mr Berlusconi alone and are unlikely to be altered dramatically by his successors. While it is easy to point the finger at the internationally disliked leader, the truth remains the same – with or without Berlusconi, Italy is a nation with a dysfunctional economy.

Sunday, September 25, 2011

26/09/2011: Ireland's Debt Overhang - unprecedented, unmanageable & unsustainable

A recent paper, titled "The real effects of debt" by Stephen G Cecchetti, M S Mohanty and Fabrizio Zampolli (05 August 2011) presented at the "Achieving Maximum Long-Run Growth" symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25-27 August 2011 put forward evidence on the overall effects of debt overhang - across public, private corporate and household debts - on the real economy.

Here is the summary of their findings, followed by a closer look at the implications of these for Ireland. I have to warn you - the latter are highly disturbing.

The authors argue that although debt can be used to drive growth and development, "...history teaches us that borrowing can create vulnerabilities. When debt ratios rise beyond a certain level, financial crises become both more likely and more severe (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). This strongly suggests that there is a sense in which debt can become excessive."

The authors set out to answer a simple question: When does the level of debt go from good to bad? 'Bad' as in producing the effect of lowering long term economic growth in the economy.

To do so, the authors used a new dataset that includes the level of government, non-financial corporate and household debt in 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010.

The core results "support the view that, beyond a certain level, debt is bad for growth":
  • "For government debt, the threshold is in the range of 80 to 100% of GDP... Our result for public debt has the immediate implication that highly indebted governments should aim not only at stabilising their debt but also at reducing it to sufficiently low levels that do not retard growth. Prudence dictates that governments should also aim to keep their debt well below the estimated thresholds so that even extraordinary events are unlikely to push their debt to levels that become damaging to growth." Furthermore, "when government debt rises to [threshold] level, an additional 10 percentage points of GDP drives trend growth down by some 10-15 basis points."
  • "Up to a point, corporate and household debt can be good for growth. But when corporate debt goes beyond 90% of GDP, our results suggest that it becomes a drag on growth."
  • "And for household debt, we report a threshold around 85% of GDP, although the impact is very imprecisely estimated."
The table below shows the core results from the paper and adds the comparable data for Ireland (Ireland was not included in the analysis). Make sure you are seating before reading it:
As shown in the table above, using the study estimates, the potential reduction in Irish GDP growth over the long term horizon arising from the combined debt overhangs is 2.1%.

The table also shows that the largest impact from debt overhang for Ireland arises from corporate debt, followed by household debt. Despite this, our Government's core objective to-date has been to deleverage banks and to contain Government debt explosion. In fact, the Government is consciously opting for loading more debt onto households - by reducing disposable after-tax incomes and refusing to implement significant savings in the public sector expenditure.

Yet, folks, our debt levels are extreme. They are more than extreme - the table below shows comparable combined public and private (non-financial) debt for the countries in the study sample, plus Ireland.
And the reates of our debt increase during the crisis are also extreme:

In fact, we have both - the highest level of debt to GNP ratio, the second highest debt to GDP ratio and the fastest increases in 2000-2010 in both ratios in the developed world. In the nutshell, this means we are more bust than the most bust economy in the world - Japan. Unlike Japan, however, we are faced with:
  • No prospect of devaluation
  • No prospect of controlling our interest rates
  • Young population that requires growth and jobs creation, and
  • Much heavier levels of private and corporate debt - i.e. debt that has more significant adverse economic effects than sovereign debt.
Yet, even exporting powerhouse of Japan is not delirious enough to believe their debt overhang can be brought under control via 'exports-led' growth.



Now, much of the issues and data discussed in this post relate to the question raised in the Dail by Peter Mathews, TD, who relentlessly pursues, in my view, public interest in raising such questions. The record of his question and Minister Noonan's answer is provided below:

Sunday, July 3, 2011

03/07/2011: Household Credit: latest data

Some more analysis of new lending - based on CBofI data through April 2011.

