Showing posts with label Central Bank of Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Central Bank of Russia. Show all posts

Friday, August 24, 2018

24/8/18: Moscow's Fiscal Resilience in the Headwinds


Back in September 2017, Fitch (with Russia rating BBB-) estimated that the U.S. sanctions were costing Russia ‘one notch’ in terms of sovereign ratings, with ex-sanctions risk conditions for the Russian sovereign debt at BBB. Last week, Fitch retained long term debt rating for Russia at BBB- with positive outlook, noting the Russian economy’s relative resilience to sanctions.

Budgetary Resilience

Per Fitch, and confirmed by the Russian Finance Ministry analysis, Russia is looking at recording a budgetary surplus in 2018:



Fitch analysis projects the budget surplus to average 0.1% of GDP in 2018 and 0.3% in 2019, from deficits of 1.0% and 0.5%, respectively. This, alongside Russia’s strong performance in monetary policy have been noted by Fitch as core markers of the Russian economy’s resilience to external shocks, including the sanctions acceleration announced back in April 2018.

Looking forward, President Putin's RUB 8.0 trillion (ca USD127 bn) new spending priorities announced back in May will amount to roughly 7.0% of GDP over the next six years. These funds will go to support higher wages and pensions for the recipients of Federal and Local funding, as well as public investment uplift in education and core infrastructure. Per Fitch: “Due to a stronger fiscal position and a robust oil price outlook, the planned measures will not threaten the country's future budget surpluses. The government will also increase available funds by enforcing a tax overhaul and increasing [domestic] borrowing.” (see Chart below)



Policies Resilience

Resilience-inducing policies, when it comes to macroeconomic management of risks arising from sanctions regimes face by Russia include:

  • Increase the Value-added Tax (VAT) rate from 18.0% to 20.0% starting in 2019, which will provide (based on Moscow estimates) ca RUB 600bn (USD 9.5bn) per annum. Social and aggregate demand impacts of VAT increases were mitigated by keeping 10% rate on certain foods, children’s goods, printed publications and pharmaceuticals, or roughly 25% of all goods and services. Some transport services will continue benefiting from 0% VAT rate.
  • A phased reduction of the export duty on oil and petroleum products from 30.0% to zero and a concurrent increase in the tax on the extraction of minerals by 2024
  • The combined tax rate on wages for mandatory social contributions will remain at 22%. 
  • The tax on the physical capital of companies (capped at 2%), will no longer apply to moveable assets (the tax will remain for fixed capital, e.g. for buildings).
  • Russia will also establish special administrative zones on Russky Island next to Vladivostok and on Oktyabrsky Island, which is part of the Kaliningrad enclave. Both will act as offshore centres where foreign-registered firms owned by Russian nationals can “redomicile” their assets. Tax advantages granted in these zones will cover taxes on profits, dividend income and different types of property.
  • A recent increase in the pensionable age (men from 60 to 65, women from 55 to 63) system will lower the burden of an ageing population and a shrinking labour force, “propping up the state Pension Fund's income”


Impact on Debt Markets

Net outrun is that even faced with escalating sanctions, and having unveiled a rather sizeable macro stimulus program, Moscow's finances remain brutally healthy. Fitch research foresees “a contained uptick in government debt levels over the coming years, with the debt burden rising from 17.4% of GDP in 2017 (IMF statistics) to about 18.3% GDP by 2020.” As share of Russian debt held by external funders continues to decline, these forecasts imply increased sustainability of overall debt levels.

In it’s recent assessment of the potential impact of the ‘Super-sanctions’ (The Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018 (DASKAA)) planned by Washington, the worst case scenario of all U.S.-affiliated investors dumping Russian bonds implies 8-10% decline in foreign holdings of Russian Sovereign debt, which will likely raise yields on long-dated Russian Ruble-denominated debt by 0.5-0.8 percentage points. Based on August 6 analysis from Oxford Economics, Russia will have no trouble replacing exiting Western debt holders with Ruble-denominated debt issuance.

Key Weaknesses Elsewhere

The key weakness for Russia is in structurally lower economic growth that set on around 2010-2011 and is likely to persist into 2022-2023 period (see IMF projections below):


Russian GDP growth rose from 1.3% y/y in the 1Q 2018 to 1.8% in the 2Q, with 1H growth reading 1.6% y/y. The uptick was led by faster industrial output growth (rising almost 4% y/y in 2Q) and manufacturing (up 4.6% y/y in 2Q). These are preliminary estimates, subject to revisions and, based on the recent past revisions, it is quite likely that we will see higher growth rates in final reading. 1H 2018 fixed investment rose 3% y/y. Real wages rose 8% y/y in real terms, but household disposable real income was up only 2% at the end of 2Q 2018 due to slower growth in the 'grey economy' and in non-wage income. Despite the rising household credit uptake (up 19% y/y at the end of 2Q 2018), retail sales were up only 2.5%, broadly in-line with real income growth.

All of these trends are consistent with what we have been observing in recent years and are indicative of the structurally weaker economic conditions prevailing in the wake of the post-GFC economic recession and the energy prices shocks of 2014-2017.