Household loans and consumer loans are covered in this post. So house purchase loans first:
  • Rates for the loans for House Purchases floating and up to 1 year fixation have risen from 3.09% to 3.20% in April 2011, relative to March. Historical average rate is 3.743% and the average rate since the beginning of the crisis (January 2008) is 3.574%. Current rates are above their 12mo MA of 2.959%. It is interesting to note that this data clearly shows that there is no statistically significant easing of rates during the crisis as crisis period average rates are not statistically significantly different from those for the entire history of the data series. Another interesting point is that when house purchasers are concerned, volatility of retail rates has risen during the crisis: the historical standard deviation of the series is 0.827 while post-January 2008 standard deviation is 1.072.
  • Volumes of loans in the above category has declined from €1.190 billion issued in March 2011 to €1.092 billion in April 2011. Again, current rates of issuance are signaling continued credit tightening: historical monthly average issuance stands at €2.577 billion, while issuance since January 2008 averages €2.0 billion.
  • Rates for the loans for House Purchases, over 1 year fixation have also increased mom in April from 4.23% to 4.29%. The rates are now above their historical average of 4.213% but below their crisis period average of 4.34%. April rate is above 12mo MA of 4.115%. As in the case of floating rate loans, fixed rate loans rates also risen in volatility during the crisis with overall historical standard deviation for the rates at 0.641 and January 2008-present standard deviation of 0.723.
  • However, good luck to anyone trying to get these loans. Fixed rate loans for House Purchases issuance fell from €568 million in March to €331 million in April. New issuance of these loans is now well below historical average monthly volumes of €705 million and below crisis-period average of €521 million. Although 12mo MA is above the crisis average at €526 million.
A chart:
But what about consumer loans not designated for house purchases?
  • Cost of consumer credit for floating loans and loans up to 1 year fixation fell from 6.02% in March 2011 to 5.23% in April. Thus, April rates were below their historical monthly average of 5.584%, their crisis period average of 5.565% and their 12mo MA of 5.640%. Note that crisis period was associated with higher volatility of rates in this category as well, with standard deviation rising from historical 0.836 to crisis-period 1.099.
  • In terms of volumes of loans issued in the above category, the volume increased from €134 million to €156 million between March 2011 and April. However, volume of new loans issuance remains well below its historical average of €393 million, crisis-period average of €378 million and 12mo MA of €193 million.
  • Cost of consumer credit for fixed loans (over 1 year) has fallen from 10.09% in March to 9.90% in April 2011, with current rate still above historical average of 8.589% and crisis period average of 9.494%, but is now below 12mo MA of 10.217%. Interestingly, volatility of rates charged on these types of loans has fallen from historical standard deviation of 0.962 to crisis-period standard deviation of 0.695.
  • Again, good luck securing such loans, though, as volumes issued declined from €60 million in March 2011 to €51 million in April. Historical average issuance stands at €169.5 million, while crisis period average is €96 million. Current issuance however remains above 12mo MA of €48.8 million.
A chart to illustrate:

Sunday, October 31, 2010

Economics 31/10/10: Mortgages, relief and stimulus

David McWilliams' idea of deferring mortgage repayments for 2 years is continuing to generate some discussions in the 'new' media. Here are my thoughts on the topic.

David's idea starts from the right premise that households are currently suffering from mortgage/debt repayment burden that is non-sustainable in the current economic conditions and acts to depress consumption and household investment. But in my view, it is not going to yield any significant impact on the economy.

As expected incomes fall due to:
  • continued recession in the economy (courtesy of the insolvency crisis we face across the entire economy);
  • elevated risk of unemployment (ditto);
  • rising tax burden on households (courtesy of the Government's perverse logic which puts the needs of financial services and Exchequer ahead of those of the real economy - households and firms);
  • heightened risk of further tax increases in the future (ditto);
  • behavioral implications of the severe and deepening negative equity (being further reinforced by the FR and Government denial of the problem and asymmetric treatment of development debts and household debt); and
  • continued increases in the cost of mortgages finance and credit (courtesy of the Government approach to dealing with the banking crisis)
Irish households are indeed under a severe financial stress. This stress is amplified by the adverse selection of younger (and thus more heavily leveraged) households into the higher risk of unemployment. These very households are also more important contributors to future private investment side of the economy, as older households are dis-saving to consume.

Collapse of consumption and household investment we are witnessing today is the direct outcome of the above forces and it will continue to worsen as long as households' disposable after tax incomes continue to decline and remain at risk of further pressure. In addition, non-discretionary segment of consumption (energy, education, transportation and health) show no signs of price deflation, implying that discretionary disposable after tax income - the stuff we get to spend in the shops or invest - is even more distressed.

The problem here is not that we face a temporary shock to our income. The problem is of debt overhang - basically, the insolvent nature of our households' balancesheets.

Thus, any solution to this problem will require a permanent debt writedown. It cannot be resolved by temporarily suspending mortgages repayments for several reasons:
  1. Temporary suspension of mortgages repayments will not draw down the overall debt burden, as banks will reload increases in mortgage finance costs into the future to offset for losses incurred during the holiday even if there is no roll up of interest during the holiday. In other words - suspending mortgage repayment for 2 years will likely lead to banks pushing even higher cost of mortgages interest into years 3 and on for all households concerned;
  2. Any rational household will anticipate (1) above to take place and will ramp up precautionary savings to compensate for expected cost increases in their mortgages, withdrawing even more cash from today's consumption. A mortgage holiday in these conditions will lead to zombie banks turning into zombie households;
  3. Any rational household will, also in anticipation of (1) withhold any purchases of property until the full realisation of true future mortgage finance costs takes place post holiday;
  4. If any suspension of mortgages finance involves rolling up of the interest for 2 years, the burden of future mortgage liabilities will increase dramatically, which, once again will be anticipated by the rational households. As a result, households will take 2 years worth of 'free' rent and then default at the point of interest roll up kicking in. We can expect a wall of mortgages defaults in 2013;
  5. In order for the repayment holiday to have any real effect, the long term growth rate in personal disposable income will have to exceed: increase in the cost of mortgage finance post-holiday + inflation - tax increases expected. This, using current growth estimates etc suggests that in order for a 2 year holiday on repayment of mortgages to have any positive effect, our aggregate expected growth rate in personal income should be in excess of 50% in years 2013-2018. This is clearly not anywhere near being realistic.
Once again, the problem we face is the size of leverage taken on by the Irish households. Whether reckless lending or borrowing or both caused this problem is irrelevant. Households become long-term insolvent when their total debt liability rises above 4-5 times their earnings even in the moderate growth in income environment.

We have - on aggregate - households facing:
  • current long and short term debt burden of ca 145% of GNP, and
  • expected (2014) sovereign debt burden of ~140% of GDP or ca 165% of GNP (under rather optimistic assumptions on GDP/GNP gap) - at least 80% of this will have to be repaid out of the pockets of our households.
The problem is that these headline figures conceal imbalances in distribution of debt.

While on per-capita basis the overall household debt liabilities amount to ca 310% of our national income, in real terms what matters is the incidence of the debt on productive households. We currently have ca 41.3% of population in employment (or 1,859,000). Of these, 552,900 are in the age group of 25-34 years of age, 469,600 are in 35-44 years of age and 393,900 are in the age group 45-54 years of age. Assume that the demographic pyramid does not change (for better or worse) in the next 10 years. Total employment pool of those that can be expected to carry the debt burden is actually closer to 1.42 million or 31.5% of the total population of the country.

This raises public and household debt leverage ratio on population that can be expected to repay it to a whooping x10 times household income. This, folks, is a bankruptcy territory for roughly speaking 1/3 of our entire population or for nearly 100% of our productive population.

A 2 year holiday from mortgages repayment will simply not solve this problem. Only significant debt write-off of household debts or full restructuring of our sovereign debt and deficit (to eliminate the need for future tax increases and reverse recent tax increases) or a combination of both will be able to correct for this severe debt overhang.

Sunday, May 9, 2010

Economics 09/05/2010: Abandonning the ship of fiscal reforms

Here is an unedited version of my current article in the latest edition of Business & Finance magazine.


After two years of frantic crisis management by default and piece-meal recapitalizations, last month, the Irish state has fully committed to an outright dumping of public and banks debts onto the shoulders of the ordinary taxpayers. Since the onset of the crisis in 2008 through 2014, based on the latest Budgetary projections and banks recapitalization plans, the Government will consign ca €221 billion liabilities onto Irish workers, businesses and entrepreneurs. This figure, adding to a whooping €234,000 of new debt per average household with two working parents, is the toxic legacy of our crony corporatism.