Friday, July 6, 2018

6/7/18: Central Bank of Russia Injects Capital in Three Lenders, Continues Sector Restrcturing


Reuters reported (https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-banks/russian-c-bank-says-to-deposit-2-8-bln-at-otkritie-trust-and-rost-idUSR4N1TT00E) on Central Bank of Russia (CBR) setting up a 'bad bank' to resolve non-performing assets in three medium- large-sized banks that CBR controls. In 2016, the CBR took over control over three medium- large-sized banks, Otkritie, B&N Bank and Promsvyazbank. Last month, the CBR announced an injection of RB 42.7 billion of funds to recapitalise Otkritie with funds earmarked to cover losses in Otkritie's pension fund.  Most Bank received RB37.1 billion in new capital. The CBR also deposited RB 174.2 billion (USD2.78 billion) in three banks (RB63.3 billion of which went to Otkritie) on a 3-5 years termed deposit basis.

The funds will be used to reorganise banks operations and shift non-performing and high risk assets to a Trust Bank-based 'bad bank' which will operate as an asset management company.

After divesting bad loans, Otkritie is expected to be sold back to private investors.

CBR's total exposure to troubled banks is now at RB 227 billion (USD3.5 billion), with CBR having spent RB 760 billion (USD 12 billion) on its overall campaign to recapitalise troubled lenders. CBR holds RB 1.3 trillion (USD30 billion) on deposit with lenders it controls.

As BOFIT note: "...the CBR to date has used over 45 billion USD (about 3% of 2017 GDP) in supporting the three banks that it took over last year. Some of this amount, however, should be recovered when assets in banks acquired by the CBR are sold off as well as in the planned privatisations of the banks." At the beginning of June, Otkritie stated that the bank aims to float a 15-20% stake in 2021. The bank said t's target for pricing will be "at least 1.3 times the capital the bank has at the end of 2020". Otkritie targets return on equity of 18% in 2020, and so far, in the first five months of 2018, the bank made RB 5.4 billion in net profit, per CBR.

Otkritie ranked sixth largest bank in Central and Eastern Europe by capitalisation by The Banker in 2017 prior to nationalisation. Following nationalisation, Otkritie ranked 16th in CEE, having lost some USD2.4 billion in capital.

Another lender, Sovetsky bank from Saint Petersburg lost its license on July 3. The bank gas been in trouble since February 2012 when the CBR approved its first plans for restructuring. In February 2018, the bank was in a "temporary administration" through the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. The latest rumours suggest that Sovetsky deposits and loans assets will retransferred to another lender.  Sovetsky was under original administration by another lender, Tatfondbank, from March 2016, until Tatfondbank collapsed in March 2017 (official CBR statement https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/PR/?file=03032017_105120eng2017-03-03T10_47_12.htm, and see this account of criminal activity at the Tatfondbank: https://en.crimerussia.com/financialcrimes/collapse-of-tatfondbank-robert-musin-siphoned-off-funds-from-state-owned-bank/ and https://en.crimerussia.com/financialcrimes/tatfondbank-officially-collapses/). Tatfondbank's tangible connection to Ireland's IFSC was covered here: https://realnoevremya.com/articles/1292-tatfondbank-raised-60-million-via-obscure-irish-company-just-before-collapse.

Overall, CBR have done as good a job of trying to clean up Russian banking sector mess, as feasible, with criminal proceedings underway against a range of former investors and executives. The cost of the CBR-led resolution and restructuring actions has been rather hefty, but the overall outrun has been some moderate strengthening of the sector, hampered by the tough trading conditions for Russian banking sector as a whole. A range of U.S. and European sanctions against Russian financial institutions and, more importantly, constant threat of more sanctions to come have led to higher funding costs, more acute risks profiles, lack of international assets diversification, and even payments problems, all of which reduce the banking sector ability to recover low quality and non-performing assets. The CBR has zero control over these factors.

Russia currently has 6 out of top 10 banks in CEE, according to The Banker rankings:


Source: http://www.thebanker.com/Banker-Data/Banker-Rankings/Top-1000-World-Banks-Russian-banks-mixed-fortunes-influence-CEE-ranking?ct=true.

These banks are systemic to the Russian economy, and only the U.S. sabre rattling is holding them back from being systemic in the broader CEE region. This is a shame, because opening up a banking channel to Russian economy greater integration into the global financial flows is a much more important bet on the future of democratisation and normalisation in Russia than any sanctions Washington can dream up.
 


As an aside, new developments in the now infamous Danske Bank case of laundering 'blood money' from Russia, relating to the Magnitzky case were reported this week in the EUObserver: https://euobserver.com/foreign/142286.

Friday, September 29, 2017

28/9/17: Pimco on Russian Economy: My Take


An interesting post about the Russian economy, quite neatly summarising both the top-line challenges faced and the resilience exhibited to-date via Pimco: https://blog.pimco.com/en/2017/09/Russia%20Growth%20Up%20Inflation%20Down. Worth a read.

My view: couple of points are over- and under-played somewhat.

Sanctions: these are a thorny issue in Moscow and are putting pressure on Russian banks operations and strategic plans worldwide. While they do take secondary seat after other considerations in public eye, Moscow insiders are quite discomforted by the effective shutting down of the large swathes of European markets (energy and finance), and North American markets (finance, technology and personal safe havens). On the latter, it is worth noting that a number of high profile Russian figures, including in pro-Kremlin media, have in recent years been forced to shut down shell companies previously operating in the U.S. and divest out of real estate assets. Sanctions are also geopolitical thorns in terms of limiting Moscow's ability to navigate the European policy space.