Consider the banks. Minister Lenihan’s announcement made on Super Tuesday in March means that over the next two years, the Irish taxpayers will foot a bill of some €37 billion in direct capital injections to the banks. The interest on this bankers’ loot will add up to another €12 billion over 10 years. Nama will contribute the net loss of up to €30 billion to our woes. This comprises the costs of loans purchases, bonds financing and Nama management and operations, less the expected recovery of assets and the cash flow from the undertaking. When all is said and done, Irish people will be left with a gargantuan bill of almost €80 billion for rescuing the banks, not counting tens of billions of written-down loans and ruined businesses.

If you doubt this figure, look no further than the numbers released to accompany Tranche 1 transfer of assets from the banks to Nama. These show that having paid €8.5 billion for the first instalment of loans, Nama financial wizards managed to overpay €1.2-3.1 billion compared to the actual value of the loans. On day one of its operations, therefore, Nama has managed to put the taxpayers billions deep into the negative equity. Minister Lenihan’s choice of the cut-off date of November 30, 2009 for Nama valuations implies that Irish taxpayers stand to lose over €1.5 billion on top of all other previously forecast Nama losses. This addition is a pure waste, as there is absolutely no logistical or economic reason for setting such a date in the first place.

In the mean time, taxpayers’ representatives – from our ‘public interest’ banks’ directors to legislators – continue to insist that Nama is a profit-making opportunity for the state. In a recent encounter with myself on a national radio programme, Darragh O’Brien TD who acts as a Vice-Chair of the Public Accounts Committee has gone so far as to claim that under Nama, the state will be borrowing money from the ECB at 1% and lending it to the banks at 3%, thereby earning an instant gain of 2% on the transaction. The fact is according to Nama own documentation it will be the state who will owe the banks an annual coupon payment at the rate of euribor (currently just over 1.2% for a 12 month contract). This rate will be resettable every 6 months, so looking back at historical data, Nama cost of borrowing can easily go to 4.9% - the euribor level back in 2007 or even higher. Since the banks will be holding the bonds they, not the Exchequer, will be collecting the interest payments. The Irish taxpayers, therefore, can potentially be on the hook for an additional €2.6 billion subsidy to the banks in the form of coupon payments on the bonds.

My estimates of the overall debt burden imposed by the banks onto the taxpayers are erring on a conservative side. The latest figures from the Central bank show that the entire Irish banking sector, inclusive of non-Guaranteed institutions, holds a balance of just €226 billion in customers deposits. Assuming that some 10-15% of these deposits are subject to customer demand in any two weeks period, risk-adjusted customer deposit base of Irish banking sector is roughly €192-203 billion. This is offset but loans to customers amounting to €609 billion, plus bonds in the amount of €73 billion, and short-term ECB deposits of €78 billion. Thus, the ratio of debt and short-term obligations relative to customer deposits in the Irish banking sector currently stands at more than 323%. Liquidity risk-adjusted, this figure rises to 400%. In comparison, UK’s Northern Rock had 306% loans to customer deposits ratio at the peak of its solvency crisis in 2008.

So the entire recapitalization fiasco, coupled with the continued stream of disastrous news from the Anglo and the spectacular collapse of the INBS, should have taught us one simple lesson – people who are in charge of the banking crisis management in this country are either unaware of facts or are willingly distorting the reality.


However, for all of its publicity, the banking crisis pales in comparison with the fiscal meltdown we face. As of the time of going to press, Irish workers and small businesses – the lifeline of our economy – are being held hostage by the ‘deal brokering’ between the Trade Unions and the Government. The likeliest outcome of these talks will be a public sector ‘reforms’ package which will see a deferred reversal of Government intentions to cut wasteful spending. Freezing future pay cuts in the public sector, while pushing forward a naïve (if not deceptive) agenda of ‘improved productivity’ means that while in theory we might get more for each euro we spend, in practice, the overall spending bill will remain well out of touch with our tax receipts. The structural deficit simply cannot be corrected by plastering the expenditure gap over with new work practice rules. Only a dramatic cut in overall spend, plus a significant cut in the numbers employed in the public sector will save this country from becoming Greece-sur-Atlantique.

Looking at the Government own projections for future deficits and factoring in the cost of borrowing, Ireland Inc will have to find some €92 billion from now through 2014. Factoring in deficits cumulated between January 1 2008 and December 31 2009 adds another €37.3 billion, plus interest to the above figure. All in, 2008-2014 fiscal deficits are likely to cost Irish taxpayers some €139 billion based on Government own figures. How realistic these Government projections are is a matter for another debate, but the recent revision of our 2009 deficit from the Government-published 11.7% to 14.3% of GDP by the Eurostat shows that the above estimate of the total deficits-related costs can be even higher. Either way, the fiscal crisis we face is clearly much more significant than the banks crisis.

Having invited the Unions back to the bargaining table, the Government has ex ante turned taxpayers into a bargaining chip that it can (and will) use to appease the intransigent interest groups.

Which brings us back to that top line figure of €221 billion in liabilities that Messrs Cowen and Lenihan have decided to offload from the banks and public sector and onto the shoulders of the ordinary taxpayers. Per CSO’s latest data there are 1,887,700 people in employment in Ireland today. Everyone of these workers – no matter whether currently covered by the tax net or not – will be facing an average bill of some €117,000 for the mistakes made by our past Governments’ public expenditure policies, bankers, regulators and developers.

This is, put simply, an unsustainable mountain of public and quasi-public liabilities. Something will have to give.

Back in 2008, Ireland’s top 11,714 earners (those who earned more than €275,000 in a year), paid almost 18% of all income tax. Forget the fact that many of these individuals are now broke. Doubling their tax rates would deliver less than €10 billion in tax revenue over the next 5 years – hardly a drop in the sea of new public debt being created. Quadrupling taxes on Irish median earners – those with income around €25,000 mark – will yield no more than €5 billion in new revenue through 2014. A full one third of all income earners back in 2008 were outside the tax net. These workers, with incomes below €17,000 per annum, are about to be thrown to the wolves by our policies as the Government sets out to plug the twin budget and the banks black holes. Taxed at the standard rate, they will be in for some €0.9 billion tax burden annually. So where will the rest of €205 billion come from?

In reality, the Government simply cannot avoid hiking taxes on businesses. Budget 2010 forecasts corporation tax revenue to reach €3.16 billion. Doubling the rate of tax to 25% can be expected to yield no more than €12-14 billion through 2014. So even this amount will not correct for the public sector and banks’ debts.

Super Tuesday’s announcements by the Minister for Finance signalled the beginning of an end for the dreams for a better future for this and several subsequent generations of Irish people. Remember when Mr Lenihan asked us to be patriotic in his Budget 2009 speech?

Since July 2007, the Government has shown itself incapable of understanding the nature of the crises we face. The banks, we were told, were suffering shortage of liquidity. This means that replacing dead-weight loans on their balancesheets with bankable quasi-Government bonds will do the job of restarting lending. We now know that the real problem the banks face is that of insolvency, with their balancesheets destroyed by worthless loans offset by hefty liabilities. We were told that the collapse in the Exchequer tax revenue not the excessive permanent spending habits of our State were to be blamed for the fiscal crisis. Now we can see the truth – the Irish Exchequer and economy are facing a problem of insolvency, for not even a restoration of tax revenue to its pre-crisis long-term trend will resolve the problem of excessive deficits.


Box-out
Over the recent weeks, the heated debate about Irish banks’ liabilities has shifted its attention to the elusive bond holders. “Who are, these captains of speculation armada? The sharks of the international financial markets?” some demanded to know. Well, we can’t quite tell you who all of them are, but at least for some of the three big banks’ bond holdings we can tell. These arch-capitalists are… you, me, and the Irish Exchequer. That’s right. Per NTMA own figures, our National Pension Reserve Fund – the pot of gold at the end of the public sector employment rainbow – designed to shore up Exchequer pensions deficit has managed to get its snout deep into the Irish banks bonds feeding trough. In the 12 months between December 2007 and December 2008, NPRF has bought itself into a long position in AIB variable rate bonds - €155 million, Bank of Ireland fixed coupon bonds €205 million, Bank of Ireland variable bonds €35.5 million, hiking its overall exposure to Irish banks’ bonds from €89.2 million in 2007 to €461.7 million in 2008. Given that these long positions withstood the wholesale collapse in banks bonds prices in 2008, this was an incredibly risky bet. Then again, adding up NPRF’s balance sheet exposures to low liquidity, higher risk investment classes, such as unquoted property investments, commodities and private equity, corporate debt in Greece, plus almost €74 million worth of Greek Government bonds, etc, NPRF’s higher risk investments accounted for almost 13% of the entire investment portfolio in 2008, up from 11% in 2007 and 6.3% in 2006.