Banks: this issue is overplayed. Bailouts and shutting down of banks are imposing low cost on the Russian economy and are bearable, as long as inflationary pressures remain subdued. Moscow can recapitalise the banks it wants to recapitalise, so all and any banks that do end up going to the wall, e.g. B&N and Otkrytie - cited in the post - are going to the wall for a different reason. That reason is consolidation of the banking sector in the hands of state-owned TBTF banks that fits both the Central Bank agenda and the Kremlin agenda. The CBR has been on an active campaign to clear out medium- and medium-large banks out of the way both from macroprudential point of view (these institutions have been woefully undercapitalised and exposed to serious risks on assets side), and the financial system stability point of view (majority of these banks are parts of conglomerates with inter-linked and networked systems of loans, funds transfers etc).

Yurga, another bank that was stripped of its license in late July - is the case in point, it was part of a real estate and oil empire. B&N is another example: the bank was a part of the Safmar group with $34 billion worth of assets, from oil and coal to pension funds.

The CBR knowingly tightened the screws on these types of banks back in January:

  • The new rules placed a strict limit on bank’s exposure to its own shareholders - maximum of 20% of its capital, forcing the de-centralisation of equity holdings in banking sector; and
  • Restricted loans to any single borrower or group of connected borrowers to no more than 25% of total lending.
I cannot imagine that analysts covering Russian markets did not understand back in January that these rules will spell the end of many so-called 'pocket' banks linked to oligarchs and their business empires.

The balance of the banking sector is feeling the pain, but this pain is largely contained within the sector. Investment in Russian economy, usually heavily dependent on the banks loans, has been sluggish for a number of years now, but the key catalyst to lifting investment will be VBR's monetary policy and not the state of the banking sector. 

Here is a chart from Reuters summarising movements in interbank debt levels across the top 20 banks:


The chart suggests that net borrowing is rising amongst the top-tier banks, alongside deposits gains (noted by Pimco), so the core of the system is picking up strength off the weaker banks and is providing liquidity. Per NYU's v-lab data, both Sberbank and VTB saw declines in systemic risk exposures in August, compared to July. So overall, the banking system is a problem, but the problem is largely contained within the mid-tier banks and the CBR is likely to have enough fire power to sustain more banks going through a resolution. 


Sunday, August 13, 2017

12/8/17: Some growth optimism from the Russian regional data


An interesting note on the latest data updates for the Russian economy via Bofit.

Per Bofit: "Industrial output in Russian regions rises, while consumption gradually recovers." This is important, because regional recovery has been quite spotty and overall economic recovery has been dominated by a handful of regions and bigger urban centres.

"Industrial output growth continued in the first half of this year in all of Russia’s eight federal districts," with production up 1.5–2% y/y in the Northwest, Central and Volga Federal Districts, as well as in the Moscow city and region. St. Petersburg regional output rose 3-4% y/y.

An interesting observation is that during the recent recession, there has been no contraction in manufacturing and industrial output. Per Bofit: "Over the past couple of years, neither industrial output overall nor manufacturing overall has not contracted in any of Russia’s federal districts. Industrial output has even increased briskly in 2015–16 and this year in the Southern Federal
District due to high growth in manufacturing and in the Far East Federal District driven by growth in the mineral extraction industries."

This is striking, until you consider the nature of the 2014-2016 crisis: a negative shock of collapsing oil and raw materials prices was mitigated by rapid devaluation of the ruble. This cushioned domestic production costs and shifted more demand into imports substitutes. While investment drop off was sharp and negative on demand side for industrial equipment and machinery, it was offset by cost mitigation and improved price competitiveness in the domestic and exports markets.

Another aspect of this week's report is that Russian retail sales continue to slowly inch upward. Retail sales have been lagging industrial production during the first 12 months of the recovery. This is a latent factor that still offers significant upside to future growth in the later stages of the recovery, with investment lagging behind consumer demand.

Now, "retail sales have turned to growth, albeit slowly, in six [out of eight] federal districts."


Here is why these news matter. As I noted above, the recovery in Russian economy has three phases (coincident with three key areas of potential economic activity): industrial production, consumption and investment. The first stage - the industrial production growth stage - is on-going at a moderate pace. The 0.4-0.6 percent annual growth rate contribution to GDP from industrial production and manufacturing can be sustained without a major boom in investment. The second stage - delayed due to ruble devaluation taking a bite from the household real incomes - is just starting. This can add 0.5-1 percent in annual growth, implying that second stage of recovery can see growth of around 2 percent per annum. The next stage of recovery will involve investment re-start (and this requires first and foremost Central Bank support). Investment re-start can add another 0.2-0.3 percentage points to industrial production and a whole 1 percent or so to GDP growth on its own. Which means that with a shift toward monetary accommodation and some moderate reforms and incentives, Russian economy's growth potential should be closer to 3.3 percent per annum once the third stage of recovery kicks in and assuming the other two stages continue running at sustainable capacity levels.

However, until that happens, the economy will be stuck at around the rates of growth below 2 percent.

Friday, April 28, 2017

28/4/17: Russian Economy Update, Part 4: Aggregate Investment

The following is a transcript of my recent briefing on the Russian economy. 

This part (Part 4) covers outlook  for aggregate investment over 2017-2019. Part 1 covered general growth outlook (link here), part 2 covered two sectors of interest (link here) and part 3 concerned with monetary policy and the ruble (link here).

From the point of Russian economic growth, investment has been the weakest part of the overall ex-oil price dynamics in recent years.

Rosstat most recent data suggests that the recovery in seasonally adjusted total fixed investment continued in 1Q 2017, with positive growth in the aggregate now likely for the 2Q 2017:

  • 4Q16 investment was down about 1% from 2015
  • Total investment rose from 22.12% of GDP in 2015 to 25.63% in 2016, and is expected to moderate to 22.23% in 2017, before stabilsing around 22.9% in 2018-2019
    • The investment dynamics are, therefore, still weak going forward for a major recovery to take hold
    • However, 2017-2019 investment projections imply greater rate of investment in the economy compared to 2010-2014 average
  • However, last year fixed investment was down by 11% from 2014
    • This is primarily down to Rosstat revision of figures that deepened the drop in investment in 2015
  • About a quarter of total aggregate investment in Russia comes from small firms and the grey economy
    • Rosstat data suggests that such investment was roughly unchanged in 2016 compared to 2015
  • Other fixed investments, which are mostly investments of large and mid-sized companies, shrank by about 1% in 2016
    • This compounds the steep drops recorded in the previous three years (down 10% in 2015 alone), so the level of investment last year remained below that of the 2009 recession
    • Investments of large and mid-sized companies within oil & gas production sector rose robustly in 2016
      • This marked the third consecutive year of growth in the sector
      • Much of the increases was driven by LNG sub-sector investments which is associated (at current energy prices) with lower profit margins 
      • On the positive side, investments in LNG facilities helps diversify customer base for Russian gas exporters - a much-needed move, given the tightening of the energy markets in Europe
    • In contrast to LNG sub-sector, investment in oil refining continued to shrink, sharply, in 2016 for the second year in a row, 
    • Other manufacturing investment also recorded continued sharp declines
    • The same happened in the electricity sector
    • In contrast, following two years of contraction, investment in machinery and equipment stabilised for the mid- and large-sized corporates
    • Construction sector activity was down 4% y/y in 2016, marking third consecutive year of declines
      • Exacerbating declines in 2015, commercial and industrial buildings completions fell again in 2016
      • Apartments completions also fell y/y marking the first drop in housing completions since 2010

As the chart above illustrates:

  • The forecast if for 2017-2019 improvements in investment contribution to growth, with trend forecast to be above 2010-2014 average
  • However, historically over 2000-2016 period, investment has relatively weak/zero correlation (0.054) with overall real GDP growth, while investment relative contribution to growth (instrumented via investment/growth ratio) has negative correlation with growth even when we consider only periods of positive growth
  • This implies the need for structural rebalancing of investment toward supporting longer-term growth objectives in the economy, away from extraction sectors and building & construction

Going forward:

  • Russia's industrial / manufacturing production capacity is nearing full utilisation 
  • The economy is running close to full employment
  • Leading confidence indicators of business confidence are firming up
  • Corporate deleveraging has been pronounced and continues
  • Corporate profitability has improved 
  • Nonetheless, demand for corporate credit remains weak, primarily due to high cost of credit 
    • Most recent CBR signal is for loosening of monetary policy in 2017, with current rates expected to drop to 8.25-8.5 range by the end of 2017, down from 10% at the start of the year
  • Irrespective of the levels of interest rates, however, investment demand will continue to be subdued on foot of remaining weaknesses in structural growth and lack of reforms to improve business environment and institutions

Taken together, these factors imply that the recovery in fixed investment over 2017-2019 period is likely to be very slow, with investment recovery to pre-2015 levels only toward the end of forecast period.

Thematically, there is a significant investment gap remaining across a range of sectors with strong returns potential, including:

  • Food production, processing and associated SCM;
  • Transportation and logistics
  • Industrial machinery and equipment, especially in the areas of new technologies, including robotics
  • Chemicals
  • Pharmaceuticals and health technologies


28/4/17: Russia Cuts Headline Rate by 50bps


Bigger than forecast move by the Russian Central Bank to cut rates (down 50bps against consensus - and my own - forecast of 25bps cut) signals the CBR's comfort with inflationary expectations forward.


As noted in my regular advisory call on the Russian economy earlier this week (transcript here), inflation fell substantial in 1Q 2017, with current FY 2017 forecast sitting at around 4.3 percent. In line with this, CBR started cutting rates at the end of March, moving from 10% to 9.75% for its benchmark one-week auction rate. Today, the CBR lowered the rate to 9.25%.

According to CBR: "“Inflation is moving towards the target, inflation expectations are still declining and economic activity is recovering. Given the moderately tight monetary policy, the 4 percent inflation target will be achieved before the end of 2017 and will be maintained close to this level in 2018-2019.”

Median Bloomberg estimate is for the rate to fall to 8.5% by the end of the year. As I noted in the call: "I expect ...year-end (2017) rate target of around 8.25-8.5% if inflation remains on the path toward 4.3% annual rate, or 8.75-9% range if inflation stays around 4.6% annual rate".

The latest move helps the cause of the Federal budget (championed by the Economic Ministry) that needs to see ruble lose some of its attractiveness as a carry trade currency. In recent months, ruble has been the third best performing currency in the world, resulting in investors willing to borrow in foreign currencies to invest in rubles denominated assets. The net effect of this on the Russian economy is improving demand for imports and deteriorating budget dynamics (as Russian budget operates ruble-based expenditure, funded to a large extent by dollar and other forex revenues from exports of primary materials).

Nabiulina's move today, however, should not be interpreted as the CBR surrender to the Economic Ministry agenda of lowering ruble value. Instead, the rate cut is clearly in line with inflation targeting and also in line with previously stated CBR concerns about investment environment in Russia. Russian aggregate investment has been extremely weak in recent years, and economic recovery needs to involve a dramatic reversal of investment volumes to the upside, especially in areas of technology, R&D, and product and processes innovation. High interest rates tend to significantly reduce investment by making capital expenditure more expensive to fund.

Thursday, April 27, 2017

27/4/17: Russian Economy Update, Part 3: Ruble and CBR Rates


The following is a transcript of my recent briefing on the Russian economy. 

This part (Part 3) covers outlook  for ruble and monetary policy for Russia over 2017-2019. Part 1 covered general growth outlook (link here) and part 2 covered two sectors of interest (link here).

Outlook for the ruble and CB rates

The ruble has appreciated this year about 6.6% against the US dollar, from 61.15 at the start of 2017 to just above 57.10 so far, and 3% against the euro from 64.0 to 62.06, compared to the start of 2016, ruble is up on the dollar ca 21.3% and on the euro some 22.4%

  • The ruble has been supported by the strengthening in the trade surplus in late 2016 into early 2017, and by improved foreign investment inflows
  • The ruble has been on an upward trend after hitting the bottom at the start of 2016
  • However, rate of appreciation has fallen in recent months, while volatility has risen
  • March real effective (trade-weighted) exchange rate (RER) was up nearly 30% y/y, as reported by BOFIT (see chart below)
  • As noted by some researchers (e.g. BOFIT), “in Russia, exchange rate shifts tend to pass through relatively quickly and strongly to consumer prices, so ruble strengthening tends to curb inflation” which, in turn, increases private and fiscal purchasing power
  • Another effect of the ruble appreciation is that it lowers government ruble-denominated tax revenue through direct link between energy exporting taxes (oil and gas) and oil prices, which are denominated in dollars 


For domestic businesses, a stronger ruble:

  • Reduces their price competitiveness with respect to imports, but also 
  • Lowers the cost of imported capital, technology and intermediates
    • Majority of Russian manufacturers are relatively highly dependent on such imports and have very limited non-ruble exports


  • Stronger ruble has very limited effect on the volume of Russian exports, primarily due to heavy bias in exports in favour of dollar-denominated energy and other primary materials
  • Ruble appreciation reduces the costs of foreign debt service for firms (a positive for larger firms and banks) and can lead, over time, to lower borrowing costs within Russian credit markets (a positive for all firms)


In line with the export-import effects discussed above:

  • Volume of Russian exports grew by over 2 % last year (primarily driven by oil and gas prices recovery and continued elevated volumes of Russian production of primary materials), plus by another (second consecutive) year of grain harvests 
    • In 2017, export growth should slow as both harvest and energy prices effects dissipate
    • Volume of exports of goods and services fell 1.87% in 2014, 0.41% in 2015 and 0.68% in 2016. Current forecasts suggest that the volume of exports will rise 4.5-4.6% in 2017
  • Volume of imports was much harder hit by the crisis
    • Volume of imports of goods and services fell 7.6% in 2014, followed by 25.0 drop in 2015 and 4.0% decline in 2016
    • Current forecasts suggest strong, but only partial recovery in demand for imports, with volumes expected to rise 7.0-7.2% in 2017
    • Key driver for imports growth will be the recovery in aggregate demand, plus appreciation of the ruble
    • Key downward pressure on imports will continue to come (as in 2016) from trade sanctions and from ongoing reforms of public and SOEs procurement rules and systems (more on this later)
  • Russia’s current account surplus contracted last year to less than 2% of GDP, printing at USD 22.2 billion, down from USD69 billion in 2015
    • 2017 projections of the current account surplus range widely, although no analyst / forecaster projects a negative print, despite expected increase in imports
    • IMF’s most current (April 2017) projection is for 2017 CA surplus of USD51.5 billion
    • This level of CA surpluses would stand above the 2014-2016 average (USD 49.6 billion), but below 2010-2013 average (USD67.4 billion) and lower than 2000-2007 average (USD 55.7 billion)
    • If IMF projection comes through, CA surplus will be supportive of significantly tighter fiscal deficit than currently projected by Moscow
    • As a percentage of GDP, CA surplus is expected to come in at 3.30% in 2017, slightly above 2014-2016 average of 3.19% and slightly below the 2010-2013 average of 3.42% of GDP


Inflation


  • With Russian inflation falling and current account surplus strengthening, 2017 will witness further pressures on the ruble to appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar and the euro
  • Russia’s annual inflation fell below 5% in 1Q 2017
  • The CB of Russia has kept a relatively tight monetary stance, holding the key rate at nearly 10% through most of 1Q, as consistent with the CBR strict targeting of the inflation rate (4% inflation target set by the end of 2017)
    • CBR dropped rate to 9.75% at the end of March, noting a faster-than-expected drop in inflation and a slight decline in inflation expectations 
  • Inflation fell from 4.6% in February to 4.5% in March and 4.1% as of mid-April
    • 12-month forecast now at 4.3%
    • CBR governor Nabiullina said the central bank does not share the finance ministry's view of a overvalued ruble, which is consistent with her projecting continued cautious stance on inflation
    • Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, recently stated that the ruble is overvalued by 10–12%
    • Consistent with this, I expect a 25 bps cut at April 28th meeting of CBR Council and year-end (2017) rate target of around 8.25-8.5% if inflation remains on the path toward 4.3% annual rate, or 8.75-9% range if inflation stays around 4.6% annual rate


Friday, April 22, 2016

22/4/16: Russian Economy: Renewed Signs of Pressure

Earlier this week, I posted my latest comprehensive deck covering Russian economy prospects for 2016-2017 (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/04/20416-russian-deck-update-april-2016.html). Key conclusion from that data was that Russian economy is desperately searching for a domestic growth catalyst and not finding one to-date.

Today, we have some new data out showing there has been significant deterioration in the underlying economic conditions in the Russian economy and confirming my key thesis.

As reported by BOFIT, based on Russian data, “Russian economy has shrunk considerably from
early 2015. Seasonally adjusted figures show a substantial recovery in industrial output in the first three months of this year. Extractive industries, particularly oil production, drove that growth with production in the extractive sector rising nearly 3.5 % y-o-y. Seasonally adjusted manufacturing output remained rather flat in the first quarter with output down more than 3 % y-o-y.”

As the result, “the economy ministry estimates GDP declined slightly less than 2% y-o-y in 1Q16. Adjusting for the February 29 “leap day,” the fall was closer to 2.5%.”

Meanwhile, domestic demand remained under pressure. Seasonally adjusted volume of retail sales fell 5.5% y/y and is now down 12% on same period in 2014. “Real household incomes contracted nearly 4% y-o-y. Driven by private sector wage hikes, nominal wages rose 6 % y-o-y, just a couple of percentage points less than the pace of 12-month inflation.”

A handy chart:


Oil and gas production, however, continued to boom:



What’s happening? “Russian crude oil output was up in January-March by 4.5% y-o-y to record levels. Under Russia’s interpretation of the proposed production freeze to January levels, it could increase oil output this year by 1.5‒2%. The energy ministry just recently estimated that growth of output this year would only reach 0.5‒1%, which is quite in line with the latest estimate of the International Energy Agency (IEA). However, Russia’s energy ministry expects Russian oil exports to increase 4‒6% this year as domestic oil consumption falls.”

It is worth noting that the signals of a renewed pressure on economic growth side have been present in advanced data for some time now.

Two charts below show Russian (and other BRIC) Manufacturing and Services PMIs:




Both indicate effectively no recovery in the two sectors in 1Q 2016. While Services PMI ended 1Q 2016 with a quarterly average reading of 50.0 (zero growth), marking second consecutive quarter of zero-to-negative growth in the sector, Manufacturing PMI posted average reading of 49.1, below the 50.0 zero growth line and below already contractionary 49.7 reading for 4Q 2015.

Russia’s composite quarterly reading is at 49.9 for 1Q 2016 an improvement on 4Q 2015 reading of 49.1, but still not above 50.0.

In simple terms, the problem remains even though its acuteness might have abated somewhat.

Sunday, January 10, 2016

10/1/16: Russian Banks: Licenses Cancellations Galore


Why Russian Central Bank’s chief Elvira Nabiullina deserves title of the best central banker she got in 2015? Why, because she sticks to her stated objectives and goes on even in challenging conditions.

When Nabiullina came to office, Russian banking system was besieged by underperforming and weak banks - mostly at the bottom of banking sector rankings, but with some at the very top too (see ongoing VEB saga here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2016/01/1116-another-veb-update-things-are.html). And she promised a thorough clean up of the sector. I wrote about that before (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/22122014-elvira-nabiullina-roubles-last.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/1432013-comment-of-appointment-of-new.html).

But times have been tough for such reforms, amidst credit tightening, rising arrears and economic crisis. Again, majority of the problems are within the lower tier banks, but numbers of loss-making institutions has been climbing over 2015. January-November 2015 data shows that almost 30% of Russian banks are running operating losses and overdue loans have risen by nearly 50% to RUB2.63 trillion. Still, this constitutes less than 7 percent of total credit outstanding. Stressed (but not necessarily overdue) loans rose from 7 percent of total credit in January 2015 to 8 percent at the end of December 2015. Notably, both stressed and overdue loans numbers are surprisingly low. And on another positive side, bank’s own capital to assets ratio averaged 13 percent. The aggregate numbers conceal quite some variation within the banking sector, as noted by Bofit: “At the beginning of November, 129 banks had equity ratios below 12%. Large deficiencies in calculating the capital have come to light in several bank insolvencies.”

Amidst this toughening of trading conditions, CBR continued to push our weaker banks from the market. Over 2015, 93 banks lost their licenses, almost the same number as in 18 months prior with just 740 banks left trading the market as of December 2015. As the result, banking sector concentration rose, with 20 largest banks now holding 75 percent share of the market by assets. In January-October 2015, some 600,000 depositors in Russian banks were moved from banks losing licenses to functioning banks, per report here.

Chart from Bofit illustrates the trends in terms of banking licenses revoked:


Overall, this is good news. Russian banking system evolved - prior to 2009 - into a trilateral system of banks, including strong larger (universal) banks, medium-sized specialist and foreign banks with retail exposures, weak and sizeable fringe of smaller institutions, often linked to industrial holding companies. Aside from VEB - which officially is not a bank - larger banks are operating in tough conditions, but remain relatively robust. Smaller banks, however, having relied in previous years on higher risk consumer credit and holding, often, lower quality capital, have been impacted by the crisis and by the lack of liquidity. Shutting these operations down and consolidating the smaller banks' fringe is something that Russian needs anyway. 

Saturday, December 5, 2015

5/12/15: Ruble converging to Urals... at last


After some strengthening in the second half of November, Russian Ruble continues to re-align with oil prices:

With current levels of Urals-Brent spread, Ruble has room to the downside still, at about 2-3 percent, taking it into 69.8-69.9 range. Which means the CBR has some room for raising foreign exchange reserves, but not much room...

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

28/10/15: Russian Economy Update: Consumption and Debt


Updating Russian stats: September consumption and deleveraging: bigger clouds, brighter silver lining. 

In basic terms, as reported by BOFIT, per Rosstat, Russian seasonally-adjusted retail sales (by volume) fell more than 10% y/y in September, with non-food sales driving the figure deeper into the red. On the ‘upside’, services sales to households fell less than overall retail sales. This accelerates the rate of decline in household consumption expenditure - over 1H 2015, expenditure fell just under 9% y/y. Small silver lining to this cloud is that household debt continued to decline as Russian households withdrew from the credit markets and focused on increased savings (most likely precautionary savings).

Russian households are not the only ones that are saving. Overall external debt of the Russian Federation fell, again, in 3Q 2015, with preliminary data from the Central Bank of Russia figures putting total foreign debt at USD522bn as of end-September, down just over USD30bn compared to 2Q 2015. Per official estimates, ca 50 percent of the overall reduction q/q in external debt came from repayment of credit due, while the other 50 percent was down to devaluation of the ruble (ca 20 percent of Russian external debt was issued in Rubles).

Overall, 3Q 2015 saw some USD40 billion of external debt maturing, which means that over 1/4 of that debt was rolled over by the non-bank corporations. Per CBR estimates, ca 40% of the external debt owed by the Russian non-bank corporations relates to intragroup loans - basically debt owed across subsidiaries of the same percent entity. And over recent quarters, this type of debt has been increasing as the proportion of total debt, most likely reflecting two sub-trends:
1) increasing refinancing of inter-group loans using intra-group funds; and
2) increasing conversion of intra-group investments/equity into intragroup debt (and/or some conversion of FDI equity into intra-group debt).

Over the next 12 months (from the start of 4Q 2015), Russian foreign debt maturity profile covers USD87 billion in maturing obligations against country currency reserves of USD370 billion-odd. As noted by BOFIT, “A common rule-of-thumb suggests that a country’s reserves need to be sufficient to cover at least 100% of its short-term foreign debt to avoid liquidity problems.” Russia’s current cover is closer to 430%. And that is absent further ruble devaluations.

A chart via BOFIT:

Saturday, August 15, 2015

15/8/15: Russian External Debt: Big Deleveraging, Smaller Future Pressures


Readers of this blog would have noted that in the past I referenced Russian companies cross-holdings of own debt in adjusting some of the external debt statistics for Russia. As I explained before, large share of the external debt owed by banks and companies is loans and other debt instruments issued by their parents and subsidiaries and direct equity investors - in other words, it is debt that can be easily rolled over or cross-cancelled within the company accounts.

This week, Central Bank of Russia did the same when it produced new estimate for external debt maturing in September-December 2015. The CBR excluded “intra-group operations” and the new estimate is based on past debt-servicing trends and a survey of 30 largest companies.

As the result of revisions, CBR now estimates that external debt coming due for Russian banks and non-financial corporations will be around USD35 billion, down on previously estimated USD61 billion.

CBR also estimated cash and liquid foreign assets holdings of Russian banks and non-bank corporations at USD135 billion on top of USD20 billion current account surplus due (assuming oil at USD40 pb) and USD14 billion of CBR own funds available for forex repo lending.

Here are the most recent charts for Russian external debt maturity, excluding most recent update for corporate and banks debt:



As the above table shows, in 12 months through June 2015, Russian Total External Debt fell 24%, down USD176.6 billion - much of it due to devaluation of the ruble and repayments of maturing debt. Of this, Government debt is down USD22.1 billion or 39% - a huge drop. Banks managed to deleverage out of USD59.9 billion in 12 months through June 2015 (down 29%) and Other Sectors external liabilities were down USD88.8 billion (-20%).

These are absolutely massive figures indicating:
1) One of the underlying causes of the ongoing economic recession (contracting credit supply and debt repayments drag on investment and consumer credit);
2) Strengthening of corporate and banks' balance sheets; and
3) Overall longer term improvement in Russian debt exposures.


Tuesday, August 11, 2015

11/8/15: Russian 2Q growth: beating forecasts on the wrong side


With apologies for a slight delay (I am actually away from work these weeks), here is a quick update on Russian 2Q 2015 GDP figures.

Those who read my musings on the Russian economy would recall that in recent months we have been seeing some signs of stabilisation in the economy performance, albeit I have been reluctant to call these signs a full turnaround as data required robustness confirmation and broadening of any improvements.

Good thing I stayed more cautious on the matter of calling a recovery. In 1Q 2015, Russian economy shrunk 2.2% y/y, surprising on the positive side the consensus expectation of a 3.7% drop. However, this time around, 2Q 2015 preliminary estimate for real GDP growth came in at 4.6%, worse than consensus forecast for 4.5%.

Now, 0.1 percentage points on expectation is not quite ugly, but -4.6% is ugly. Thus, in itself, the 2Q 2015 figure does not quite put under sever pressure the expected 3.4-3.6% annual contraction for 2015 as a whole, but it does put question marks around the thesis of Russian economy's recovery.

The contraction in 2Q takes us into July-August when oil prices have fallen even further and ruble devaluation pressures returned - both making it hard for the CBR to cut rates to support economy.

Noticeably, acceleration in the decline can be seen in q/q seasonally-adjusted figures. These are yet to be released, but Capital Economics shows estimates of 2.5% q/q decline in real GDP on seasonally adjusted basis, nearly double the rate of contraction (1.3% q/q) recorded in 1Q 2015.

The charts below show just how ugly 2Q 2015 figures are on a historical perspective:

 and over the shorter horizon:

Source: both: Capital Economics

As noted by Barclays, much of the deterioration in growth in 2Q was down to oil prices

 Source: @Schuldensuehner

Although in terms of pressures on growth, consumption component of the Domestic demand remains weak.
Source: @Schuldensuehner

The CBR policy rates are clearly weighing on the consumption and investment ability to rebound, with high policy rate (11%) compounding already tight funding markets for the banks, resulting in very high cost of credit.

We have no details on the GDP figure breakdown, yet, but Capital Economics suggested that based on 2Q headline figure, household expenditure fell at a rate similar to 1Q 2015 (-8.9%). Which implies that it was industrial production that drove growth figures further down in 2Q 2015.

The latter point is consistent with the evidence from Manufacturing PMIs in recent months:


So what's the top level conclusion from all of this? 2Q was ugly. Signs of stabilisation in the economy are still present, but robustness of these signals is now more under question than a week ago. In simple terms, we will need to see Q3 data posting closer to 0% change in GDP and beating 1Q 2015 reading, if we are to confirm expectation for growth recovery in 4Q 2015 - 1Q 2016. 

Monday, June 15, 2015

15/6/15: CBR Cuts Rates to 11.5% in Hope of Lifting Sagging Investment


Central Bank of Russia cut policy rate to 11.5% today from 12.5%, undershooting markets expectation for a 150bps cut to 11.0%. The move was expected and relatively modest cut this time around suggests more heavy cuts in 2H 2015. In part, this reflects relatively sharp decline in growth in April: having contracted modest 1.9% in 1Q 2015, Russian GDP fell at an annual rate of 4.2% in April. Another incentive for CBR to lower rates is the Ruble, which posted surprising comeback in early 2015, putting new pressure on the federal budget. CBR bough USD3.6 billion in May, in an attempt to keep Ruble lower.

Rate cut is a welcome move, but in current environment it also shows just how little room for manoeuvre the monetary policy has. Russian banks are deleveraging. Loans outstanding in the corporate and household sectors have fallen in 1Q 2015. The trend continued in April: SME loans share of total corporate loans fell from 22% in April 2014 to 18% in April 2015. In January-April 2015, corporate lending outstanding was up nominally 17% in ruble terms compared to the same period 2014. Inflation run at around 15.8%, which means that in real terms, corporate loans remained basically flat. Household loans grew by 4% y/y in ruble terms. Which means in real term, level of outstanding loans to households fell. As usual, roughly 1/3 of all corporate loans were denominated in foreign currency.

The rate cut will also help with non-performing loans. Stock of NPLs in the corporate sector rose by roughly 30% y/y in the first four months of 2015 to 6% of the total stock of corporate loans. Household credit NPLs stood at 7%. Both rates of NPLs are relatively benign, by Western standards, but the growth rate in NPLs is worrying. Lower cost of carrying these loans will help alleviate some of the pressures.

Overall, Russian investment remains a major bottleneck for the economy. Chart below shows Russian Investment as percentage of GDP, compared to both the Emerging Asia economies and Emerging Europe economies. This clearly highlights the dire state of Russian investment over 2000-2013, and a significant decline in investment from 2014 on, including the IMF forecasts for 2015-2020 period.